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INTRODUCTION 
 
Oui, je suis présent. Et ce qui me frappe à ce moment que je ne peux aller plus loin. 1 
Albert Camus, “Le Vent à Djémila” 
 
 The literary relationship of William Faulkner and Albert Camus, though a bit recherché, is 
one of intrigue and geographic transcendence.  Their relationship, however, was certainly an odd 
one, that is, if we can even call it a relationship.  We might, in fact, call their connection a story 
of unrequited love—of unrequited literary love.  Or perhaps “unrequited” is a bit too strong.  
Indeed, their fondness was mutual though slightly unbalanced: Camus publicly praised the 
American2, yet Faulkner never publicly made any statements regarding Camus until after his 
death in 1960.  Over the years, few have recognized and noted their correspondence, probably 
since their communication was often indirect and brief.  They only met once, though one could 
easily mistake them as lifelong acquaintances.  Their knowledge of each other’s literary lives and 
works was uncanny, especially in light of the fact that their direct communication was extremely 
sparse.  They not only knew about one another but also understood each other’s works and 
endeavors, given that they both seemed to live in worlds that equally disgusted and confused 
them—worlds which simultaneously rejected them and shoved them into isolation.   
I initially noticed their literary ties when I came across Albert Camus’s theatrical 
adaptation3 of William Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun (1951), the sequel to the controversial 
novel Sanctuary (1931).  At first, I was stunned, for never before would I have imagined that 
these two men, separated by an ocean and thousands of miles, possessed an explicit link, a 
                                                
1 “Yes, I am present.  And what strikes me in this moment is that I can go no further.”  Henceforth, all translations in 
this study are my own unless otherwise noted or cited from a popular source. 
2 In September 20,1956, Les Nouvelles Littéraires published an interview with Camus before the premiere of 
Requiem pour une Nonne, calling Faulkner “le plus grand écrivain contemporain” (the greatest contemporary writer) 
(Cézan 10).  
3 Requiem pour une Nonne, first presented on September 20, 1956. 
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literary bridge that traversed and transcended their geographic and cultural divisions.  Little did I 
know as I started my comparative research that eventually I would stumble upon one of the 
richest and most unique literary relationships of the twentieth century.  And as my research 
progressed and their literary connections continued to surface, I became perplexed by how little 
scholarly research has hitherto considered this comparative topic.  Of course, everyone knows of 
the famous Faulkner-Hemingway and Camus-Sartre relationships (or rivalries), but to many a 
Faulkner-Camus relationship might seem rather forced, affected, or specious.  Superficially, we 
immediately note only two commonalities: (1) both Faulkner and Camus won the Nobel Prize in 
Literature4 and (2) as I already mentioned, Camus theatrically adapted Faulkner’s Requiem for a 
Nun.  But, obviously, Nobel laureateship does not warrant any immediate comparison, and both 
authors’ Requiems only tender a comparison insofar as juxtaposing the original with the 
adaptation.  Furthermore, this relationship becomes even more peculiar as we consider both 
authors’ milieux.  Faulkner was a white Mississippian; Camus, a pied noir with a mother of 
Spanish descent.  Faulkner was a dropout at the University of Mississippi; Camus earned his 
diplôme d'études supérieures (roughly equivalent to a Master of Philosophy) from the University 
of Algiers.  The descendant of a military ancestry, Faulkner desperately tried to join the United 
States Army and the British Royal Air Force; as quondam communist-turned-socialist and 
tireless pacifist, Camus believed that the French, pieds noirs, and Arab natives in Algeria could 
live together peacefully, without colonial oppression or violent revolution.  Still, in spite of all 
these immediate disconnections and disparities, this study will broadly focus on how we might 
unlatch the limited understanding of the Faulkner-Camus relationship by exploring how and 
where their correspondence and literary congruity resounds across and between their oeuvres.      
                                                
4 Interestingly enough, Camus was, in fact, a Nobel candidate during the same 1949 selection cycle that Faulkner 
eventually won ("Nomination Database: Literature"). 
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In short, this study endeavors to expand yet condense the Faulknerian-Camusian 
relationship according to two principal subjects: time and tragedy.  Later in this introduction, I 
will adumbrate why and how we can initially connect both Faulkner’s and Camus’s canons 
according to these vague topics.  First, however, I would like to delineate the general arguments 
and trajectory of this study.  Broadly, this study contends that both Faulkner and Camus present 
time and the experience of time as a human tragedy relative to the motif of sterility that pervades 
both their canons.  Thus, this study intends several objectives: (1) to establish how time, 
according to both Faulkner and Camus, is tragic; (2) to examine how sterility is relevant to time; 
(3) to delineate how and where sterility presents itself in both authors’ works; (4) to demonstrate 
the temporal implications and ramifications of sterility as depicted by both authors; and (5) to 
elucidate how Faulkner and Camus exhibit the temporality of sterility as gravid with tragedy.  I 
then organize this study into three chapters that accentuate different “types” of sterility or topics 
wherein sterility becomes crucial.  The first chapter will examine the temporal implications of 
infanticide and the Child according to the nuclear family, reproduction and genealogy, futurism 
and the future of humanity.  This chapter will consider infanticide in Faulkner’s Requiem for a 
Nun and Camus’s Le Malentendu (1944) as symbolic of the destruction of the nuclear family as 
well as the political and philosophical ramifications of infanticide broached in Camus’s Les 
Justes (1951).  Building on the issues of the Child, reproduction, and the family, the second 
chapter will consider the differences between feminine and masculine modalities of time and the 
friction between these modalities that arises within the topics of masculine supremacy and 
hetero-(masculine)-normativity; castration, emasculation, and impotence; sexism, misogyny, and 
gynocide.  This chapter examines the feminine temporalities of Temple Drake from Faulkner’s 
Sanctuary and Janine from Camus’s “La Femme Adultère” (1957) and how both women’s 
 5 
experience of time changes as they suffer the abuses of an overbearing, castration-fearing 
masculine order.  Nevertheless, this chapter will also explore the castrated/emasculated/de-
masculinized temporalities of Quentin and Jason Compson in Faulkner’s The Sound and the 
Fury (1929).  Finally, the third chapter will then focus on the presence of a queer temporality as 
distinct from and opposed to the heteronormative temporal modalities within the conventions and 
issues surrounding procreation, childrearing, and the nuclear family.  This chapter will then 
reconsider Quentin Compson as a queer character and his experience of time as indicative of a 
queer temporal modality as I analyze his “perverted”5 love of death and the metonymic 
displacement of desire that defines his concealed passion for his roommate, Shreve6.  I will then 
end this chapter and my study with an examination of Camus’s Caligula as a queer character 
with a distinctly queer time relative to the issues of repressed sexual desires, the pressures of 
heteronormative sexual and social conventions, performativity, and the death drive.  Ultimately, I 
argue that the effects of Faulkner’s and Camus’s representations of time via sterility induce an 
irresolvable confusion of and within time that eventually paralyzes these characters in a hopeless 
present, devoid of futurity, trapped within a perpetual yet irredeemable past.   
In one of the first essays comparing Faulkner and Camus, John Philip Couch7 points out 
that the Faulkner-Camus comparison reveals much by way of understanding modern tragedy, for 
both of their literary careers can be defined by the desire to “communicate the qualities of tragic 
seriousness,” the hunt for the best language to convey and manifest tragedy (122).  Couch’s 
                                                
5 Faulkner’s word choice in the Appendix to The Sound and the Fury (208). 
6 As I reconsider Quentin’s experience of time as queer, I must note that this reconsideration is not directly 
connected with my analysis of Quentin’s time as castrated, nor should we attempt to draw any connections between 
the two analyses.  When I first analyze Quentin’s time, I am solely considering his character as 
heterosexual/normative.  When I return to Quentin in the final chapter, I attempt to reanalyze him as a queer 
character, looking at examples that distinctly indicate his potential queerness and how his queerness affects his 
temporal reality.  As such, though one might be compelled to make this connection, the castration of a hetero-
masculine Quentin’s time is not commensurate with the queer temporality of a queer Quentin. 
7 “Camus and Faulkner: The Search for the Language of Modern Tragedy” (1960) 
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essay is unique owing to the fact that it scrupulously compares both authors’ Requiems according 
to their tragic potency,  though he ultimately decries both works as failures (125).  Nevertheless, 
while loosely using “modern” in his article’s title and throughout his essay, Couch never 
definitively reveals what makes the modern tragedy “modern” relative to the history of tragedy.  
While his study analyzes the modernity of the Requiems, his conclusion seems indecisively 
based on whether Camus’s play is a good adaptation, not whether it is a good tragedy, though his 
article would have us believe that the play is equally a failed tragedy because it is a failed 
adaptation.  The obvious disconnect between adaptation and tragedy notwithstanding, I must 
question according to what historical “definition” of tragedy is Couch evaluating both Requiems 
since to denote these works as modern tragedies would seem to indicate diachronic differences 
within the politics of the tragedy.  More importantly, what is the modern tragedy?  In reviewing 
Faulkner’s Requiem in the program to his adaptation, Camus writes a brief prière d’insérer, or 
blurb, concerning Faulkner and tragedy and equally reveals his own thoughts about the modern 
tragedy:  
Le Requiem est ainsi, selon moi, une des rares tragédies modernes. . . . D’abord parce 
 qu’un secret y est progressivement révélé et que l’attente tragique y est constamment 
 entretenue. Ensuite parce que le conflit qui oppose les personnages à leur destin, autour 
 du meurtre d’un enfant, est un conflit qui ne peut se résoudre sinon dans l’acception de ce 
 destin lui-même.  Faulkner contribue ici à faire avancer le temps où la tragédie à l’œuvre 
 dans notre histoire pourra s’installer aussi sur nos scènes.  Ses personnages sont 
 aujourd’hui et ils sont affrontés pourtant au même destin qui écrasait Électre ou Oreste.  
 Seul un grand artiste pouvait tenter ainsi d’introduire dans nos appartements le grand 
 langage de la douleur et de l’humiliation. . . . Ajoutons pour finir que le grand problème 
 de la tragédie moderne est un problème de langage.  Des personnages en veston ne 
 peuvent parler comme Œdipe ou Titus.  Leur langage doit être en même temps assez 
 simple pour être le nôtre et assez grand pour atteindre au tragique.  Faulkner a trouvé, 
 selon moi, ce langage.  Mon effort a été de le restituer en français et de ne pas trahir 
 l’œuvre et l’auteur que j’admirais.8 (Théâtre, Récits, Nouvelles 1865-6)  
                                                
8 “Requiem is thus, in my opinion, one of the rare modern tragedies . . . . First, because it gradually reveals a secret 
and constantly maintains the expectation of tragedy.  Second, because the conflict that confronts the characters with 
their destiny, centered on the murder of an infant, is a conflict that cannot be resolved except through the acceptance 
of this destiny.  Here, Faulkner furthers the time when the tragedy at work in our history can also take its place on 
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Not only does Camus laud Faulkner’s artistic abilities but he also helps us define the modern 
tragedy, particularly the language of the modern tragedy, which must be quotidian yet equally 
forceful and eloquent.  For Couch, Camus’s ultimate failure is his language; the racial tension 
found within the various Southern dialects of Faulkner’s Requiem is lost in translation (125).  
Though the Southern-American dialects are certainly lost within the general fluency of Camus’s 
French, the racial tension remains relevant, for the enmity between Nancy and Temple, servant 
and master, is still vividly forceful.  And, as Philippe Forest discusses throughout his book9, the 
tragedy in both Requiems is maintained by the infanticide and the fact that we will never truly 
understand why Nancy murders Temple’s child.  Additionally, paying some attention to the 
aggregate of the Camusian theatre, E. Freeman notes that the modern tragedy of Camus’s 
dramaturgy arises from the tension between human action and moral limits and the justification 
of exceeding these limits10.  In Camus’s works, one such limit that is often crossed is the killing 
of children; hence, infanticide becomes an archetype of the Camusian tragedy.  Still, as I read 
Couch’s and Forest’s studies, I wonder if the tragedian commonalities between Faulkner and 
Camus extend outside the pages of Requiem.  If Couch is just in noting that both authors were 
comparably “searching” for the language of modern tragedy, might we surmise that this search 
was not fixed definitively within the years they were writing their respective Requiems? 
 I ask this question because, ultimately, this study endeavors to enlarge the Faulkner-
Camus comparison.  I also state this question rhetorically, for, as my research progressed, I 
                                                                                                                                                       
our stage.  His characters are up-to-date, yet they still brave the same destiny that crushed Electra and Orestes.  Only 
a great artist could attempt to introduce the grand language of pain and humiliation into our homes. . . . To finish, let 
me add that the great problem of modern tragedy is a problem of language.  Characters in business suits cannot 
speak like Oedipus or Titus.  At the same time their language must be simple enough to be ours and elaborate 
enough to reach tragic.  I believe Faulkner found this language.  My effort was to reconstruct it in French while 
betraying neither the work nor the author that I admire.” 
9 Le Roman Infanticide: Dostoïevski, Faulkner, Camus (2010) 
10 “Camus's Les Justes: Modern Tragedy or Old-Fashioned Melodrama?” (1970) 
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eventually realized that Faulkner and Camus appeared to have been extensively familiar with 
each other’s works, which suggests the promise of a mutual influence.  Along with their 
mutually canonical familiarity, the miniscule amount of writings that we have from both writers 
concerning the other, in fact, demonstrates more than familiarity but understanding and empathy, 
as if they had closely known each other for years.  We know that Camus deeply admired 
Faulkner.  We also know that throughout his literary career, Camus noted having read many of 
Faulkner’s novels, such as Sartoris (1929), The Sound and the Fury, As I Lay Dying (1930), and 
Light in August (1932) as well as asserting his fondness for and the influences of Sanctuary, 
Pylon (1935), and A Fable (1954) (Prioult 7; Guérin 319).  Yet, Faulkner’s familiarity and 
admiration are more difficult to pinpoint.  Faulkner never enthused over Camus’s works nor did 
he explicitly list those works he may have read.  We do know that following Camus’s 1957 
Nobel Prize acceptance, Faulkner sent him a congratulatory telegram reading, “On salue l’âme 
qui constamment se cherche et s’interroge”11 (“L’âme qui s’interroge” 537-8).  In Faulkner, 
Mississippi (1996), Édouard Glissant recounts a visit to Rowan Oak, Faulkner’s home in Oxford, 
Mississippi, and, while exploring Faulkner’s study and library, Glissant chronicles having 
examined an inscription written “in a book by Albert Camus” (Glissant 15).  But what did this 
inscription say?  And in what book was this inscription found?  Glissant, unfortunately, does not 
reveal anything else about this singular moment, but his recollection does reveal that Faulkner 
owned and read at least one of Camus’s books.  Again, in Faulkner’s encomium of Camus, he 
writes, “[Camus] disait: ‘Je n’aime pas croire que la mort ouvre sur une autre vie.  Pour moi, 
                                                
11 “I praise the soul that constantly searches for reason and questions its own existence.”  Faulkner made this quote 
public in the eulogistic article “L’âme qui s’interroge" for Nouvelle Revue Française’s March 1960 publication in 
memoriam Camus.  Faulkner’s English translation of the same article was published a year later in the Transatlantic 
Review’s Spring 1961 issue (“Albert Camus” 113-4). 
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c’est une porte qui se ferme’”12 (L’âme qui s’interroge” 537).  Though quoted incorrectly,13 
Faulkner is referencing a passage from Camus’s essay “Le Vent à Djémila,” originally published 
in the collection of essays titled Noces (1938).  And as we read the rest of Faulkner’s article, we 
recognize his general knowledgeability of Camusian absurdism, which evinces that he might also 
have been familiar with the essays L’Envers et l’Endroit (1937), Le Mythe de Sisyphe (1942), 
and L’Homme Révolté (1951).  Finally, perhaps one of the most personal, intriguing, and 
mysterious quotes between these two men is a very brief comment Faulkner writes about himself 
and Camus: “We share the same anguish” (qtd. in Glissant 64).  What anguish was Faulkner 
talking about?  What exactly did Faulkner see in Camus that he also saw in himself?  Though 
Faulkner provides no explanation, we recognize that his comment is less a suggestion of 
similarity and more a declaration of spiritual understanding and homage to Camus as both a 
writer-philosopher with a canon imbued with woe and self-sacrifice and as a human who felt 
exiled within his own motherland and struggled to find meaning and clarity within the Absurd.   
 With the personal connections between these two writers beaming in many fascinating 
and mysterious directions, hopefully we can see why the limited quantity of research topics and 
critical sources that compare Faulkner and Camus is a shocking misfortune.  Like Couch and 
Forest, most research heretofore almost exclusively compares Faulkner and Camus according to 
Requiem14.  The most extensive analysis of both authors seems to be Christaine Prioult’s book, 
William Faulkner et Albert Camus: Une Rencontre, une Communauté Spirituelle15 (2007).  
Prioult’s book is noteworthy as it seeks a canonical comparison according to a myriad of topics, 
                                                
12 “[Camus] said: ‘I do not like to believe that death opens onto another life.  For me, it is a door that closes itself.’” 
13 The real quote reads, “Il ne me plaît de croire que la mort ouvre sur une autre vie.  Elle est pour moi une porte 
fermée” (“It does not please me to think that death opens onto another life.  It is, for me, a closed door”) (“Le Vent à 
Djémila” 27). 
14 Blair, John G., “Camus’s Faulkner: Requiem for a Nun” (1969); Izard, Barbara, Requiem for a Nun: On Stage and 
Off (1970); Wilson, Paule A., “Faulkner and Camus: Requiem for a Nun” (1979); Collington, Tara, “‘Une des rares 
tragédies modernes’: L'Adaptation camusienne de Requiem pour une Nonne de Faulkner” (2007) 
15 William Faulkner and Albert Camus: An Encounter, a Spiritual Commonwealth 
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including: (1) the influences of Dostoevsky, (2) Faulkner’s and Camus’s commonalities with 
Hemingway and Melville, (3) Faulkner’s influence on L’Étranger, (4) a comparison of Requiem 
for a Nun and La Chute (1956), and (5) the stylistic similarities to Faulkner found in Camus’s La 
Peste (1947) and L’Exil et le Royaume (1957).  While Prioult’s book is impressive, overall, her 
exegesis concentrates more on Camus’s works and his obvious Faulknerian inspiration rather 
than exploring how their mutual anguish and empathy lead them both to comparably pursue, 
illustrate, and analyze specific literary and humanitarian themes within their oeuvres.  
Nevertheless, Prioult’s study does focus one chapter on a more proportionate yet less obvious 
commonality within the Faulknerian and Camusian canons: the issue of time.  For the most part, 
Prioult’s chapter represents a compilation of the past eighty years worth of research concerning 
temporality in both author’s canons; though, she still accredits Faulkner with inspiring and 
influencing the temporal structures of Camus’s fictions and, therefore, focuses slightly more on 
Faulknerian metaphysics.  Still, Prioult’s work is noteworthy for initiating this comparative 
discourse on temporality. 
Influenced by the studies of Couch, Forest, and Prioult and in light of the relationship 
between Faulkner and Camus, I reach one of my preliminary questions: How might time and 
tragedy operate conjointly within Faulkner’s and Camus’s canons, especially since both topics 
pervade their fictions?  Though this study does not seek to exhaustively explore this question, I 
do wish to pinpoint a specific commonality that appears canonically prevalent and connective.  
As I mentioned earlier, this commonality is the motif of sterility.  However, this question 
presupposes that Faulkner and Camus present time in a similar manner or, at least, that both 
writers have a comparable conception of time.  Indeed, in a general sense, we might initially 
proclaim that both Faulkner and Camus recognized time as a misfortune and a nuisance.  The 
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misfortune and nuisance of time seems to spawn from its incomprehensibility, absurdity, and 
disorder.  Of course, for both Faulkner and Camus, the clock or calendar do not resolve the 
incomprehensibility and absurdity of time, nor does any other device meant to systemize 
temporality.  Instead, these devices and systems only render time more absurd.  Rather, 
Faulkner’s and Camus’s works are concerned with the experience of time apart from the devices 
that attempt to keep our metaphysical realities in check.  In the works of Faulkner and Camus, if 
the tragedy, misfortune, or absurdity of time generate from our experience of time, then how do 
we experience time?   
Essentially, we will never definitively answer this question, for everyone experiences 
time in a unique manner.  Still, among all the potentially infinite understandings and experiences 
of time, most temporal modalities can likely be reduced to the “simple” difference between how 
we experience time according to what is ephemeral and what is perpetual. (I say “simple” since, 
linguistically, this difference between the ephemeral and the perpetual is fairly dichotomous 
without being too elusive).  If we are to propose the existence of an experiential time, then there 
must equally be a time that is not experienced, a time that is natural and, therefore, indifferent to 
human existence—of course, if humanity did not exist or if we did not possess the sensory and 
cerebral faculties to discern the existence of time, then this natural time would hardly seem to 
matter at all.  Nonetheless, according to natural time, everything would technically be ephemeral, 
and only time itself would be perpetual.  However, according to experiential time, the distinction 
between the ephemeral and the perpetual becomes less dichotomous.  But what classifies the 
ephemeral and the perpetual according to experiential time?  According to its etymological 
meaning, “ephemeral” comes from the Greek ephēmeros, meaning “lasting only a day” 
(“ephemeral, adj.”).  The ephemeral then represents our understanding of what was or is 
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temporary; thus, the ephemeral or ephemera represent the past or those objects, persons, and 
ideas that will eventually belong to the past.  Yet, the ephemera that are wholly ephemeral and 
metaphysically past still leave behind psychological and phenomenological traces in our present, 
allowing for “the past” to seem perceptibly “present.”  According to experiential time, the 
perpetual becomes a bit more complicated, for an object’s or entity’s “existence” as perpetual is 
entirely precarious.  Etymologically, “perpetual” has several unique but varying denotations.  
First, the obvious denotation would be “that which lasts forever” and “continuous and 
unbroken.”  However, historically, the term has been used to mean “held or occupied until death” 
or “that which lasts a lifetime” (“perpetual, adj.”).  These latter two definitions suggest that an 
object’s or entity’s status as “perpetual” only matters according to one’s understanding and 
experience of such object or entity as lasting for a lifetime.  So, while something might 
technically be ephemeral according to natural time, that same object or entity is equally perpetual 
relative to experiential time.  As such, we begin to see the confusion that comprises the 
precarious ephemeral-perpetual dichotomy.  This dialectic is further complicated when the 
individual mind or a collective consciousness is confronted with the reality of death—this 
confusion and tragedy thereby becoming paramount to our understanding of Faulknerian and 
Camusian temporality. 
 Nonetheless, how do Faulkner and Camus depict this confusion between ephemerality 
and perpetuity, and, more importantly, how is this confusion relative to sterility?  Initially, I note 
several key quotes from the Faulknerian and Camusian oeuvres that highlight the obscurity 
within the ephemeral-perpetual dichotomy.  In Faulkner, I recognize the recurrent reference to a 
famous line from Macbeth’s soliloquy near the end of Shakespeare’s tragedy: “Tomorrow and 
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tomorrow and tomorrow.”16  Though this quote would have us believe that the real tragedy is 
“tomorrow,” the future pains of existence, we can equally deduce that this quote is synonymous 
with “yesterday and yesterday and yesterday,” the notion that the pains of the past remain ever-
present, day after day.  For this reason, this quote becomes analogous with another famous 
Faulknerian quote from Requiem for a Nun: “The past is never dead.  It’s not even past” (80). 
Both cases present a phenomenological comprehension yet confusion of what distinguishes the 
ephemeral from the perpetual, and vice versa.  However, as Jean-Paul Sartre notes in an essay17 
on The Sound and the Fury, Faulknerian metaphysics is without a future, a temporality of the 
past and the ephemeral, for the past negates what the future is or could be (La Nouvelle Revue 
Française 52.1 1057-61).  In Camus, I note several comparable quotes.  First, in Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe, like Faulkner’s future-negation, Camus writes about “la création sans lendemain” or 
“ephemeral creation” or, translated more literally, “creation without tomorrow” (151).  While 
this quote does not necessarily import the perpetual encumbrance of the past, it does illuminate a 
negation of futurity.  In 1937, Camus also writes in his Carnets of a problem between destiny 
and the past: “Futilité de problème de l’immortalité.  Ce qui nous intéresse, c’est notre destinée, 
oui.  Mais, non pas ‘après,’ ‘avant’”18 (Carnets: mai 1935-février 1942 51).  As Camus writes, 
our concern is with destiny and the future but not with a future that is wholly separate from the 
present or, especially, from the past.  Instead, when we think of the future and its potentiality, we 
often project the past onto the future and judge the future according to the past, our minds 
continually stuck of the before—this notion will later constitute our understanding of a 
“phantasmatic future.” 
                                                
16 In Requiem for a Nun, Temple Drake repeats this quote multiple times in the novel’s latter half.  In Pylon, 
Faulkner titles his fourth chapter “Tomorrow” and his fifth chapter “And Tomorrow,” a shortened allusion to the 
same Shakespearean quote. 
17 “A propos de Le Bruit et la Fureur: La Temporalité chez Faulkner” (1939) 
18 “Futility of the problem of immortality.  What interests us is our destiny, yes.  But not ‘after,’ ‘before.’”  
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 The connection between the aforementioned comprehension of time and sterility becomes 
more transparent when we read Camus’s claim in Le Mythe de Sisyphe that the human mind and 
life are without a future and, therefore, sterile: 
Je ne veux parler pour l’instant que d’un monde où les pensées comme les vies sont 
privées d’avenir. . . . La seule pensée qui ne soit mensongère est donc une pensée stérile.  
Dans le monde absurde, la valeur d’une notion ou d’une vie se mesure à son 
infécondité”19 (98).   
 
If we consider Camus’s understanding of time as sans avenir or privé d’avenir20 (without future 
or deprived of future), then we can begin to draw a connection between sterility and 
temporality—if thoughts and lives are both without a future and sterile, then to be sterile would 
appear syllogistically to mean to be without a future.  According to the ephemeral-perpetual dyad 
and experiential time, if sterility represents the privation of futurity, then sterility would equally 
import the “ephemeralization” of the perpetual and, as such, would render the individual or 
collective consciousness aware of its own mortality.  But, is sterility’s relationship with 
temporality merely metaphysical and, therefore, not applicable in those more pragmatic realms 
of everyday existence?  Within the Faulkner and Camusian canons what “types” of sterility do 
we find, where do we find these sterilities, and how does sterility consequently affect time?   
Within their works, sterility is pervasive and equally multivalent, relevant in a variety of 
issues such as sexuality, impotence, castration, procreation, incest, rape, misogyny, gynocide, 
and infanticide.  Surely, the connection between time and sterility is peculiar and 
counterintuitive.  In what follows, I will deviate from this study’s preliminary, metaphysical 
discussions to a humanistic and pragmatic sense of time that is affected by various cultural, 
social, and historical issues within the Faulknerian and Camusian fictions.  Before moving on to 
                                                
19 “For the moment, I want only to speak of a world where thoughts, like lives, are deprived of future. . . . The only 
thought that is not fallacious is therefore the sterile thought.  In the world of the absurd, the value of an idea or of a 
life is measured by its infertility.”  
20 Camus uses these two terms throughout Le Mythe de Sisyphe. 
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the primary discussion of how Faulkner and Camus present sterility as a tragic temporal modality 
within the larger fields of age, gender, and sexuality, I will begin by deconstructing the 
denotations and connotations of sterility to establish a few key definitions, helping to clarify the 
various angles and contexts through which sterility will be applied.  
 In common speech and language, “sterile” and “sterility” are terms not often associated 
with time or used to explain or understand temporality.  Sterility is often considered a biological 
term relevant to copulation or reproduction—or to the inability to copulate or reproduce.  And 
indeed, etymologically, sterile comes from the Latin sterilis and Sanskrit starī, both meaning 
“barren cow” (“sterile, adj.”).  The newer definitions of sterile date to the nineteenth century and 
show its integration into a hygienics discourse from which we get the verbal derivatives of 
sterilize and sterilization.  Thus, in our modern understanding, we separate sterile into two 
general categories: first, a biological and sexual term similar to infertile, barren, and unfruitful; 
and second, a term suggesting cleanliness, disinfection, and purity.  However, we also see a 
eugenics discourse around the same time as the hygienics one that combines these two general 
categories.  Now, sterile, sterility, and sterilize have a combined biological, sexual, and hygienic 
definition meaning to render someone incapable of producing offspring, usually for reasons 
deemed, at the time, socially undesirable, such as physical handicaps, intellectual disabilities, 
mental illnesses, gender and sexual aberrations as well as for reasons of racial and ethnic 
domination and homogeneity21.  Still, despite all the various denotations and connotations that 
we could deduce and ascribe to sterility, the one unifying factor across all its definitions is, in 
fact, an implication of time, and more specifically, an implication that time is limited or has been 
limited or bracketed (for instance, by death), and that the or a future does or will not exist.  
                                                
21 One of the first uses of sterile within a eugenics discourse, in British Health Review’s February 1910 issue R. R. 
Rentoul said, “In 1903 I publicly advocated the sterilisation of the insane” (“sterilize, v.”). 
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 In the biological, sexual sense, sterility evokes notions of time and futurity from its 
antitheses, such as fertility, procreation, posterity, and genealogy.  Hence, in this case, time 
obviously carries a generational signification (both chronological and genealogical), and the 
perpetual is associated with the idea that copulation and reproduction are a means of preserving 
and propagating the human race, to insure and secure future generations.  To be sterile (via 
infertility, impotence, castration, et cetera) would consequently denote the inability to produce a 
genealogical future, or posterity.  In the hygienic and certainly in the eugenic senses, sterility and 
sterilize represent a desire for cleanliness, sameness, and social homogeny via the domination or 
annihilation of the “unclean.”  In the essay “Le Témoin de la Liberté,” Camus notes this 
connection between sterility, death, and domination and writes, “Vouloir dominer quelqu’un . . . 
c’est souhaiter la stérilité, le silence ou la mort de ce quelqu’un”22 (Essais 401).  Hence, sterility 
and sterilization have also become synonymous with death and destruction, to dominate and to 
cleanse a population of the abject, the “undesirable,” thereby eliminating congenital, intellectual, 
psychological, and cultural differences (or “dirtiness”).  In a conceptual sense, the hygienic and 
eugenic meanings of sterile also invoke an air of doom: to sterilize is to induce a quality of 
definitive lifelessness, pointlessness, and futility.  Hence, to sterilize someone suggests to make 
procreation impossible but also to cleanse and decontaminate one’s identity, destroy one’s reason 
for being and the sense that an individual or communal future exist.  We find the latter form of 
sterility (which I call the sterilization of identity) within the numerous types of discriminations, 
such as racism and genocide, misogyny and gynocide, et cetera.  This final definition largely 
encompasses the other definitions because it usually informs, and has historically motivated, 
sexual sterilization and the desire for cultural homogeneity.  Still, what remains constant is the 
                                                
22 “To want to dominate someone . . . it is to wish for sterility, the silence or death of this someone.” 
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notion that time has been sterilized, the future, the hope for change and newness becomes 
increasingly bleak. 
 As mentioned, the different definitions and interpretations of sterility largely inform each 
other and often occur simultaneously within a single topic or even a single event.  Thus, I 
approach the problem of how to effectively discuss this term within Faulkner’s and Camus’s 
canons without driving my argument in circles.  To maintain clarity and a logical trajectory, I 
have divided sterility according to different “types” of sterilization: of life, of sex(uality), and of 
identity.  Several examples will inevitably overlap into the other categories, but mostly I will use 
those examples transitionally.  Beginning with the sterilization of life, we will focus on a 
Camusian view of life as sterile and death as sterilizing and how this attitude equally resonates in 
the Faulknerian canon.  Primarily, this section will consider how the topics of the Child and 
infanticide factor into a larger understanding of time and futurity according to reproduction, 
genealogy, and posterity.  Moving on to the sterilization of sex(uality), we will return briefly to 
the biological and reproductive topics of sterility as they relate to larger issues surrounding 
gender and sexuality.  However, in the absurd, fictive worlds of Faulkner and Camus, successful 
procreation or the desire to propagate are practically nonexistent.  Still, sex and sexuality do not 
always assume propagation; rather, the reproductive nature of time and futurity would only be 
pertinent to normative heterosexuality due to the biological nature of our species.  For this 
reason, the sterilization of sexuality will also focus on the differences between the feminine and 
masculine senses of time as distinct from procreation as well as on the non-normative temporal 
modalities and how time and sexuality cooperate within the realm of the queer.  Finally, this 
study will discuss the sterilization of identity within the framework of the sterilization of 
sexuality since, more often than not, the sterilization of sexuality becomes an issue of identity, or 
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of losing one’s identity.  Nevertheless, the sterilization of identity constitutes, perhaps, the 
largest form of sterilization in the Camusian and Faulknerian canons, so an exhaustive 
exploration of this category in all its diversity would be next to impossible.  Accordingly, I have 
limited this discussion to those issues of “abjected” bodies and identities (the non-normative, 
racial minorities, and the intellectually disabled) that simultaneously carry connotations of sexual 
sterilization. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE STERILIZATION OF LIFE 
 
The sterilization of life (of “life-time”) is mostly synonymous with death or murder 
depending on the context.  But, the events that comprise the death or murder are predominantly 
less important than what the act of dying suggests23.  In a secular sense, death, as Camus 
believed, is sterile, unequivocally specifying the end, the destruction of time and the future, and 
the nonexistence of an afterlife.  In addition, although Faulkner was a religious man and student 
of the Bible, his works possess a similar type of sterilizing death as those in the fictions of 
Camus.  Still, in many religious discourses, death is demarcated as liminal instead of sterile, 
representing a static moment of an indeterminate amount of time between life and afterlife.  
Since the latter is purely theoretical and essentially without concrete textual support, this chapter 
will focus only on those examples that present life as sterile and death as sterilizing.   
 While death is pervasive in the Faulknerian and Camusian canons—as it is in almost 
every author’s canon—more precisely though, Faulkner and Camus seem to emphasize certain 
deaths more than others.  These deaths typically include the death of the young and innocent, or 
infanticide24.  The deaths of women and gynocide appear equally in both canons; nonetheless, 
these terms also presuppose various issues that will be more important while discussing the 
sterilization of sex and identity.  In the most literal and obvious sense, the ending of a life marks 
not only the end of a time but also the true ephemeralization of something that was theoretically 
                                                
23 I say this only because this study focuses on the issue of temporality relative to death and not the medical or 
criminological issues surrounding a death or murder.  This is not to say that a natural death is equal to a murder, but 
in both cases they represent the sterilization of life.  
24 Hereafter, I will mark both the death and murder of the child as infanticide.  While the fictional murdering of the 
child would normally be classified as infanticide, I will also mark the general and natural deaths of children within 
the noted fictions as infanticide, for these events also mark a theoretical and narratological murder committed by 
Faulkner and Camus. 
 20 
perpetual until that moment of death.  Especially if we might understand life and time in terms of 
a perpetual present, death flags the termination of that perpetuity.   
 Furthermore, instead of using “death,” I will often write the “end of life-time.”  Life-time, 
though, should not be confused with or mistaken for lifetime.  Lifetime is largely a lateral term—
that is, a bracketing term concerned with the ends of a lifespan—that presupposes either a 
prospective presumption of death’s imminence or a retrospective contemplation of the fact that 
one’s life had a beginning and end.  Thus, lifetime conceptually exudes an air of doom, for it 
excludes any individual sense and experience of time and does not ontologically present a 
struggle between ephemerality and perpetuity, only denoting the existence of the ephemeral.  
Nevertheless, life-time is a medial and durational term, concerned with neither the origins nor the 
ends, which I will use to include the phenomenology of time.  While still possessing the general 
meaning of the “time of life,” life-time refers to the interior workings of temporality within the 
individual life and how the individual consciousness experiences or understands the life’s time.  
Like Temple Drake cries repeatedly in Requiem for a Nun, “Tomorrow and tomorrow and 
tomorrow” is one understanding of life-time that indicates that the time and trials of life seem 
never-ending.  Yet, when the individual consciousness of life-time is confronted with the reality 
of lifetime, or death, we then see the collision of the ephemeral and the perpetual engendered by 
life-time.  For example, imagining a conversation between himself and his father, Quentin 
Compson in The Sound and the Fury remarks, in the tone of his father, “you cannot bear to think 
that someday it will no longer hurt you like this” (112).  Experiencing the time and agony of life 
as never-ending, Quentin confronts the prospect of death and suicide.  Although he cannot bear 
the anguish of life-time any longer, he cannot equally bear to think that one day he will be dead 
and will no longer feel the pain to which he has become inured.  In the end, Quentin chooses the 
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sterilization of suicide.  When the agony of the Macbeth-ian “tomorrow and tomorrow and 
tomorrow” is confronted with the reality that someday life will end, consequently we see the 
paradox of time, which, so it seems, will only be resolved by a sterilizing death.  In the case of 
Quentin Compson, the sterilizing effects of death prove to be the only manner through which he 
can stop time and eliminate his harrowing obsession with the past. 
 So, our concern is with life-time, or rather, with what the ending of life-time signifies.  
As we all know very well, all lives have a lifespan and death is inevitable.  In Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe, this inevitable and impartial death represents for Camus why no single life or way of 
living is better than another.  From this notion, Camus draws his primary argument against 
suicide: the quantity of one’s experience matters most, and to keep living represents a revolt 
against death.  Life is about revolt, and the only way to revolt against death, and hence against 
the absurd, is to keep living, to endure and persevere, similar in many ways to Faulkner’s Nobel 
Prize speech in which he declared, “I decline to accept the end of man.  It is easy enough to say 
that man is immortal simply because he will endure . . . I refuse to accept this.  I believe that man 
will not merely endure: he will prevail” (“William Faulkner: Banquet Speech”).  Consequently, 
if the quantity of life-time is paramount, what do the deaths at various ages signify?  If these 
significations are different, can we still consider death as impartial?  Or, what implications are 
Faulkner and Camus making about death at specific ages?  For both writers, infanticide serves an 
important metaphysical purpose, more so than the other types of death and murders.  More 
specifically, when trying to comprehend the event or act of infanticide, the death itself is merely 
precursory and is only important insofar as it indicates a termination of the individual life-time.  
Once this notion is established, the death is no longer the area of concern, and, rather, our 
attention shifts to trying to understand what the quantity of life-time of those now ephemeral and 
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bracketed existences signify.  Metaphysically, infanticide imports sterility, the ephemeralization 
of the perpetual, for it represents the death of a future, of a futurity implied within fertility, 
reproduction, and posterity. 
 
Infanticide and the Family 
In the Faulknerian and Camusian canons, infanticide only occurs a few times, yet, when 
it does occur, the scene or incident usually occasions a climax or becomes the work’s focal point.  
For Faulkner, the only case of infanticide occurs in Requiem for a Nun, though Faulkner refrains 
from presenting the actual death of Temple Drake’s (or Mrs. Gowan Stevens’s) unnamed child.  
Camus presents the same scene is his adaption, yet there are other infanticidal examples in 
Camus’s fiction.  In La Peste (1949), we see the most vivid and painfully tragic death of a young 
boy during a modern day Black Death.  Additionally, the discussion and intentions of infanticide 
are found in Les Justes (first staged in 1949), where Kaliayev, a Russian-Socialist revolutionary 
and assassin, fails to throw a bomb at the Grand Duke Sergei Romanov’s passing carriage 
because the Duke’s young niece and nephew are also in the carriage.  After this first failed 
attempt, Kaliayev and his fellow revolutionaries discuss how they should proceed if the issue of 
throwing a bomb at a carriage with children arises on their second try.  Finally, the issue of 
infanticide arises in Le Malentendu when Martha and La Mère kill a man whom they later realize 
is their estranged brother-son, Jan, who is actually an adult but, nonetheless, whose death 
similarly relates to the infanticide in Requiem for a Nun.  This section will begin by analyzing 
how Faulkner and Camus present infanticide as signaling the destruction of the family and the 
sterilization of genealogy and posterity in Requiem for a Nun and Le Malentendu.  Following 
these exegeses, I will concentrate on a philosophical and political analysis of what the Child 
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signifies and how Camus’s Les Justes broaches a debate on whether infanticide is ever 
justifiable, even during revolutionary causes when the ultimate aim is for a better future. 
 Within the contexts of both Faulkner’s and Camus’s Requiem for a Nun, the death of 
Temple’s baby, as presented on Faulkner’s pseudo-stage and Camus’s actual stage, signals not 
only the destruction of innocent life but also the dissolution of the Stevens family and the 
sterilization of the family’s genealogical future.  Since Faulkner constructs his story nonlinearly 
within the novel’s playscript sections, we first learn of the murder; then, going back in time, we 
witness the events leading up to the murder.  In Act One during the trial of Nancy Mannigoe, we 
learn that the Stevens’s maid has killed Temple’s second-born child.  By Act Two Scene Two, 
we go back in time to the evening during which Nancy kills the infant.  Hence, in this scene we 
see a type of resurrection of the infant.  Yet, by the scene’s end, the infant is dead once again, 
and, thus, this moment will be our primary focus.  The death of Temple’s baby marks the 
dissolution of the Stevens family: the baby is killed during a time when Temple intends to leave 
her husband, Gowan, for another man and has also sent away her eldest child, Bucky, to live 
with his grandmother.  Act Two Scene Two begins with Temple and Nancy in an intense 
argument concerning Temple’s readiness and willingness to leave her family.  Moments before 
Nancy murders the infant, Temple admits that Nancy has been more than a housemaid to her 
family but, in fact, a kind of savior who held the Stevens together even during their worst hours.  
Apologizing to Nancy after yelling at her, Temple opines:  
I’m sorry.  Why do you force me to this—hitting and screaming at you, when you have 
always been so good to my children and me—my husband too—all of us—trying to hold 
us together in a household, a family, that anybody should have known all the time 
couldn’t possibly hold together? even in decency, let alone happiness? (163)  
 
Other than being darkly ironic for the reason that Nancy will soon finalize the disintegration of 
this family, Temple’s words indicate that she is well aware of, if not desiring, her family’s 
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dissolution.  Temple suggests that this ongoing familial deterioration was inevitable, especially 
given the pasts of Gowan and Temple recounted in Sanctuary.  The Temple Drake of Requiem 
for a Nun is not the same Temple Drake we see at the beginning of Sanctuary nor is she the same 
Temple Drake corrupted by Popeye and the Memphis brothel.  Though I will focus solely on 
Temple’s transformation in the second chapter, the Temple Drake of Requiem for a Nun is a 
woman forced to enter a loveless marriage and have children with a man that instigated most of 
her horrors in Sanctuary—Gowan abandons Temple, leaving her defenseless against hoards of 
depraved, libidinous men.  Like Gowan’s abandonment of Temple in Sanctuary, Temple now 
intends to abandon Gowan—abandonment and unreliability define their past; thus, Temple 
fittingly returns the deed and tries to end their marriage via abandonment.   
Consequently, the Temple Drake of Requiem for a Nun finds herself physically trapped 
by a family she did not want and still emotionally and psychologically trapped in the Memphis 
brothel of Sanctuary.  Eventually, Temple forcefully admits that despite her husband and her 
children, she will leave and flee with her lover, Pete.  And as she walks to the nursery to kill the 
infant, Nancy tells Temple, “I tried everything I knowed.  You can see that”  (165).  Nancy’s 
final words to Temple are a bit puzzling, for we do not actually know to what she is referring.  
Nancy is likely referring to her efforts to keep this family together and to convince Temple not to 
abandon her two children.  Her final words equally indicate that Nancy feels as though she has 
no other choice but to murder the child, for all other options have been exhausted and proven 
ineffective—obviously, this choice is morbidly ironic.  Considering Temple’s familial and 
marital entrapment, we find several possible reasons why Nancy kills the infant.  First, Nancy 
might have committed the infanticide to punish Temple not only for leaving her family but also 
for sacrificing an innocent infant, essentially making the child Nancy’s problem and 
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responsibility.  Second, perhaps Nancy kills the infant to prevent Temple from running away.  
Third, Nancy might have killed the infant as a means of preventing the eventual suffering and 
neglect that the to-be-orphaned child would have to face.  Fourth, both disgusted with yet pitying 
Temple, perhaps Nancy kills the infant in order to completely destroy the Stevens family, giving 
Temple what she wanted and releasing her of her familial and marital duties.  And though the 
murder forces Temple to stay with her husband, their marriage is a marriage only in name, 
Temple’s disdain for Gowan seems entirely immitigable.  Finally, we notice that Bucky, the 
elder child, though technically alive, is, in fact, narratively dead and nonexistent, the Stevens 
family wholly disintegrated even though their patronym superficially remains.  In each case the 
death of the child (the murdered child and the narratively absent child) not only marks the 
dissolution of the family but the end of a future assumed within posterity and genealogy—the 
future that the Child portends via upholding and perpetuating the family’s patronym and legacy.  
  Comparable to Requiem for a Nun, the infanticide that occurs in Le Malentendu equally 
accentuates the death of the child as symbolic of the dissolution of the family and genealogical 
futurity.  In this play, however, Camus questions the stability of the family structure as Jan’s 
attempt to reunite with his family results in murder and suicide.  Concurrently, in this play 
Camus presents an absurd world and god that seem to wholly oppose the traditional familial 
structure as this “god” incites the play’s conclusive tragedy.  Therefore, in this play’s absurd 
storyworld, Camus denies any notion of futurity with regard to family, genealogy, or posterity as 
his absurd god plots against and fuels the destruction of Jan’s family.  First, the murdering of Jan 
by his mother and sister is indeed symbolic of this destruction, for Martha and La Mère 
subsequently commit suicide after learning that Jan was their estranged brother and son.  Second, 
unlike the other examples of infanticide, Jan is an adult and as such does not necessarily 
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epitomize the same sense of fertility, newness, and innocence as an infant or adolescent.  
Nevertheless, he does symbolize a procreative fertility since he is married to Maria, suggesting 
the promise of propagation.  Third, while it is Martha and Le Mère who kill Jan, we learn that Le 
Vieux, the old manservant, largely instigates this tragedy, for he is the absurd god of this 
storyworld who not only prevents the mother and daughter’s awareness of Jan’s identity but also 
calculatedly reveals Jan’s identity following his murder and incites the subsequent mother-
daughter suicides.  With this promise of reunification and propagation, Le Vieux must uphold the 
absurd order by sterilizing this family and their future.  
 In this play, Camus suggests that the family as both an institution in itself and as a means 
of structuring time—that is, history and genealogy—is paradoxically sterile, predicting or 
instigating an end rather than a genesis.  While Jan’s desire to reconnect with his family is what 
paradoxically instigates their demise, we get the sense that this family, or possibly all families, 
was already doomed to deteriorate.  First, Jan and his family have been estranged for many 
years, long enough apparently that neither his mother nor sister recognizes him upon his return.  
Second, Jan is hesitant about immediately revealing his identity for reasons of stirring trouble, 
and although he is supposed to be this story’s hero, his indecisiveness becomes his hamartia, for 
his mother and sister kill him before he can make up his mind.  For both these reasons, Camus 
depicts the family and familial relations as arbitrary, for familiarity can easily become 
foreignness as dictated by time and space; Jan and his family have certainly become complete 
strangers.  Third, upon the discovery that she has murdered her son, La Mère utters in a toneless 
voice, “Allons, je savais bien qu’un jour cela tournerait de cette façon et qu’alors il faudrait en 
finir”25 (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 225).  Hence, we might discern Le Malentendu as an 
Oedipal tragedy, not only for the reason that estrangement and unfamiliarity induce murderous 
                                                
25 “Yes, I have known well that one day it would turn out this way, and then it would be the end.”  
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tragedy between family members but also since La Mère’s words suggest a type of self-fulfilled 
prophecy and, like Temple’s words before her child’s murder, equally indicate this air of familial 
doom. 
Yet, even before La Mère’s Oedipal realization and the murder of her son, we recognize 
this family’s doom and deterioration for several other reasons.  First, the reader of Camus’s 
canon will note that Le Malentendu is intertexually connected to a newspaper article that 
Meursault reads in L’Étranger, the article detailing this play’s tragic plot.  Second, we remark 
the obvious dramatic irony, that La Mère and Martha, ignorant of Jan’s identity, are plotting 
Jan’s murder while Jan, trying to reconnect with his family, is ignorant of what really goes on in 
his family’s motel.  Third, at the play’s beginning Jan abandons Maria and goes to his family’s 
motel alone; consequently, he detaches himself from the one person who gives him the hope of a 
family and familial futurity while he ironically leads himself to his “other” family and his death.  
Fourth, we will also remark the diegetic absence of the biological father, as is the case 
throughout the Camusian canon.  This absence, though, is not to say that a father is what holds a 
family together.  Rather, this patriarchal absence indicates that the familial deterioration began 
even before the curtains open, that, in general, the family is always already deteriorating, as 
equally suggested by Jan’s abandonment of Maria at the play’s beginning.   
While Camus proposes that the structure of the nuclear family is arbitrary and innately 
flawed and doomed to deteriorate, he ironically introduces his absurd god to insure this family’s 
demise.  While Le Vieux is merely the old manservant by title, his character symbolically plays 
the roles of the absent “father-figure” as well as the non-existent Father—Camus’s absurd god.  
Consequently, Le Vieux is an ironic character because he comes to negate everything that the 
F/father are meant to represent traditionally and dogmatically, namely the protection and 
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preservation of the family.  Le Vieux comes to clearly represent God at the play’s end as he 
mistakenly responds to Maria’s cries to God as a call for his help as well as the fact that “Le 
Dieu” rhymes with Le Vieux (244-5). Le Vieux equally embodies Le Dieu because he comes to 
represent the word of God (Logos).  In the Camusian sense, nonetheless, Logos (or the word of 
Camus’s “God”) is antithetical to traditional Christian doctrine.  In the final scene, Le Vieux’s 
presence on stage, as usual, is marked as a type of materialization rather than an active entrance 
as his figure “appears” (paraît) from the darkness, he speaks with a firm and forceful voice, and 
responds to Maria’s anguish and cries for help with a curt, assertive “Non!”  (244-5).  But this 
rejection is not merely his refusal to help her.  Rather, it suggests a negation of all order and 
reason and is essentially a divine judgment or verdict, functioning as Maria’s death sentence, for 
we imagine that she will either commit suicide or die of sorrow and misery.  As such, the word 
of God becomes the word of death.   
 Thus, Le Vieux antithetically takes the form of both the F/father and Death and, both 
consequently and ironically, represents and induces sterility.  Alternatively, we might simply say 
that he is a sterile character.  For the most part, Le Vieux embodies sterility since his character is 
largely representative of absence—(1) the absence of theatric presence via corporeality and 
verbosity and (2) the absence of emotion—which illustrates Le Vieux as a lifeless and insentient 
character.  Likewise, Camus’s stage directions depict how Le Vieux constantly embodies 
absence even when he is technically “present.”  First, his character does very little on stage other 
than standing and sitting.  Since he does not speak and rarely moves, we are usually reminded of 
his presence only when the stage directions mark his exiting, as he again becomes absent.  
Second, when he is on stage, silhouettes or reflections often mark his presence, which portrays 
his character not only as incorporeal and spectral but also as ominous and mysterious.  Third, as I 
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already mentioned, Le Vieux’s comings and goings are often described as materializations.  
Often, his presence is marked passively by the verb “paraître” or “apparaître” (to appear)—“le 
vieux domestique paraît dans l’encadrement,” “le vieux domestique apparaît en haut de 
l’escalier,” “la porte s’ouvre et le vieux domestique paraît”26 (178; 224; 244).  Additionally, his 
“presence” on stage is always transient, fugitive, and especially menacing since the other 
characters are usually unaware of his presence as he quickly appears and disappears from door 
frames or walks behind windows, looking at the characters inside the motel.  The idea that he 
appears and disappears emphasizes his incorporeality and spectral presence-absence.  Finally, he 
is the messenger who brings “the word” (though, they are wordless words) to Le Mère and 
Martha of the identity of the man they murdered, inciting both women’s subsequent suicides 
(224-5).  Accordingly, symbolic of the F/father, Le Vieux’s presence in this play largely 
represents absence—the absence of the biological father and the absence of a just and 
sympathetic divine being.  As father, Le Vieux’s presence is indicative of the verbal and 
corporeal absence of the biological father and, thus, of the nuclear family’s deterioration.  As the 
Father, Le Vieux represents an ineffective, powerless, and emotionally sterile deity—his 
presence, in fact, symbolizes the absence of any divinity.   
  And this role as “God” is, perhaps, Le Vieux’s most important role.  But, how does Le 
Vieux as “God” instigate the infanticide and destruction of this family?  As we read Le 
Malentendu and pay close attention to the well-crafted stage directions, we notice that Le 
Vieux’s strange actions are much more calculated and diabolical than they purport.  In the 
extremely brief Act One Scene Two, the stage directions note that Le Vieux, alone on stage and 
looking through the window, sees Jan approaching the motel.  Le Vieux then hides behind the 
                                                
26 “the old manservant appeared in the door frame,” “the old manservant appeared at the top of the stairs,” “the door 
opened and the old manservant appeared” 
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window curtain.  Upon entering, Jan notices Le Vieux hiding and sarcastically asks if anyone is 
there.  Le Vieux then stares at Jan and subsequently exists without speaking a word and ending 
the scene (164).  This peculiar scene leads us to wonder: Why did Le Vieux hide upon seeing 
Jan?  Personal insecurities?  Anthropophobia?  Xenophobia?  Or rather, does Le Vieux, being the 
“God” of this storyworld, immediately recognize Jan’s identity, a feat of which the mother and 
daughter are clearly incapable?  Camus clarifies these questions later during the scene when 
Martha is checking Jan into the motel.  Jan presents his passport to Martha, a moment which 
would have revealed Jan’s true identity and prevented the subsequent tragedy; however, at this 
moment, Le Vieux appears, yet again, in the doorway, distracting Martha.  Martha dismisses Le 
Vieux, noting that she did not call him, and returns Jan’s passport without reading it (178).  This 
scene functions primarily on three levels: (1) it serves as more dramatic irony; (2) it foreshadows 
the play’s climax, when Le Vieux reveals the passport to both Martha and La Mère after killing 
Jan; and (3) this scene reveals that the coincidence of events and consequences of this play are 
less innocuous and more intentional, silently calculated and instigated by Le Vieux.  Allegedly, 
his impaired hearing is the reason for his “accidental” entrances on stage, yet these “accidents” 
serve a much greater purpose than just breaking the flow of action and dialogue.  In this case, his 
presence serves to obstruct the truth, which exposes that Le Vieux knows the truth.  While there 
are hints throughout the play that Le Vieux is aware of Jan’s identity and is scheming the 
family’s demise, our suspicions are finally justified when we see that while Le Mère and Martha 
are removing the clothing from Jan’s poisoned body, Le Vieux notices that Jan’s passport has 
fallen to the floor, picks it up, and hides it from the mother and daughter:  
[Martha] fouille le veston et en tire un portefeuille dont elle compte les billets.  Elle vide 
touts les poches du dormeur.  Pendant cette opération, le passeport tombe et glisse 
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derrière le lit.  Le vieux domestique va le ramasser sans que les femmes le voient et se 
retire”27 (216).   
 
Hence, we recognize that Le Vieux knows yet hides the truth from the mother and daughter and 
silently watches the tragedy ensue. 
Consequently, this Camusian “God” is not a creator of life but an inciter of death28.  This 
conclusion does not effectively exonerate Martha and La Mère, for they would have killed 
whatever guest had checked in that day.  Still, the daughter and mother are not to blame for the 
infanticide and the destruction of this family.  Le Vieux is.  Inciter of death, voice of unreason 
and disorder, Le Vieux witnesses the potential reunification of this family (the re-perpetuation of 
their genealogy), marked by Jan’s return with his wife.  But sterility (death) is the goal, the 
desired end, the only truth.  Thus, Le Vieux prevents this reunification and obstructs the 
disclosure of Jan’s identity.  He is even present, though furtively, when Martha and La Mère 
collect and dispose of Jan’s poisoned body in the river, following them in the process to ensure 
they dump the body.  Finally, only after the deed is done does Le Vieux decide to reveal Jan’s 
passport and identity.  Revealing the passport at the beginning of Act Three Scene One, Le 
Vieux “appears”/materializes on stage at the top of a staircase, at the bottom of which is Martha 
and Le Mère (224).  As such, his descent down the staircase with the passport (the Truth) is 
highly symbolic of his status as God.  Unlike the deus ex machina of ancient Greek theatre when 
a god descends from the heavens to resolve a hopeless situation, Le Vieux’s celestial descent (a 
reverse dénouement) does not resolve the tragedy but, rather, incites more tragedy as his divine 
revelation uncloaks a truth that deliberately foments the suicides of La Mère and Martha.  
                                                
27 “Martha searched the jacket and pulled out a wallet in which she counted the dollar bills.  She emptied all of the 
sleeping man’s pockets.  During this operation, the passport fell and slipped behind the bed.  The old manservant 
goes to pick it up without the women seeing him and quietly slips away.”  
28 Though, philosophically, one could argue that the difference between “creator of life” and “inciter of death” is 
merely rhetorical, and essentially they can be positioned as contiguous.   
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Accordingly, Le Vieux’s role in this play, while multifaceted, is mainly to assure the destruction 
of this family and secure sterility and death as the ultimate truth and revelation.  
  
Infanticide and the Child 
In Les Justes, we see infanticide become a topic of philosophical and political 
considerations instead of simply assuming the familial and genealogical significations presented 
in Requiem for a Nun and Le Malentendu.  Still, like Le Malentendu, Les Justes raises 
Dostoyevskian questions of divine existence.  In Les Justes, the question becomes, If a god does 
not exist, and thus everything, including murder, is permitted, is the killing of children equally 
permissible?  The play further narrows this hypothetical to a question about political and 
humanitarian intentions and efforts of anti-totalitarian (and at the time, anti-czarist) terrorist 
groups.  If the intentions of a revolution are to promote the “greater good” and “general welfare” 
and to end tyrants and tyrannies, is the murdering of children acceptable during the revolutionary 
process or within the crossfires if these murders constitute a means of reaching the end?  
Ultimately, for Camus, infanticide is never permitted regardless of the circumstances.  And as E. 
Freeman remarks in his essay “Camus’s Les Justes,” this play is about limits, particularly the 
ethical limits of murder—infanticide being one such limit (79).  Hence, we understand this play’s 
title (translated The Just Assassins).  Writing both this play and L’Homme Révolté at the same 
time, Camus endeavored to depict terrorists who were not morally hallow and bloodthirsty—
Camus’s ideal rebel being the just assassin.  In Les Justes, however, infanticide never occurs, for 
these terrorists are just and ethical.  For Freeman, Camus’s choice of not committing infanticide 
is what keeps this play from completely succeeding as a modern tragedy (87-91).  While I agree 
that Les Justes is less tragic than many of Camus’s other works, I believe that Freeman fails to 
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fully understand the tragedy that arises from even considering the idea of infanticide as 
politically permissible, especially during an era when the exigency of revolution and change 
engendered unparalleled violence and desperation.  The play’s tragic energies equally force us to 
question whether we ourselves would or could ever justify killing children.  We should also note 
that Camus committed a horrifying infanticide just two years early in La Peste.  Perhaps, when 
considering the trajectory of the Camusian canon, the choice not to kill another child was one 
made strategically, to thematically bring life back inside his work.  Furthermore, Camus’s twins, 
coincidently, were born in 1945 while he was working on La Peste—another possibility for why 
he may have favored life in Les Justes. 
 The lack of infanticide notwithstanding, as previously mentioned, Les Justes leads us to 
question the political and philosophical significances of killing children and coerces us to 
question our own values and humanity.  Could we ourselves ever justify the killing of children?  
Of course, most of us would scream a curt “No!”  Yet, would or could we ever dare to ponder a 
justification?  Despite all heretical implications and potential vilifications, could we ever give 
credence to a justification and venture to an “anti-life” perspective?  Another big question yet to 
be answered is: Why is the murdering of the Grand Duke’s niece and nephew more tragic and 
less permissible than his own assassination?  We could even make this question more general: 
Why is the killing of children more reproachable than the killing of adults?  The answer seems 
fairly immediate and simple: children are young and innocent while adults are more worthy of 
guilt and susceptible to corruption and evil.  But this difference seems a justification only when 
temporally isolated from the actual homicide.  When Kaliayev approaches the Grand Duke’s 
carriage and notices the children, the Grand Duke is no longer his concern.  Nor is the assumed 
innocence of the niece and nephew the initial worry, though it does quickly become pertinent.  
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Would Kaliayev have thrown the bomb if the niece and nephew of the Grand Duke were 
demonic or destined to follow in the dictatorial footsteps of their uncle?  Or would any of us kill 
a child who threatened our future existence?29  Still, none of these questions and moral 
dilemmas, though stimulating and contentious, seems to bring us closer to the actual infanticidal 
event.  Instead, they distance us from the actual event and displace one significant detail: the 
body of the Child.  Les Justes is not just concerned with the killing of children for political or 
ideological reasons, but the play is equally concerned with what the Child’s body and what the 
desecration or obliteration of this body signify.  Of course, the latter arouses the question of how 
we define the Child and its body.  For these reasons and others, we should not look at this issue 
as pertaining to the politically contemporary and speciously rhetorical opposition between the 
“pro-life” and “pro-choice” stances since they both actually proffer a pro-life stance and are 
oriented antithetically to an unheard of “anti-life” stance.  Modern ultrasounds and sonograms 
aside, since the Child’s body and the sight of the Child’s body are our primary concern, the 
following discussion pertains only to the extrauterine body (mainly the extrauterine Child, but 
this term can equally refer to all the present living).  Moreover, as our poetic hero Kaliayev 
affirms, the revolutionary’s crusade should be for those who are living, breathing, and suffering 
in the present world, not for the unpredictable existence of a future generation and time:  
 D’autres . . . Oui! Mais moi, j’aime ceux qui vivent aujourd’hui sur la même terre que 
 moi, et c’est eux que je salue.  C’est pour eux que je lutte et que je consens à mourir.  Et 
 pour une cité lointaine, dont je ne suis pas sûr, je n’irai pas frapper le visage de mes 
 frères.  Je n’irai pas ajouter à l’injustice vivante pour une justice morte.30 (65)    
  
                                                
29 Such question was equally broached and answered in the popular 1976 horror movie The Omen, wherein the 
anthropomorphized son of Satan, who is a mere toddler, must be murdered by its earthly father in order to save 
humanity.  
30 “Others . . . yes!  But me, I like those who are living today on the same earth as me, and it’s them that I salute.  
It’s for them that I fight and agree to die.  And for the sake of a distant city which I am not sure even exists, I will 
not strike the faces of my brothers.  I will not add to the living injustice for the sake of a dead justice.” 
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 Revolution is not to fight for what is uncertain and amorphous but rather for what is 
present and obtainable.  Shall I dare say that the intrauterine fetus is the uncertain and 
amorphous?  This adjudgment is not to say that the intrauterine lacks any potentiality, but the 
intrauterine’s potentiality is far different from that of the extrauterine.  The intrauterine’s 
potentiality is that of parturition, of eventually becoming the extrauterine and taking her/his 
future place in humanity's genealogy.  The intrauterine is a wish for a hope.  For this reason, we 
cannot yet ascribe hope or the hope of futurity to the intrauterine, for its “body” and existence 
are, however, still extremely uncertain, amorphous, and precarious—we are all aware of the 
many possible complications that come with pregnancy, childbirth, and postnatal care.  The 
existence of the extrauterine, on the other hand, is more structured, unquestionable, and evident, 
for the extrauterine body is right in front our eyes, breathing, walking, developing, and has now 
shown the potential to live on.  Therefore, to fight for the intrauterine’s future is only to fight for 
posterity, so that the human race may merely exist and continue to exist.  Nevertheless, this 
notion leads us to question whether this world in its current climate and conditions is worthy of 
propagation or can even support posterity.  To fight for the extrauterine’s future is to fight for the 
quality of life, to make sure that those who are already living and suffering are not only to 
continue living but also to live well.  To fight for the extrauterine, consequently, would equate to 
an indirect fight for the eventual life and quality of life of the (to-be)-intrauterine, for one could 
assume that improving the quality of life for the current populations would hopefully endure for 
future generations.      
 Thus, our focus is on the extrauterine’s body, specifically the body of the Child.  But 
what exactly does the Child’s body signify?  The infantile or juvenile body, of course, 
symbolizes those excessively sentimental qualities of purity, innocence, and hope.  Perhaps more 
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importantly, the Child’s body signifies development and nascence.  This body still possesses a 
quality of being unmarked and limitless, not yet restricted by the barrage of cultural and social 
markings that later come to bracket and shackle adults.  At the same time nonetheless, the Child 
is not immune to the Symbolic order of the parents and family; and surely, the Child could come 
to perpetuate the same signifiers via heritage, family values, education, discrimination, 
stereotyping, individual experience, intuition—and the list goes on.  Even still, an interval exists 
between the Child’s body and the parental bodies.  This interval does not just denote physical 
and generational separation but, rather, an existential detachment.  For example, when a parent 
declares, “This is my daughter/son,” the parent implicitly specifies, in a somewhat performative 
manner mirroring the actual birth of the Child, the two largest signifiers that identify children: 
sex and lineage.  The first is important because in time it will socially inscribe gender 
expectations on the Child’s body.  The second, though, is immediately important, for the parent 
establishes origin, the Child’s place in history and genealogy.  The Child’s body signifies the 
parents.  Or rather, the Child’s body signifies the ephemeral existences of the parents.  Through 
the birth and the adding of another generation to their genealogy and the human race, the parents 
incidentally demarcate their enclosed position along the grandparent-parent-child continuum and, 
in doing such, retrace their ephemeral existences—their deaths.  Thus, while the Child 
signifies—or, to use a Derridean term, is a trace of—the parents, the Child’s body equally 
represents the opposite of the parents.  As the trace of the parents and as the Child lives on, the 
Child’s body then shows death back to the parents, or to any adult, not in that the Child itself 
represents death but instead represents the progression of time and the coming of their deaths.  
Rather, the Child seems to always signify life, potential, futurity, but through this symbolization, 
the Child’s body simultaneously forecasts the deaths of everyone else.   
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 In our biologically restrained world, if something shows life, it must equally adumbrate 
death: life must bring death, but death does not mean more life.  Logically, to murder the Child 
would not consequentially equate to a preclusion of this death symbol.  To kill the life-death 
symbol of the Child would seem to reemphasize twofold the death-half of the symbol.  First, to 
kill the Child, as a symbol of new life, would qualify the Child’s life as definitively ephemeral 
(according to the word’s etymological meaning), for the Child, relatively speaking and compared 
to the entire history of human existence, had barely lived at all.  Second, to kill the Child, as a 
symbol of biological, historical progression and death, would highlight both the precariousness 
of life and the destruction of the biological and genealogical future.  If the Child represents death 
because her/his new life means the death of everyone else, then the death of the Child, as a 
result, would signify a sterilization of the biological timeline.  If we have already recognized our 
deaths through the Child’s body and if the Child is then murdered, what then lies ahead except 
for our previously forecasted deaths without that perceivable hope and kinetic energy of the 
extrauterine Child?   
 Of course, one could merely suggest that life and procreation are cyclical, that the death 
of the extrauterine Child is always subsequently counterbalanced by the prospective life of the 
(to-be)-intrauterine Child, whose body would accordingly come to represent the same futurity 
and hope—hence, the Western obsession with the Spring and renaissance.  Such a claim still 
evades several significant points.  First, though our world has proven incidentally that new life 
tends to follow death, such a claim is not an absolute truth but is merely a happenstance and 
contingency.  Life can bring more life and will always bring death, but death never brings new 
life since death is, at least in the perceivable, earthly world, essentially sterilizing.  Following 
this logic, present life is what carries importance and is to be cherished, supported, uplifted—not 
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the uncertain and unstructured futures of the to-be-intrauterine.  If we assume all hope and 
futurity in the intrauterine, in “reproductive futurism,”31 and if one day we reach the point (which 
presently seems not too distant) when this world can no longer sustain or produce new life, all 
that will remain is death, and we will have surely reached a world with no future and no hope.  
Second, one could use such a claim to deny the significance and potential of the present living, 
or even their right to life, suggesting a kind of interchangeability and replaceability of one life 
with or for another to-be-life.  But, as already mentioned, if the interchangeability or 
replaceability of life becomes impractical or impossible, we again are left only with death, no 
future, no hope, for we had forgotten, denied, and negated the future and potential of all the 
extrauterine bodies.     
 This notion, in fact, seems to be the cardinal argument against infanticide in Les Justes.  
The goal of the revolution, as both Kaliayev and Stepan remark, is to uphold human honor and 
humanity against those who have sought to destroy, dehumanize, and deem certain lives abject 
and unworthy of mercy.  Simply, this communist revolution seeks a future where families are not 
starving and homeless while others eat voraciously and spend prodigally.  First, promoting and 
fighting for humanity while simultaneously killing extrauterine children is a hypocritical 
revolutionary tactic.  Second, if the revolution is to fight for a better future for the extrauterine 
but is to deem infanticide permissible, it would seem that the latter would theoretically negate the 
former, for what perceivable future are we fighting for with murdered extrauterine children?  The 
words of Kaliayev fortify this concern.  Upon returning from his first failed assassination 
attempt, Kaliayev tries to justify his hesitations and avers, “Je ne pouvais pas prévoir . . . Des 
enfants, des enfants surtout.  As-tu regardé des enfants?  Ce regard grave qu’ils ont parfois . . . Je 
                                                
31 This term is taken from Lee Edelmen’s book No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive.     
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n’ai jamais pu soutenir ce regard . . .”32 (54).  Kaliayev could not throw the bomb because he saw 
the children, their eyes, their grave visages, so obviously these faces meant something to him, 
something strong enough to momentarily override his murderous and revolutionary alacrity.  His 
impression of the children’s faces as dour and solemn seems the reason for his hesitation.  As 
Stepan suggests, one could say that Kaliayev, as a poet, is simply too sentimental.  However, 
there seems to be more to his hesitation, to his ethics and morals as a revolutionary terrorist.  
And the children’s grave faces seem to signify something more than just puerile unhappiness.  It 
seems, instead, that Kaliayev understands the paramountcy of the Child’s life to his 
revolutionary cause.  When he sees the faces of the Grand Duke’s niece and nephew, he does not 
see the visages of tyrannical lineage since that existential interval between the Child and the 
adult relative initially occludes such an immediate connection.  Instead, he sees the grave, grim, 
sad, and suffering faces of every child in the Russian Empire, or perhaps in the world, for whom 
he is supposed to be fighting.  To throw his bomb would then mean to negate his struggle and 
efforts by sterilizing (ephemeralizing) the Child’s existence and the future of the presently living 
humanity.         
 Overall, the Child (both intrauterine and extrauterine) does not wholly assume the future; 
however, this section focuses on the futurity fostered within the Child—that is, a futurity relative 
to genealogy, posterity, and the continuation of humanity.  The Child is not our future but we 
must not forget that the Child has a future, one that is existentially distinct from our own, yet 
again, as tendered by the existential interval between the Child and everyone else.  Though the 
Child does not metaphysically or ontologically change our futures, that is, the fact that our time 
is more limited than the Child’s time, if we understand that the Child holds a place beyond our 
                                                
32 I could not have foreseen this . . . Children, children especially.  Have you seen children?  This grave look that 
they sometimes have . . . I can never stand this look . . .” 
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time, that is, a time after our deaths, we then understand the Child as upholding humanity’s 
future but not the future of the individuals within humanity.  As such, the death of the Child, 
again, does not change the fact that our time is limited or that we still have a remaining future 
within that limited time; nevertheless, the Child’s death transitively symbolizes the sterilization 
of humanity’s futurity, that is, a human presence succeeding our own.  In Les Justes, the 
revolution is to ensure primarily a better life for the extrauterine, but resultantly the revolution is 
also to safeguard that this better life prevails in those generations after our own, for the 
extrauterine youth and their (to-be)-intrauterine.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THE STERILIZATION OF SEX(UALITY) AND THE STERILIZATION OF IDENTITY 
 
 With the Child and what the Child’s body signifies in mind, let us move on to the 
sterilization of sex(uality).  Yet again, I will ascribe a temporal understanding to sex(uality), or 
rather, how gender and sexuality produce various understandings of time.  If we are to apprehend 
the Child as assuming a role in futurism and in the works of Faulkner and Camus, then sex and 
sexuality have everything to do with time.  However, this understanding of reproductive futurism 
is heteronormative, not only for the reason that biology restricts procreation to heterosexual sex 
and insemination but also since reproduction (especially fertility and virility) and posterity are 
desired and considered virtuous among the heteroreproductive populace.  For this reason, this 
section will consider the theoretical differences between feminine and masculine conceptions of 
time apart from procreativity and will be followed by a third chapter on the existence of a “queer 
time” in the Faulknerian and Camusian canons—a time at variance with and often wholly 
contrary to the heterosexually valorized reproductive futurism or, as I will later call it, 
genealogical futurism.  
 This section will begin by exploring how Faulkner and Camus present masculine and 
feminine time.  Establishing the difference between feminine and masculine modes of time, I 
will use the theories of feminine temporality as proposed within the writings of Julia Kristeva, 
Hélène Cixous, and Luce Irigaray to aid our understanding of how the masculine and feminine 
differ.  I will argue that both authors present masculine time (linear and teleological) as 
domineering and superincumbent, often suppressing or effacing those modes of time that deviate 
from linearity and teleology, hence, generally a feminine mode of time but also, as I will later 
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discuss, queer temporal modalities.  In this chapter I will analyze the sterilizing effects of the 
masculine on the temporal experiences of Temple Drake in Sanctuary and Janine in “La Femme 
Adultère” from L’Exil et le Royaume.  However, the case does not always persist that the 
masculine sterilizes the feminine; rather, the opposite is often true, when the feminine indeed 
emasculates or, as I will later explain, castrates the masculine.  In what follows this conception, I 
will analyze the emasculation and metaphorical castrations of Quentin and Jason Compson in 
The Sound and the Fury.  I will also discuss how the castration of Benjy Compson is indicative 
of a sterilization of identity: his family anatomically castrates him and then temporally castrates 
him as they send him away to an asylum.  In Camus’s oeuvre, there is not an example of a 
feminine-induced emasculation or castration of masculine time as direct as in Faulkner’s, 
probably because women play, for the most part, much smaller roles than male characters in the 
Camusian canon.  Nevertheless, I will use my analyses of gendered time to transition to an 
examination of queer time in this study’s third chapter.  Building up the major topics of the 
Child, reproductive futurism, and feminine and masculine temporal modalities, my discussion of 
queer time will focus on Quentin and Camus’s Caligula, specifically how their psychologies 
reveal many similarities, namely repressed desires and manifest jouissance that reveal 
homoerotic and transgendered qualities as well as their desires for self-annihilation.  
 Understanding the difference between masculine time and feminine time, I often turn to 
the French feminists Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous, and Luce Irigaray, for they each present a 
uniquely different explanation of feminine time within different theoretical contexts, including 
semiotics, linguistics, sociology, psychoanalysis, and sexuality.  Resorting to the theories of 
Kristeva, Cixous, and Irigaray, I intend not to suggest that their theories represent unequivocally 
the feminine experience; rather, I consider the French feminists in this study because their 
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theories, I feel, best help to elucidate the unique temporal modalities that Temple and Janine 
experience in their respective stories.  Furthermore, their individual theories always stress a 
feminine opposition to a masculine linearity, teleology, and history that is ever so rampant in the 
Faulknerian and Camusian canons.  To begin our understanding of the difference between 
masculine and feminine, I turn to Kristeva’s essay “Le Temps des Femmes” (1979) wherein she 
explains that feminine time retains a sense of repetition and eternity:  
D’un côté: cycles, gestation, éternel retour d’un rythme biologique . . . . De l’autre côté, 
et peut-être par conséquent, la présence massive d’une temporalité monumentale, sans 
faille et sans fuite, qui a si peu à voir avec le temps linéaire qui passé que le nom même 
de temporalité ne lui convient pas, et qui, englobante et infinie comme l’espace 
imaginaire, fait penser . . . aux mythes de résurrection qui, dans toutes les croyances, 
perpétuent la trace d’un culte maternel antérieur ou concomitant et jusqu’à son 
élaboration le plus récente, la chrétienne, pour laquelle le corps de la Vierge Mère ne 
meurt pas mais passé, dans le même temps, d’un espace dans l’autre . . . .33 (7) 
 
 
Kristeva aligns the feminine with not only a sense of cyclical and circular time but also what she 
calls “monumental” time, a time that suggests eternity and is more concerned with spatiality than 
the progress of history.  Irigaray makes a similar statement about this sense of monumental time 
in An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1984), commenting on the cosmogonic ordering of time and 
space and the inversion of time and space in sexual difference: 
In the beginning was space and the creation of space, as is said in all theogonies.  
The gods, God, first create space.  And time is there, more or less, in the service of space.  
On the first day, the first days, the gods, God, make a world by separating the elements.  
This world is then peopled, and a rhythm is established among its inhabitants.  God 
would be time itself, lavishing or exteriorizing itself in its action in space, in places.   
Philosophy then confirms the genealogy of the task of the gods or God.  Time 
becomes the interiority of the subject itself, and space, its exteriority . . . .  The subject, 
                                                
33 “On the one hand, there are cycles, gestation, the eternal recurrence of a biological rhythm . . . . On the other hand, 
and perhaps as a consequence, there is a massive presence of monumental temporality, without cleavage or escape, 
which has so little to do with linear time (which passes) that the very word ‘temporality” hardly fits: All-
encompassing and infinite like imaginary space, this temporality reminds one of . . . the various myths of 
resurrection which, in all religious beliefs, perpetuate the vestige of an anterior or concomitant maternal cult, right 
up to its most recent elaboration, Christianity, in which the body of the Virgin Mother does not die but moves from 
one spatiality to another within the same time . . . “ (“Women’s Time”16-17) 
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the master of time, becomes the axis of the world’s ordering with its something beyond 
the moment and eternity: God[s].  [This God(s)] effects the passage between time and 
space.  Which  would be inverted in sexual difference?  Where the feminine is 
experienced as space, but often with connotations of the abyss and night . . . while the 
masculine is experienced as time.  (7; my italics)   
 
Thus, like Kristeva, Irigaray links the feminine with spatiality and eternity.  According to the 
cosmogony of most theogonies, space was created before time, man before woman, and for 
Irigaray this ordering initially links the masculine with space and the feminine with time.  But as 
a rhythm and custom became established, especially in the case of sexual difference, space and 
time, masculine and feminine were inverted, for it now seems the case that femininity is 
experienced as a space and masculinity conceived of in terms of time.   
 And why else would writers and philosophers for centuries refer to “Father” Time and 
“Mother” Earth (or Species)?  But the association of the feminine with space is not to say that the 
feminine does not have a specific time; rather, this feminine time is eclipsed by an oppressive 
masculine, which has seemingly become the standard conception of temporality.  In “Castration 
or Decapitation?” (originally “Le Sexe ou la Têtê?”), Cixous makes clear the oppressiveness of 
masculine time, citing as an example an ancient Chinese story about an army general ordered to 
make soldiers out of his king’s one hundred and eighty wives.  During the training, the general 
taught the wives how to walk in unison according to the “language of the drumbeat” (42).  Upon 
hearing these orders and the drumbeats, instead of complying, the women broke out in laughter.  
Irritated by this intractability, the king ordered the decapitation of the two head wives as to make 
examples out of them.  In her analysis of this story, Cixous explains that the masculine is an 
ordered and indoctrinating time, “governed by a rule that keeps time with two beats, three beats, 
four beats, with pipe and drum” (42).  For Cixous, feminine time, however, is more disorderly 
and less definable than the feminine times of Kristeva and Irigaray.  Yet, this disorderliness 
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carries a positive signification for Cixous since the feminine ridicule of masculine time, of the 
inane officiousness of the intervallic drumbeats, suggests an intransigence that fittingly interrupts 
and upsets the masculine.  And still, when the emasculating, disorderly feminine time indeed 
interrupts and undermines (castrates) the masculine, the masculine immediately retaliates by 
decapitating the feminine, silencing her voice, her laugh, her defiance in an attempt to restore 
masculine order and dominance.  For Cixous, although the masculine will respond 
disproportionately to feminine intransigence and the anxiety of castration with a desperate effort 
to restore male order, the feminine disorder is never completely silenced and the masculine order 
never completely restored.  Masculine time requires that the male mourn, resign to his loss(es), 
to his castration, to the cause-effect linearity of an irredeemable past.  The feminine loses 
without mourning, without holding onto loss, for the feminine time stresses not the origin, the 
outcome/end, or the supposed linear causality that connects origin to end; instead, the feminine is 
unbounded and endless (53-54).  For Cixous, the feminine is “neither outside nor in,” and 
recalling Kristeva and Irigaray, resists the interiority of masculine time, assuming a temporality 
“all-encompassing and infinite like imaginary space” (Cixous 54; Kristeva 16). 
 Applying Kristeva’s, Irigaray’s, and Cixous’s theories and arguments to Faulkner’s and 
Camus’s canons, we see a striking similarity between the relationships of Temple Drake and 
Popeye in Sanctuary and of Janine and Marcel in “La Femme Adultère,” especially the concept 
of a masculine castration anxiety reacting with sexism and misogyny (metaphorical decapitation) 
with the goal of re-objectifying, interiorizing, and suppressing the feminine.  To avoid confusion 
or the accusation of an incorrect comparison, there are also significant differences between these 
two relationships.  Janine and Marcel are husband and wife, and, presumably, they mutually 
agreed on their union whereas the “relationship” between Temple and Popeye is one of rape, 
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abduction, and enslavement.  Accordingly, my goal is not to imply that Marcel, who Janine often 
describes as a decent, kind, hardworking man, is as comparably worthy of opprobrium as 
Popeye.  However, my goal will be to illuminate in both cases—the one seemingly innocuous, 
the other explicitly reprehensible—a masculine time that, when threatened with emasculation, 
sexual sterility, and impotence, reacts by precluding and sterilizing (with devastating success) an 
emerging and threatening feminine time.  Following these examples, I will then refer to the cases 
of Quentin and Jason Compson, whose senses of time are effectively emasculated and castrated 
by their sister, Caddy, and her daughter, so much so, in fact, that Quentin and Jason retaliate, to 
no avail, by attempting to reestablish a masculine order.  I will also refer to the (temporal) 
castration of Benjy Compson relative to his position as a character deemed abject by his family, 
whose anachronistic morality consequently castrates their youngest child’s life-time, for not only 
is he physically castrated but also he is eventually sent away to an asylum where, essentially, he 
is to die. 
 In Sanctuary and “La Femme Adultère,” Temple and Janine find themselves unwillingly 
displaced from their homes by male characters: Temple is raped and abducted by Popeye and 
taken to a brothel in Memphis; Janine is taken on her husband’s painfully long business trip 
across Algeria, not because she is simply Marcel’s wife and accompanying her spouse on a 
getaway but essentially because she is one of his employees.  In the beginning of Sanctuary, 
Faulkner introduces a young, ingenuous, and carefree Temple Drake, a simple sorority débutante 
who relishes in her sociality and the ceremonious living of the Southern aristocracy.  By mid-
book, kidnapped and thrown in a brothel, Temple consumes the culture of the Memphis 
underground and progressively exhibits sexual frustration and confusion as she eventually 
expresses her desire to become a man.  By the end we see Temple’s identity completely effaced; 
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the girl who at the beginning was described as constantly moving, ebullient, frivolous, and 
independent has now degenerated into a state of insufferable and abject lethargy, her mind 
assumed by a chasmic nothingness, her being awaiting the ultimate sterility of death.  In “La 
Femme Adultère” we are introduced to a middle-aged, diffident, and listless Janine who seems 
stuck emotionally, romantically, and, quite literally, physically, for she and Marcel are on an 
agonizingly slow bus ride.  Janine often questions how she has acquired her present body and 
life, remembering her years as a young, confident, flirtatious gymnast.  We also notice her sexual 
frustration: Marcel seems sexually, if not entirely, uninterested in his wife.  Camus equally 
suggests that Marcel is likely impotent or sterile, and Janine mentions several times the fact that 
they have yet to, or ever will, propagate.  However, as the day passes to night, Janine has a brief 
outburst of frenzied desire, leaving her husband in bed and dashing out into the desert where a 
sensation of liberation and sexual jouissance comes over her.  However, once the jouissance 
passes and the hope of liberation abates, Janine returns to her bed, her husband, weeping and 
intimating an air of defeat.   
 Thus, in both stories, Temple and Janine find themselves hurled into an abyss of 
existential degradation and degeneration that renders both women in states of nihilistic 
hopelessness.  But what do these transformations say about how Temple and Janine experience 
time, or, rather, how their understandings and experiences of time change drastically because of 
an overwhelming masculine control?  When we first meet Temple and Janine within their 
respective stories, we indeed meet two completely different women—their appearance, their age, 
their romantic lives, their prospects, everything about them would seem initially in opposition.  
For this reason, both characters deserve individual intention paid to their particular 
circumstances.  Even still, their stories do share that same quality of a distinctly feminine time 
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and reality at difference to a belligerent masculinity that deliberately threatens the very survival 
of the feminine.  And although they fight (nonviolently) and attempt to abscond and debase their 
masculine manacles, in the end, despite their appreciable though obscured triumphs, both 
Temple and Janine find themselves without time, without futurity except for that masculine 
linearity leading them directly towards death.    
 
Temple 
Introducing his reader to a young and vivacious Temple Drake, Faulkner’s opening 
description of this ingenuous teenager insinuates that Temple (her body, her image, her quiddity) 
exists outside of or transcends time.  At the same time, Faulkner also introduces Temple in a 
scene filled with collegiate and non-collegiate boys who are almost obnoxiously watchful of her 
every move, as if she were their prey, their game.  However, Faulkner complicates this situation 
by placing, in fact, Temple as the dominant in this predation dyad—her prey, the many 
onlooking male suitors: 
Townspeople taking after-supper drives through the college grounds or an 
oblivious and bemused faculty-member or a candidate for a master’s degree on his way to 
the library would see Temple, a snatched coat under her arm and her long legs blonde 
with running, in speeding silhouette against the lighted windows of the Coop . . . 
vanishing into the shadow beside the library wall, and perhaps a final squatting swirl of 
knickers or whatnot as she sprang in the car waiting there with engine running on that 
particular night. . . . [T]he town boys, lounging in attitudes of belligerent casualness, with 
their identical hats and upturned collars, watched her enter the gymnasium upon black 
collegiate arms and vanish in a swirling glitter upon a glittering swirl of music, with her 
high delicate head and her bold painted mouth and soft chin, her eyes blankly right and 
left looking, cool, predatory, and discreet.   
Later, the music wailing beyond the glass, they would watch her through the 
windows as she passed in swift rotation from one pair of black sleeves to the next, her 
waist shaped slender and urgent in the interval, her feet filling the rhythmic gap with 
music.  Stooping they would drink from flasks and light cigarettes, then erect again, 
motionless against the light . . . like a row of hatted and muffled busts cut from black tin 
and nailed to the window-sills.  (Sanctuary 28-29; my italics) 
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In this excerpt, Faulkner illustrates Temple as being in constant motion, both purposeful and 
aimless, though throughout the novel Faulkner insinuates that Temple moves only without 
thought or objective.  Nevertheless, this passage certainly evokes at the very least a desire and 
visceral motive to her motion even if evading a productive and practical rationale.  Temple’s 
body, her image are described as constantly vanishing and reappearing, rotating and swirling.  
Thus, her movement seems not only impetuous and frivolous but also furtive and stealthily 
predacious as if she is trying to conceal herself and her intentions and to deceive her spectatorial, 
voyeuristic male audience.  While the nocturnal intentions and sexual prospects of the “black 
collegiate arms” and town boys are quite obvious from their disposition of paradoxically 
“belligerent casualness,” Temple, however, in her aimless swirling and twirling, stymies her 
male counterparts’ desires to progress from juvenescent sociality to bedroom intimacy.  
Consequently, as we read in the above passage, while Temple swirls about the gymnasium, the 
men are described as “motionless” and “nailed to the window-sills,” almost completely inactive 
as their presence is only meant to assist Temple’s dancing from “one pair of black sleeves to the 
next” or to attribute a pathetic futility to this scene’s pervasive voyeurism.  Consequently, 
Faulkner depicts an initial contrast between the feminine and the masculine gravid with Cixous’s 
theory regarding sexual difference.  Temple is disorderly and frivolous yet discreet and 
predacious; she has no schedule, no ultimate goal for her evening, no purpose to her frivolous 
dancing, and yet her entire image and movement denies the masculine gazes and desires and 
immobilizes their bodies.  
Yet, both this passage and Faulkner’s novel present other initial contrasts between 
feminine and masculine modalities of time.  If we analyze this passage according to the theories 
of Kristeva, Irigaray, and Cixous, we see a unique distinction between the masculine and the 
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feminine wherein a feminine time disrupts, if only temporarily, a masculine order.  In “Le Temps 
des Femmes” Kristeva defines masculine time as “projet, téléologie, déroulement linéaire et 
prospectif; le temps du départ, du cheminement et de l’arrivée, bref le temps de l’histoire”34 
which is commensurate with Horace Benbow’s claim that “nature is ‘she’ and Progress is ‘he’” 
(Kristeva 7; Sanctuary 15; my italics).  Kristeva also notes the masculine temporality in 
linguistics and syntax:  
 On peut y ajouter, en outre, que ce temps [le temps masculin], appelons-le linéaire, est 
 celui de langage comme énonciation de phrase (syntagme nominal + syntagme verbal; 
 topic-comment; début-fin) et qu’il se soutient de sa butée qui est d’ailleurs celle de cette 
 énonciation-là, la mort.35 (7) 
 
Applying a Kristevean understanding of syntax and logic to Faulkner’s text, in general, we note 
the masculinity of the Faulknerian enunciation.  In fact, Sartre describes the Faulknerian 
sentence as the “And . . . and . . . and then” style of chronological addition (La Nouvelle Revue 
Française 52.1 1058).  However, in this passage describing Temple, this progressive, sequential 
and is lacking, at least in the usage of diegetic addition, and, instead, we see an insistence on 
simultaneity or, even, atemporality.  This insistence on a time other than the progressive, linear 
time of the masculine is recognized initially in the profusion of present participles—vanishing, 
waiting, running, lounging, swirling, glittering, squatting, stooping, wailing, filling and so on.  
The present participles, whether used verbally or adjectivally, evoke an action in the continuous 
aspect, the effect of which is an extension of duration and processual incompletion (denoted by 
the imperfect tense) of what would naturally be finite activity and sequentially discrete events.  
Hence, the profusion of present participles insists on the simultaneity of various actions and 
                                                
34 “project, teleology, linear and prospective unfolding; time as departure, progression, and arrival; in short, the time 
of history.” 
35 “One can add, in addition, that this time [masculine time], call it linear, is that of language as the enunciation of 
sentences (nominal syntagm + verbal syntagm; topic-comment; beginning-end), and that it is supported by its own 
stumbling block, which is also the stumbling block of that enunciation–death.” 
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atemporal description rather than diegetic sequentiality, potentially highlighting another 
preliminary distinction between feminine time and masculine linearity. 
Equally opposed to masculine linearity is the immediate imagery of circles and spirals in 
this passage, especially the chiastic structure that Faulkner uses within these images: Temple 
“[vanishes] in a swirling glitter upon a glittering swirl of music.”  The chiastic structure of the 
“swirling glitter . . . glittering swirl” not only notes the circularity and frivolity of Temple’s 
movements but also highlights a phantasmagoric quality in her description.  With the notion of 
phantasmagoria, we notice both phantasmatic (fantasy and phantasm) and phantomatic (spectral) 
elements in Temple’s description, though both qualities are essentially inseparable.  Faulkner 
stresses the incorporeality of Temple’s body, movement, and existence, especially with her 
vanishing, swirling, and glittering and with the account that Temple’s body vanishes within the 
transient music and, in fact, her body actually becomes the music as her “feet [fill] the rhythmic 
gap with music.”  Moreover, the chiasmus and the phantasmagoria emphasize spatiality rather 
than temporality: Temple’s body, although seemingly incorporeal, moves from place to place 
within space in a dreamlike, or spectral, sequence of surreal description.  This incorporeality and 
phantasmagoria evoke what Kristeva notes as monumental time (“all-encompassing and infinite 
like imaginary space”) and what Irigaray deduces as the cosmogonic connection between the 
feminine and spatiality.      
 But, as I have already suggested, Temple’s metaphysical experience changes across the 
novel’s trajectory, and, hence, we must now consider Popeye and his influence on Temple’s 
metaphysics.  When Popeye and Temple first meet, we immediately recognize that Popeye 
seems threatened by Temple, especially by her flirtatiousness and presumptuousness.  As Temple 
slowly emasculates and aggravates Popeye, he eventually responds by raping and abducting her, 
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his attempt to reassert his masculinity and silence Temple’s derisive and threatening femininity.  
In the previous excerpt, Faulkner notes the tension between the masculine and the feminine with 
not only the voyeuristic and belligerently casual male audience but also Temple’s “predatory” 
disposition.  Her predacious mien is significant when she first meets Popeye, for we notice 
Popeye’s insecurities and fear of emasculation that stem from various reasons, primarily his 
appearance and impotence.  Temple’s predacity consists of two components: coquetry and 
derision.  Faulkner suggests that because Temple is a gorgeous young woman, often the men in 
her life willingly do everything for her, and, as a result, she can easily resort to coquetry to get 
what she wants.  While stranded with Gowan, at the Old Frenchman Place after a car accident, 
Temple runs into Popeye during a panic, and Faulkner writes, “Without ceasing to run she 
appeared to pause.  Even her flapping coat did not overtake her, yet for an appreciable instant she 
faced Popeye with a grimace of taut, toothed coquetry.  He did not stop; the finicking swagger of 
his narrow back did not falter” (48).  Even in a panic, Temple instinctively resorts to 
flirtatiousness, trying to charm Popeye into helping her.  Popeye, though, responds impertinently, 
his walk redolent with mincing fastidiousness.  Thus, Faulkner presents a curious arrangement: 
Temple flirts with a man who responds to her coquettishness with an affected and effeminate 
gait.  Thus, this moment impels us to question Popeye’s sexuality, even before we recognize his 
dearth of sexual virility.  And soon after this aforementioned encounter, we see that Popeye 
indeed seems threatened by Temple, particularly when she again tries to flirt with him and coax 
him into driving herself and Gowan back to Jefferson: “ ‘Say,’ she said, ‘don’t you want to drive 
us to town?”  (49).  Temple’s question is rhetorically strategized as less interrogative and more 
boldly intrusive and presumptuous as she tries to flirtatiously manipulate Popeye by imposing 
her needs and desires on this mysterious man.  Popeye quickly responds negatively, to which 
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Temple responds by prying presumptuously and condescendingly, “Come one. . . . Be a sport” 
(49).  Though Temple’s asking of Popeye to be a “sport” is probably a consequence of her 
ingenuousness, the imperative itself could be read as patronizing, especially since Popeye then 
responds with an invective: “Make your whore lay off of me, Jack [Gowan]” (49).  Popeye’s 
castigatory imperative to Gowan is obviously not only a demand that Gowan control his 
girlfriend but also an insult at Temple, revealing that her effrontery is angering him.  Temple, of 
course, responds with more direct mockery, first, ridiculing Popeye about his appearance: “What 
river did you fall in with that suit on?  Do you have to shave it off at night?”; and second, by 
shouting, “You mean old thing!” at Popeye as he stands menacingly still and silent, coldly 
starring at the agitated, impetuous young woman.  Popeye’s disposition indicates that Temple’s 
insults have aggravated him indeed.  The relationship between Temple and Popeye becomes 
more complex and abusive as the novel continues; however, this altercation highlights the 
victim-victimizer dialectic of their relation, as both Temple and Popeye constantly vacillate 
between both sides.  Still, in this scene, we notice the building tension between Temple and 
Popeye, especially Temple’s attempts to use her femininity to manipulate and ridicule Popeye 
and Popeye’s reaction of trying to reassert his masculinity.                   
 The complexity of Temple and Popeye’s victim-victimizer relationship notwithstanding, 
in the pages leading up to the infamously egregious rape scene, Popeye assumes predominantly 
the role of the victimizer.  As such, his role as victimizer aims toward subduing and silencing the 
presumptuously derisive and impetuous Temple.  But, Popeye is not merely interested in 
overpowering Temple and asserting some notion of masculine superiority; rather, Popeye wants 
to corrupt her, control her, and transform her into an obedient sex slave—Temple has already 
proven herself flirtatious, but she must be made biddable and sexually willing.  As a result, 
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Popeye would have not only subdued and reasserted his masculine, authoritative desires over a 
woman who simultaneously arouses and threatens him but also proved his masculinity to the 
numerous men who notice his “queer” and fastidious idiosyncrasies and his dainty physique (4). 
Popeye’s first step towards controlling and corrupting Temple is by raping her with a corncob.     
 In Faulkner’s suggestively gruesome36 rape scene, we indeed remark the beginning of 
Temple’s transformation, especially the sterilization of her identity.  In this scene, Faulkner 
begins Temple’s transformation by slowly breaking down her sensory acuity as Popeye 
approaches and violates her—the rape eventually representing a consummate effacement and 
replacement of her original identity with the identity of her victimizer.  The scene begins with 
Popeye killing Tommy, who is both guarding and making approaches at Temple.  Following the 
murder as Popeye approaches Temple, Faulkner writes: 
To Temple, sitting in the cottonseed-hull and the corncobs, the sound [of the gun] 
was no louder than the striking of a match: a short, minor sound shutting down upon the 
scene, the instant, with a profound finality, completely isolating it, and she sat there, her 
legs straight before her, her hand limp and palms-up on her lap, looking at Popeye’s 
tight back and the ridges of his coat across, against his flank, wisping thinly along his leg. 
He turned and looked at her.  He waggled the pistol slightly and put it back in his 
coat, then he walked toward her.  Moving, he made no sound at all; the released door 
yawned and clapped against the jamb, but it made no sound either; it was as though 
sound and silence had become inverted.  She could hear silence in a thick rustling as he 
moved toward her through it, thrusting it aside, and she began to say Something is going 
to happen to me.  She was saying it to the old man with the yellow clots for eyes.  
“Something is happening to me!” she screamed at him, sitting in his chair in the sunlight, 
his hands crossed on the top of the stick.  “I told you it was!” she screamed, voiding the 
words like hot silent bubbles into the bright silence about them until he turned his head 
and the two phlegmclots above her where she lay tossing and trashing on the rough, 
sunny boards.  “I told you!  I told you all the time!”  (102; my italics) 
 
At this point, Faulkner immediately notes that we are reading Temple’s thoughts and perceptions 
about the transpiring events, and so we notice Temple’s nightmarish perception of what is 
happening.  To Temple, sound and silence have been inverted: those sounds which she would 
                                                
36 I say “suggestively gruesome” since Faulkner deliberately and carefully withholds obscene details, though various 
specifics about the rape are revealed throughout the novel as Temple remembers and relives the assault. 
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expect to hear (like the shooting of a gun, the shutting of a door, and the footsteps of someone 
else) are imperceptible, while the silence (the motionless air and space between herself and 
Popeye) is terrifyingly audible.  This synesthetic inversion indicates not only the surreally 
nightmarish quality of this scene but also that Temple is in such a state of fear and panic that her 
sensory perception has essentially been disengaged.  As Popeye advances toward Temple, she 
begins to suffer the obliteration of her universe and metaphysical boundaries.  Additionally, the 
impetuous, frivolous, and vivacious débutante to whom we were introduced earlier in the novel 
as constantly moving and dancing, as swirling, glittering, and vanishing, and as predatory is now 
characterized as motionless and limp, her hands “plam-up,” suggesting surrender, 
defenselessness, and fatality.  For the rest of the novel, Faulkner generally describes Temple as 
being limp, inert, and useless, as if she now embodies her victimizer’s flaccid penis.  Finally, we 
notice an insistence on Temple’s existential negation.  She screams, “Something is going to 
happen to me. . . . ‘Something is happening to me!’ . . . ‘I told you it was!’”; however, since 
sound and silence have been transposed, her screams are mere nothingness.  Faulkner even 
writes that the intended noise of her screaming “void[s] [her] words like hot silent bubbles into 
the bright silence about them.”  Thus, the “silence” of her screaming negates her distress and call 
for help to a silent and uncaring world.  Temple searches for sanctuary and soundness, but 
merely receives silence, nothingness, and sexual abuse.  Later in the novel, Temple will 
continually refer to the “shucks” and the horrifyingly uproarious sounds they make.  When she 
remembers the shucks and the corncob with which Popeye violated her, she infuses sound back 
into this scene, into her memory of this nightmare.  By doing such, she rectifies and reorders this 
scene’s sensory erasure, reestablishing her reality but only according to the rape, to the negation 
and sterilization of her identity.       
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 Nevertheless, Temple’s transformation (the sterilization of her identity) does not end after 
the rape.  In fact, we eventually witness Temple voice her desire to become a man, consequently 
obliterating the feminine with the masculine order that has taken over her life.  This desire to 
become a man ultimately stems from the memory of her rape, and her attempt to negate her 
femininity becomes an attempt to control her past.  At first, Temple’s initial identity is eradicated 
and replaced with a mentality and physicality akin to Popeye’s, especially his flaccid penis: she 
is corporeally limp and lifeless, and later she becomes incredibly sexual, borderline salacious and 
sadistic.  However, Temple eventually comes to regard Popeye as a coward, as less than a “real 
mean,” and so, she desires to become such a “real man,” strong and dominant, as someone who 
can control and please a women, of which Popeye is no longer capable.  During a sexual 
interaction with Popeye, during which Temple continually voices her frustration with Popeye’s 
inability to gain an erection and please her, she begins to imagine herself as a man who could not 
only sexually please herself but who could also intimidate Popeye:  
Then he was standing over and she was saying Come on.  Touch me.  Touch me!  You’re 
a coward if you don’t.  Coward!  Coward!  
“ . . . Then it touched me, that nasty little cold hand, fiddling around inside the 
coat where I was naked.  It was like alive ice and my skin started jumping away from it 
like those little flying fish in front of a boat.  It was like my skin knew which way it was 
going to go before it started moving, and my skin would keep on jerking just ahead of it 
like there wouldn’t be anything there when the hand got there. 
 “Then it got down to where my insides begin . . . and my insides started bubbling 
and going on and the shucks began to make so much noise it was like laughing.  I’d think 
they were laughing at me because all the time his hand was going inside the top of my 
knickers and I hadn’t changed into a boy yet. 
 “ . . . But I kept on saying Coward!  Coward!  Touch me, coward!  I got mad, 
because he was so long doing it.  I’d talk to him, I’d say Do you think I’m going to lie 
here all night, just waiting on you?  I’d say.  Let me tell you what I’ll do, I’d say.  And 
I’d lie there with shucks laughing at me and me jerking away in front of his hand and I’d 
think what I’d say to him.  I’d talk to him like the teacher does in school, and then I was 
a teacher in school and it [Popeye] was a little black thing like a nigger boy . . . I had 
iron-gray hair and spectacles and I was all big up here like women get. . . .  And I was 
telling it what I’d do, and it [Popeye’s penis] kind of drawing up and drawing up like it 
could already see the switch. 
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 “Then I said that wont do.  I ought to be a man.  So I was an old man, with a long 
white beard, and then the little black man got littler and littler and I was saying Now.  
You see now.  I’m a man now.  Then I thought about being a man, and as soon as I 
thought it, it happened.  It [Popeye’s penis] made a kind of plopping sound, like blowing 
a little rubber tube wrongside outward.  It felt cold, like the inside of your mouth when 
you hold it open.  I could feel it, and I lay right still to keep from laughing about how 
surprised he was going to be.  (218-220; my italics)  
 
In this confusing passage, we obviously notice that Temple has assumed the place of the 
victimizer, though she still recalls the time when Popeye victimized her with the “laughing” 
shucks.  Temple then notices the icy lifelessness of Popeye’s hand (penis), its glacial touch 
apparently revolting to her skin.  Temple then remarks that when Popeye’s hand reaches her 
groin, “there wouldn’t be anything there.”  This remark suggests that Temple has not yet 
transformed herself into a man, though she indeed indicates her desire for her clitoris to be a 
penis.  Also, this statement aligns the feminine genitalia with negation (castration), the feminine 
with a sense of nothingness, a notion wholly anathema to the notion of the feminine that Temple 
originally represented but which still illuminates her transformed perception of her femininity 
and feminine body.  When Popeye attempts to penetrate Temple, either with his cold figures or 
with his flaccid penis, Temple remembers the rape and the shucks, knowing all the while that if 
she were a man and, thus, without female genitalia, Popeye could not have raped her.  
Consequently, because Popeye is able to either masturbate or penetrate Temple, she immediately 
realizes that she still possess a feminine body and, hence, has not “changed into a boy yet.”  Not 
only has Faulkner completely estranged Temple from her previous identity but also he associates 
her gender, sex, and sexuality with nothingness and negation, as the reasons why she currently 
feels hopeless and insignificant.  Desperate to end her trauma, by attempting psychologically to 
transform her clitoris into a phallus, Temple literally tries to fill her void and add meaning back 
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into her life.  Yet, such a transformation would be impossible so long as Popeye fills the role of 
the masculine and attempts to penetrate Temple’s insides.   
Inevitably, to revise the gender and sexual roles, Temple continues to deride Popeye, 
explicitly voicing her annoyance with his impotence: “Do you think I’m going to lie here all 
night, just waiting on you?”  Temple then shifts to a scene where she is a mature, female teacher 
and Popeye, her obedient, reprovable student.  Temple, yet again, comments on Popeye’s 
flaccidity, noting that his penis is “drawing up and drawing up,” or shrinking at the sight of the 
teacher’s switch, or wooden stick to be used punitively against the reproachable student.  Finally, 
Temple then realizes that this teacher-student image is not satisfactory, for she would still be a 
woman.  Temple then imagines herself as a man who successfully intimidates Popeye, thus, 
transposing herself into the masculine role and Popeye into the feminine.  Temple declares that 
she is now a man, and as such actually performs a kind of psychosomatic sex change, imagining 
Popeye’s penis reconstructed into a clitoris (“like blowing a little rubber tube wrongside 
outward”).  Additionally, when she states that she “thought about being a man, and as soon as 
[she] thought it, it happened.  It made a kind of plopping sound,” the first “it” refers to her own 
penis and subliminal sex change while the second and third “it” refer to Popeye’s penis being 
transformed into a clitoris, noting that his penis felt like the inside of an open mouth, obviously 
summoning a metaphor for the labia and vaginal walls.  Successfully imagining Popeye’s and 
her own sex/gender reassignment surgeries, Temple then relishes in the image of Popeye placing 
his hand on her groin, shocked and angered by the fact that he has found male organs instead of 
feminine genitalia—this image, for Temple, being the ultimate retributive act and transposition 
of the sex and gender roles.  Nonetheless, as she falls asleep waiting for Popeye to climax, 
Temple’s fantasy soon vanishes, eradicated by a nightmarish recollection of the shucks.  
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Therefore, Faulkner successfully illustrates the sterilization of the feminine by silencing and 
subduing the feminine as well as transmogrifying the feminine sex into the masculine as Temple 
desires to change her past.  Popeye’s castration-anxiety/emasculation and sexual violation of 
Temple as a means of reestablishing his masculine dominance are both essentially what incite 
Temple’s transformation and the sterilization of her identity.  Unfortunately, since Temple 
cannot actually give herself a phallus, she must remain a woman anatomically and, therefore, 
must constantly remember the horrors of her past.   
Thus far, I have spoken of a gender difference between masculine time and feminine 
time, but the previous excerpt raises the question of how sexuality and sexual difference alter 
temporality.  Again, the difference rests between a linear, teleological time and a circular and 
regenerative time.  In An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray speaks of the fecundity of the 
feminine sexual experience and orgasm, noting its regenerative nature and continual newness:  
. . . she moves in harmony with the fecundity of nature. . . . Intimately tied to universal 
circulation and vibration that go beyond any enclosure within reproduction.  Turing in a 
cycle that never resolves back to sameness.  More passive than any voluntary passivity, 
yet not foreign to the act of creating/procreating the world.  Within her something takes 
place, between earth and sky, in which she participates as in a continual gestation, a 
mystery to be deciphered.  (195)   
 
If Faulkner limned the descriptions of Temple and her temporal experiences according to his 
original description, Irigaray’s postulation would seem a perfect match.  The original Temple 
transcended time, danced across space and musical vibrations, swirled and twirled in infinite 
spirals of phantasmatic euphoria, and was truly a mystery to be deciphered.  However, the new 
Temple who desires to be a man no longer experiences time and space as she did once before.  
Instead, she wishes to eradicate her feminine identity, and as we observed in the latter excerpt 
from the novel, she wishes to negate and transform her feminine sexuality into a masculine one.  
We also notice in the previous excerpt from Sanctuary that Temple’s thoughts now follow the 
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“and . . . and . . . and then” syntactic structure of masculine linearity and chronological addition, 
further indicating how the masculine order has supplanted her femininity.  Moreover, this 
excerpt from Irigaray also proposes a distinctly feminine sexual experience with a distinctly 
feminine temporal experience.  Irigaray’s insistence on the memory and regeneration of the 
feminine sexual experience and orgasm indicates that each orgasm is singularly different yet 
interconnected as the interval between orgasms is diminished by a mnemonic tactility and 
cyclical nature, and so no single orgasm constitutes a complete consummation or ending.  The 
masculine experience of sex, then, is defined relatively by an up-and-down, in-and-out motion 
that seeks a terminal, isolated orgasm as the linear project and conclusion.  As such, masculine 
sexuality comes to represent sameness, each act of masturbation or fornication directed at the 
same desire, at reaching the same goal.  In Sanctuary, Faulkner notably depicts the temporality 
of masculine sexuality via the velocity of cars bolting down straight roads and through tunnels.  
As Popeye abducts and drives Temple to Memphis directly after raping her, Faulkner writes:  
Popeye drove swiftly but without any quality of haste or of flight, down the clay 
road and into the sand.  Temple was beside him. . . . she swayed limply to the lurching of 
the car.  She lurched against Popeye, lifting her hand in limp reflex.  Without releasing 
the wheel he thrust her back with his elbow.  “Brace yourself,” he said.  “Come one, 
now.” . . .  
When they reached the tree Popeye swung the car out of the road and drove it 
crashing into the undergrowth and through the prone tree-top and back into the road 
again in a running popping of cane-stalk like musketry along a trench, without any 
diminution of speed. . . . 
Popeye swung back into the sandy ruts.  Yet there was no flight in the action; He 
performed it with a certain vicious petulance, that was all.  It was a powerful car.”  
(Sanctuary 136-7; my italics)  
 
In addition, later, writing about a series of delusions that cause Horace Benbow to vomit in terror 
and disgust, Faulkner writes: 
Lying with her [Horace’s] head lifted slightly, her chin depressed like a figure lifted 
down from a crucifix, she watched something black and furious go roaring out of her 
pale body.  She was bound naked on her back on a flat car moving at speed through a 
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black tunnel, the blackness streaming in rigid threads overhead, a roar of iron wheels in 
her ears.  The car shot bodily from the tunnel in a long upward slant, the darkness 
overhead now shredded with parallel attenuations of living fire, toward a crescendo like a 
held breath, an interval in which she would swing faintly and lazily in nothingness filled 
with pale, myriad points of light.  (233; my italics) 
 
In both passages, Faulkner substitutes the phallus with the car as the object of sexual penetration.  
For Popeye, the substitution takes place, like with the corncob, because of his impotence.  For 
Horace, the substitution takes place because in his delusion he imagines himself a woman, 
essentially transmogrifying himself into Temple’s position during her rape and during her car 
ride with Popeye to Memphis, and thus, regenerating the explicit nature of this automotive 
rapidity.  In the first excerpt, Popeye drives his car back and forth between the road and the sand 
and shrubbery that would seemingly line the highway—this back-and-forth motion of the car is 
indicative of the back-and-forth penetration of the phallus.  Eventually, the car makes its final 
move by driving back into the sand, the consummation of Popeye’s aggressive driving and of the 
implicit sex act.  Shortly following this passage, Temple remarks that she is “still bleeding,” 
which insinuates this scene’s sexual brutality (137).  In the second excerpt, the carnality is much 
more explicit with images of the car shooting “bodily” in and out of a dark tunnel, eventually 
reaching a “crescendo,” an orgasm.  Accordingly, both excerpts show the masculine sexual 
experience as a project of departure and arrival, focused on that conclusion and goal of a 
discrete, discontinuous climax.    
   And Temple desires this discontinuous, disconnected climax since to have this masculine 
sexual experience would mean not only that she is no longer a women and therefore can negate 
her past but also upon intercourse she would then not be reminded of her past, the masculine 
experience focused on the teleological end rather than a regenerative, monumental experience.  
As Popeye touches Temple and begins to penetrate her, she cannot help remembering and 
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reliving her rape.  The shucks always return since she cannot successfully negate her biological 
sex and genitalia.  Temple desperately desires a sexual experience and orgasm wholly 
disconnected from her past, both metaphysically and sexually—an experience like that of a 
speeding car constantly distancing itself further from the past—because she can no longer bear 
her feminine existence and the memory triggered by her female anatomy.  Accordingly, Faulkner 
initially presents a feminine sexuality and temporality as an experience and pleasure that, as 
Irigaray elucidates, “moves in harmony with the fecundity of nature,” is a “transcendence of life.  
Still in the future, always being reborn . . . a new morning, a new spring, a new dawn,” but later 
transforms this cosmic, sublime experience into a living hell (Irigaray 195; 197).  And it is the 
overbearing, castration-fearing masculine that turns Temple’s life into this nightmare, silencing 
not only her voice, as Cixous would claim, in retaliation for her threatening, emasculating tongue 
but also her being, her desire and ability to exist in a cosmos of harmonious regeneration, 
incorporeality, atemporality, and infinity where she is unrestricted by the projects and telos of 
masculine time.  For Temple, although she tries to abate her nightmare, ultimately, her futureless 
future has been sealed, and at the novel’s close, free from Popeye’s cold, evil grip and with her 
father in Paris, Faulkner illustrates that her transformation has reached completion as he 
describes her in a scene and state entirely antithetical to his original introduction of her character:  
It had been a gray day, a gray summer, a gray year. . . . in the Luxembourg 
Gardens as Temple and her father passed the women sat knitting shawls and even the 
men playing croquet played in coats and capes, and in the sad gloom of the chestnut trees 
the dry click of balls, the random shouts of children, had that quality of autumn, gallant 
and evanescent and forlorn.  From beyond the circle with it spurious Greek balustrade, 
clotted with movement, filled with gray light of the same color and texture as the water 
which the fountain played into the pool, came a steady crash of music. . . .  
In the pavilion a band in the horizon blue of the army played Massenet and 
Scriabin, and Berlioz like a thin coating of tortured Tschaikovosky [sic] on a slice of stale 
bread while the twilight dissolved in wet gleams from the branches, onto the pavilion and 
the sombre toadstools and umbrellas.  Rich and resonant the brasses crashed and died in 
the thick green twilight, rolling over them in rich sad waves.  Temple yawned behind her 
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hand, then she took out a compact and opened it upon a face in miniature sullen and 
discontented and sad. . . . She closed the compact and from beneath her smart new hat 
she seemed to follow with her eyes the waves of music, to dissolve into the dying brasses, 
across the pool and the opposite semicircle of trees where at sombre intervals the dead 
tranquil queens in stained marble mused, and on into the sky lying prone and vanquished 
in the embrace of the season of rain and death.  (317; my italics) 
 
In this final scene, Temple and her father are in the Luxembourg Gardens around twilight.  
Immediately, we notice the stark contrasts between the setting, tone, and Temple's disposition.  
The lush, Parisian beauty is paradoxically inundated with artificiality and unreality, deterioration 
and death37: the day and light are gray, the twilight is green and dissolving, the Greek balustrade 
is “spurious,” the “sad gloom” of the chestnut trees is “evanescent and forlorn,” the band is 
“torturing” a Tchaikovskian composition which the narrator relates to “stale bread,” the brass 
instruments “crashed and died,” the marble statues are dead, the band’s music is dissolving, the 
sky is “prone and vanquished,” and the “season of rain and death” is approaching.  This scene 
carries an air of lifelessness and staleness, an already-belonging-to-the-past moribundity wherein 
everything seems unreal and abiotic, irrecoverable and unsustainable.  All that remains in the 
present is an irreparable wasteland of the past.  And Temple, the young lady in constant motion, 
waywardly and effervescently dancing between various, insignificant “collegiate arms” while 
“her feet [filled] the rhythmic gap with music,” is now motionless, seemingly catatonic as her 
eyes merely follow the dissolving waves of music into the dissolving twilight sky. 
By the novel’s end, even though Faulkner has restored, more or less, the good-evil 
dichotomy—the "good and innocent" have been “saved,” the evil “vanquished,” et cetera—
resolution is impossible, or just implausible given the absurd existential decay that practically 
                                                
37 During his sojourn in Paris in the mid-1920s, Faulkner’s letters to his mother constantly expressed his love of the 
Luxembourg Gardens.  Oddly enough though illuminating with regards to how we might understand this final scene, 
Faulkner writes in one letter dated September 6, 1925, “I have just written such a beautiful thing that I am about to 
bust—2000 words about the Luxembourg gardens and death.  It has a thin plot about a woman, and it is poetry 
though written in prose form.  I have worked on it for two whole days and every word is perfect” (Selected Letters of 
William Faulkner 17) 
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every character has suffered.  Nor would Faulkner dream of ending Temple’s nightmare.  In this 
final scene, we vaguely notice more sensory distortion, exacerbating this scene’s disorder and 
surreality.  For the last time in this novel, Temple takes out her compact and gazes at herself in 
the small mirror, her face reduced to a miniature size.  Unless the mirror in Temple’s compact is 
convex38, which would seem unlikely, her reflection should be a virtual image of the same size 
and proportions.  Still, Faulkner writes that the mirror reduces minimizes her image—the mirror 
no longer functions to reflect her superficial reality but rather her existential degradation.  
Perhaps what seems most poignant about this ending is not merely the pervasive deterioration 
and death nor the fact that Temple is “sullen and discontented and sad” but more importantly the 
notion that Temple has surrendered herself to fortuity, resigned herself to continue living.  With 
a nightmarish past and bleak future, Temple does not choose life over death with a platitudinous 
“it gets better” mentality; instead, she vulnerably and powerlessly accepts defeat in the face of 
life, her punishment and doom being more life without sanctuary.      
 
Janine 
Whereas Faulkner presents an ingenuous, vivacious young woman eventually corrupted 
by an evil, castration-fearing, retributive masculine economy, Camus introduces Janine, and 
middle-aged and diffident, in a state similar to how we find Temple at the end of Faulkner’s 
novel.  Like Temple during the final scene of Sanctuary, in “La Femme Adultère” we find Janine 
dejected, hopeless, and without a future, metaphysically and existentially imprisoned within a 
world she did not create and from which she cannot escape.  The story begins with the image of a 
fly buzzing around a bus.  Camus then quickly introduces Janine, who is watching this fly.  
                                                
38 The convex mirror would, virtually, present a distortedly smaller image, though it is unlikely that the presumably 
simple mirror in her compact would be anything but a plane-mirror. 
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Though this story’s narration is heterodiegetic, we quickly see that the narration is heavily 
focalized on Janine’s thoughts and experience.  And even before we are given any context about 
Janine and Marcel or their present situation, we can already notice that Janine feels trapped and 
listless: 
Une mouche maigre tournait, depuis un moment, dans l’autocar aux glaces 
pourtant relevées.  Insolite, elle allait et venait sans bruit, d’un vol exténué.  Janine la 
perdit de vue, puis la vit atterrir sur la main immobile de son mari.  Il faisait froid.  La 
mouche frissonnait à chaque rafale du vent sableux qui crissait contre les vitres.  Dans la 
lumière rare du matin d’hiver, à grand bruit de tôles et d’essieux, le véhicule roulait, 
tanguait, avançait à peine. . . .  
L’autocar était plein d’Arabes qui faisaient mine de dormir, enfouis dans leur 
burnous.  Quelques-uns avaient ramené leurs pieds sur la banquette et oscillaient plus que 
les autres dans le mouvement de la voiture.  Leur silence, leur impassibilité finissaient 
par peser à Janine; il lui semblait qu’elle voyageait depuis des jours avec cette escorte 
muette.  Pourtant, le car était parti à l’aube, du terminus de la voie ferrée, et, depuis deux 
heures, dans le matin froid, il progressait sur un plateau pierreux, désolé, qui, au départ 
du moins, étendait ses lignes droites jusqu’à des horizons rougeâtres.39  (11-12; my 
italics) 
 
On this bus, the only life form that seems to have any life, volition, or kinetics is the fly, whereas 
all the passengers are motionless, their bodies swaying only according to the bus’s motion, which 
Janine equally perceives as essentially motionless.  The desert is cold, the wind sandy, and the 
climate and landscape are oppressively dry and sterile.  We notice Janine’s frustration with her 
marriage and husband, the “mute escort.”  Janine also finds superincumbent the silence and 
expressionlessness of the formless, enshrouded passengers.  As was the case with Temple in the 
barn, the nothingness of silence is more insufferable and tortuous than strident clamor.  Most 
                                                
39 “A meager fly was circling, for a moment, in the bus though the windows were closed.  Strange, it was going and 
coming without noise, on an exhausted flight.  Janine lost sight of it, then saw it land on her husband’s immobile 
hand.  It was cold.  The fly was shuddering to each gust of sandy wind scratching against the windows.  In the 
unusual light of the winter morning, to the loud noise of sheet metal and axles, the vehicle was rolling, stumbling, 
barely advancing. . . . The bus was full of Arabs who were pretending to sleep, enshrouded in their burnouses.  
Several had brought their feet to their seats and swayed more than the others to the movement of the bus.  The 
silence, their impassivity was beginning to weigh on Janine; it seemed that she had been traveling for several hours 
with this mute escort.  However, the car had left at dawn, from the terminus of the steel tracks, and, for two hours, in 
the cold morning, it was progressing on a stony plateau, desolate, which, during the departure at least, extended its 
straight lines all the way to the reddish horizon.”       
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importantly, the seeming motionlessness of the bus and the abject silence have severely 
augmented and swollen Janine’s perception of time: what has merely been two hours, for Janine, 
has felt like several days.  Thus, we begin to understand Janine’s desire for escape.  We also 
know that Janine is a pied noir in “exile” in Algeria, and there is an obvious distinction between 
herself and the burnouse-wearing Arab passengers.  Janine is not literally in exile; however, one 
of the prevalent themes of L’Exil et le Royaume is the notion, feeling, and problem of otherness 
and foreignness and the existential dilemmas that arise from feeling as though one were in exile, 
simultaneously disconnected and estranged from one’s motherland as well as from one’s present 
residence and social environment.  The indigenous Algerian population still feels foreign to 
Janine, as she often perceives them as merely hooded, amorphous figures (“les formes drapées”) 
(16).  The perceptible racism of such a description on Camus’s part notwithstanding, Janine 
considers Algeria an impenetrable and unfathomable country—the weather preventing expedient 
travel, the veiled Arabs preventing corporeal identification and association, but, rather, spurring a 
clear and menacing otherness, disidentification and disassociation.  However, Algeria, its people, 
culture, and language are not the only reason why Janine has fallen into such diffidence, 
discontentment, and consternation; in fact, Algeria’s foreignness to Janine seems merely 
tangential to her current state, whereas Marcel and her marriage seem paramount.     
In fact, her husband and marriage are what keep Janine disconnected from the Algerian 
country and culture.  Because of Marcel, consequently, Janine’s life and certainly her time come 
to embody Marcel’s life and time—that masculine time and teleology of business, economics, 
and money.  We soon learn that this trip is a matter of Marcel’s business, and Janine, being her 
husband’s employee and wife made biddable after years of romantic dissatisfaction, loneliness, 
and an apparent identity crisis, has reluctantly joined him on this capital venture.  And what 
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better picture to represent this masculine teleology and linearity, this illusion of cause-and-effect 
economic progress than the image of a bus slowing driving along a seemingly endless, straight 
road which is supposed to lead Marcel and his wife towards commerce and prosperity?  Of 
course, Marcel, whose only passion is money and business, subjects Janine to this time and life 
while his mind is selfishly focused on when the bus will arrive at their destination rather than on 
his wife’s transparent discomfort.  And at least as far as the narrative structure and voice reveal, 
Janine is the only one who suffers this excruciatingly arduous bus ride and marriage, whereas 
Marcel is senselessly focused on his own time and future: 
Quand Marcel avait voulu l’emmener avec lui dans sa tournée, elle avait protesté.  Il 
pensait depuis longtemps à ce voyage, depuis la fin de la guerre exactement, au moment 
où les affaires étaient redevenues normales.  Avant la guerre, le petit commerce de tissus 
qu’il avait repris de ses parents . . . les faisait vivre plutôt bien que mal.  Sur la côte, les 
années de jeunesse peuvent être heureuse.  Mais il n’aimait pas beaucoup l’effort 
physique et, très vite, il avait cessé de la mener sur les plages. . . . Ils n’avaient pas eu 
d’enfants.  Les années avaient passé, dans la pénombre qu’ils entretenaient, volets mi-
clos. . . . Rien ne semblait intéresser Marcel que ses affaires.  Elle avait cru découvrir sa 
vraie passion, qui était l’argent, et elle n’aimait pas cela, sans trop savoir pourquoi.40 (14-
5) 
 
Marcel’s and, hence, Janine’s time is not only the linear time of business but also the linear time 
of inheritance and genealogy, Marcel’s shop and trade bequeathed to him by his parents.  
Interestingly enough, however, Marcel and Janine do not have children, and so their time has yet 
to subsume that time of reproductive futurism and posterity.  Whether Janine desires children or 
not, she seems equally reluctant to leave Marcel as she is frustrated with his brazen disregard for 
her desires.  Evidently contiguous with her identity crisis, Janine clings to Marcel as she suffers 
from an existential angoisse of living and dying alone: “Surtout, elle aimait être aimée, et il 
                                                
40 When Marcel had wanted to bring her along on his trip, she had protested.  He had been thinking of this trip for a 
longtime, since the end of the war precisely, when business had returned to normal.  Before the war, the little dry 
goods shop that he had acquired from his parents . . . had allowed them to live rather well.  On the coast, the years of 
youth can be happy.  But he did not like much physical effort, and very quickly, he had stopped bringing her to the 
beaches. . . . They didn’t have any children.  The years had passed in semi-darkness behind half-closed shutters. . . . 
Nothing seems to interest Marcel besides business.  She thought she had discovered his true passion, which was 
money, and she did not like that, without knowing why.” 
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l’avait submerge d’assiduités.  A lui faire sentir si souvent qu’elle existait pour lui, il la faisait 
exister réellement.  Non, elle n’était pas seule . . .”41 (13).  Janine, desirous of that common 
prospect and almost essential need for romantic interpersonality and mutuality, validates her 
relationship as not only attributing meaning to her existence but also allocating an existence for 
herself, as if she did not exist before nor would exist later without Marcel or a husband.  Still, 
Janine anguishes equally over her past life, particularly her years as a gymnast and her once 
youthfully slender body and ingenuous confidence.  Upon reaching their hotel and in their suite 
alone, Janine takes a nap, “[rêvant] aux palmiers droits et flexible, et à la jeune fille qu’elle avait 
été”42 (20).  Camus illustrates Janine with a melancholic complexity: her life with Marcel, or at 
least his presence and status as his wife, provides her with some existential meaning and 
fulfillment, yet she dreams and yearns for her past life and youth.  Therefore, Janine appears 
trapped from practically every angle: trapped on a bus, trapped in a country that seems wholly 
alien to her, trapped in a marriage, trapped within her age and body, trapped within time and 
space.  But, despite these metaphysical and existential entrapments, Janine still tries to escape, to 
liberate herself from Marcel and his masculine shackles, and to reconnect with her subdued 
feminine quiddity and time. 
 Whereas most of the novel depicts the time according to Marcel’s desires and ventures, 
as we approach this short story’s end, we finally see a feminine time and experience begin to 
emerge, similar, in fact, to Irigaray’s linking of feminine time and sexuality with the cosmos.  
We also mark a shift in Camus syntactic style, changing from a slow, monotonously and 
sequentially organized style that highlights the tedium of the bus ride to a highly descriptive style 
with longwinded yet poetic and elegiac sentences emphatic of Janine’s visceral exudations and 
                                                
41 “Most of all, she liked being loved, and he had flooded her with assiduities.  By so often making herself feel that 
she existed for him, he had her exist in reality.  No, she was not alone . . .” 
42 “[dreaming] of the erect and flexible palm trees, and of the young girl she once had been” 
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jouissance as she begins to find escape and liberation in the desert terrain and celestial 
firmament.  Because these final scenes of Janine’s frenzied ecstasy are suggestively sexual, I will 
first discuss the sexuality of Janine and Marcel’s marriage, particularly the notion that Marcel is 
impotent or infertile, implicit in the various phallic imagery, which seems either to function by 
metonymically replacing Marcel’s penis with an abiotic, ersatz stand-in or by kindling Janine’s 
sexual frustration.  I will also note beforehand that Simon P. Sibelman has already conducted a 
study on this story’s phallic imagery in his essay “The Anguish and the Ecstasy,” which arguably 
exhausts all possible phallic imagery (some by virtue of Sibelman’s own fancy) that could be 
extracted from this text.  Sibelman’s essay, though persuasive and compelling, only considers the 
phallic imagery as indicative of Janine’s sexual frustrations and existential crisis, a realization of 
both her husband’s romantic and carnal ineptitude and her own life’s meaninglessness, which 
ultimately engenders Janine’s moment of epiphanic jouissance in the desert.  Sibelman’s essay, 
however, does not elaborate on how the phallic imagery comes to represent Marcel’s impotence, 
castration anxiety, and emasculation as a result of Janine’s titular, and possibly extradiegetic, 
“adultery.”  Sibelman’s essay equally would have us believe that Janine’s entangled existence 
and sexual dissatisfaction is merely a matter of unavoidable, existential fortuity, a matter solely 
immanent and internal.  Without declaring unreservedly that Janine is by no means responsible 
for her present circumstance, I will focus on how Marcel and the conventions of marriage have 
dehumanized Janine, forcing her into this role as diffident, biddable, dependent wife.  
Emasculated, Marcel assiduously, but not tenderly or romantically, keeps watch of Janine, 
controlling and silencing her in retaliation to his emasculation.  Finally, whereas Sibelman refers 
to the phallic imagery as intrinsically replacing the penis and penetration (literally, in Sibelman’s 
argument, the phallus-cum-penis penetrates and pleases Janine), I consider the phallic imagery as 
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mere mimesis and metonymy that suggests phallicism only in shape and superficial appearance, 
not in function or potency.  Thus, I contend that the phallic imagery does not function to 
penetrate and satisfy Janine, arousing her psychosomatic climax and jouissance, nor does it 
necessarily represent some lustful, extramarital desires; instead, the imagery highlights her 
frustrations and dissatisfactions with a hetero-masculine-controlled sex.  And at the story’s end, 
the phalluses are not the source of Janine’s pleasure; instead, her jouissance is induced by a 
spiritually autoerotic connection with the cosmos and the earth as she tries to rid herself of the 
masculine, though, unfortunately, to no enduring avail. 
The first phallic image in this story is also perhaps the most telling: on the bus, Marcel 
sits “[serrant] si fortement une petite valise de toile, placée entre ses genoux”43 (11).  Sibelman 
and Vicki Mistacco have already noted the metonymically phallic nature of this image as well as 
the transference of potency from phallus to valise, or suitcase.  Also referred to as a malle—
phonetically equivalent to mâle and, therefore, redolent of the masculine sex—the suitcase, 
therefore, represents Marcel’s capitalistic prospects and career as well as his masculine virility.  
Marcel carries his manhood in his suitcase and business, whereas his sexual virility, at least 
through Janine’s eyes, is virtually nonexistent, displaced by his love for money (Sibelman 44; 
46).  And from a quote previously cited, the fact that Marcel’s love and attention has so 
unappeasably shifted from his wife to commerce deeply disturbs Janine.  Since this story begins 
in medias res, we question why this shift has occurred in Marcel, why he no longer cares for 
romance and intercourse with his wife.  If we begin to consider the title, we surmise the 
possibility that Janine has committed prediegetic adultery, provoking Marcel’s romantic and 
sexual vacancy; though, he still holds onto Janine, keeping close watch of her, drowning her in 
assiduities and insisting that she join him on this trip.   
                                                
43 “[gripping] so powerfully to a tiny suitcase placed between his knees” 
 71 
And though Marcel holds his masculinity in the junk of his business, we still see that 
Camus has and continues to corporeally de-masculinize Marcel throughout this story, yet again, 
using phallic images to suggest castration and emasculation.  While Sibelman has noted 
disadvantageously that Marcel has an “effeminate” physique and visage, more conducive to such 
an argument is Marcel’s sense of inferiority towards other men with a perceptibly masculine air 
and arrogance:  
De l’autre extrémité de la place venait un grand Arabe, maigre, vigoureux, couvert d’un 
burnous bleu ciel, chaussé de souples bottes jaunes, les mains gantées, et qui portait haut 
un visage aquilin et bronzé. . . . I avançait régulièrement dans leur direction, mais 
semblait regarder au-delà de leur groupe, en dégantant avec lenteur l’une de ses mains.  
"Eh bien, dit Marcel en haussant les épaules, en voilà un qui se croit général." . . . Alors 
que l’espace vide de la place les entourait, il avançait droit sur la malle, sans la voir, 
sans les voir.  Puis la distance qui les séparait diminua rapidement et l’Arabe arrivait sur 
eux, lorsque Marcel saisit, tout d’un coup, la poignée de la cantine, et la tira en 
arrière. L’autre passa, sans paraître rien remarquer, et se dirigea du même pas vers les 
remparts. . . . "Ils se croient tout permis, maintenant," dit-il.44  (24; my italics) 
 
Though Sibelman does not thoroughly analyze this scene, for his study is focused on Janine and 
not Marcel, Sibelman does expatiate that this cloaked and visually-striking Arab man is another 
phallic symbol—not only does this man seem to epitomize conventional virility but also his 
burnouse-draped figure is suggestively phallic via his silhouette (Sibelman 49).  Of course, if we 
are to believe this argument, we must also assume that all formes drapées are incidentally 
phallic, though this claim is not implausible, for Camus often eroticizes the “exotic” and 
“strange” Algerian populace as seen through the eyes of his pied noir protagonists.  In this scene, 
the phallicism of the Arab man is not only suggestively erotic and virile but also hostile to 
                                                
44 “From the other side of the square came a tall Arab man, thin, vigorous, covered in a sky-blue burnouse, wearing 
supple yellow boots and gloves, and holding loftily his aquiline, bronzed face. . . . He was advancing steadily in 
their direction but seemed to be looking past their group while slowly removing a glove from one of his hands.  
“Well,” said Marcel, shrugging his shoulders, “there’s one who thinks he’s a general.” . . .  While the empty space of 
the square surrounded the three of them, the Arab advanced straight toward Marcel’s trunk, without seeing it, 
without seeing them.  Then the distance that separated them diminished rapidly, and the Arab reached them when 
Marcel suddenly grabbed the trunk’s handle and pulled it back.  The other passed by, without appearing to notice 
anything, and headed for the ramparts with the same steps.  “They think that they can do anything now,” Marcel 
said.” 
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Marcel, whose malle-cum-penis is clearly inferior, the Arab completely disregarding its 
existence and machismo.  The association of the malle with Marcel’s manhood is grammatically 
ironic, for it suggests not simply a displacement of virility from biotic organ to abiotic object but 
also a “feminization,” la malle obviously being a feminine noun45.  And so, when Camus writes 
that the Arab “avançait droit sur la malle, sans la voir” and when Marcel “la tira en arrière,” 
Marcel’s “manhood” goes from object-noun (la malle) to a purely feminine article (la)46 as the 
Arab man asserts his apparent arrogance and masculine superiority.  The “en arrière” is also 
suggestive of Marcel’s castration and emasculation, or merely de-masculinization, for he must 
metonymically pull backwards his trunk/penis so that the Arab man does not knocked it 
over/trample on it.  Following this logic, Marcel’s de-masculinization follows from penis to la 
malle to la, the first displacement suggesting impotence, and the second displacement suggesting 
castration—the malle has been removed and all that is left is a la.   
 This explanation of Marcel’s de-masculinization relative to his marriage would differ 
slightly from a Cixousian analysis drawn from “Castration or Decapitation?” since Janine is not 
the direct reason why Marcel is immediately emasculated in this scene, but, rather, the Arab man 
seems the castrator.  We should also consider that this scene occurs directly after a failed 
business venture—the contents of his malle/mâle rejected consequently.  Nevertheless, we must 
additionally note that Janine is the “adulterous” and “wanton” wife that must not be trusted, and 
it is Janine’s “adulterous” gaze and sexual frustration that spots and brings Marcel’s attention to 
                                                
45 I use “feminization” only in the grammatical sense, for I do not intend that Marcel acquires feminine 
characteristics.  Marcel’s castration/emasculation/de-masculinization does not mean that he becomes the feminine or 
is feminized, for the masculine and the feminine do not constitute a diametric opposition or negation wherein one 
can merely interchange sexes by negating the one, particularly, by deeming the voided masculine genitalia as a 
“feminization” or “effeminate” characteristic.  However, I do consider the association of Marcel’s “manhood” with a 
femininely gendered noun as suggestive for his de-masculinization.  
46 the Arab “was advancing straight toward the trunk, with out seeing it”; Marcel “pulled it back.”  The English 
translation cannot show the effect of the gendered French noun (la malle).  In French, the la represents both the 
gender-article of the trunk and the pronoun “it” used to replace the noun. 
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the statuesque Arab.  Camus writes, “Ils s’arrêtèrent sur la place.  Marcel se frottait les mains, il 
contemplait d’un air tender la malle, devant eux.  “Regarde,” dit Janine,”47 after which Janine 
directs Marcel’s eyes to the Arab man (23).  Of course, Janine’s informing Marcel to regarder 
(look) at the Arab man is indicative of her own regard (gaze), bringing her jealous and 
progressively de-masculinized husband’s attention, which at the moment is focused on his 
ineffectual trunk (penis), to an image and scene that will only de-masculinize, if not 
castrate/emasculate, him further.  Consequently, whether Janine’s intentions to bring Marcel’s 
eyes to the Arab man are innocuous or wanton is superfluous since we can ultimately tell that 
this scene is a product of Janine’s sexual discontentment as her eyes wander to other men.  
Janine, then, acts as the indirect castrator in this scene, and Marcel, aware that his wife’s 
wandering gaze is fixed on a redoubtably handsome and Arab man, responds with sarcastic 
criticism of the Arab’s haughty demeanor, a sign of both Marcel’s inferiority and a desperate 
attempt to fortify his now precarious sense of masculinity. 
With Marcel’s de-masculinization in mind (and mind, as well, that this story is gravid 
with phallic imagery indicative of his castration/emasculation), we begin to understand why 
Marcel so desperately, but non-sexually, tries to control and restrain Janine, for his marriage and, 
therefore, his dominance over his wife remains his final, conventionally masculine quality.  Even 
still, Janine tries to escape and liberate herself from Marcel’s castration-anxious, masculine order 
and time.  The first scene that suggests this newly active endeavor to escape and liberate arrives 
when Marcel and Janine first ascend a nearby fort that overlooks the oasien expanse of the desert 
in the early evening.  Janine is able to convince a languid and recently downtrodden Marcel to 
climb the fort with her.  As she climbs the fort’s steep steps, Janine can feel something growing 
                                                
47 “They stopped in the square.  Marcel rubbed his hands; he contemplated the trunk before them with a tender look. 
‘Look,’ said Janine.” 
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within her, the air vibrating and the silent expanse echoing all around her.  This scene’s 
synesthetic quality—the hearing and feeling of the silence—creates a fantasy for Janine rather 
than the nightmare-induce synesthesia that Temple experiences in Sanctuary.  With Janine at the 
top of the fort and gazing across the vast oasis, Camus writes:         
Janine, appuyée de tout son corps au parapet, restait sans voix, incapable de s’arracher au 
vide qui s‘ouvrait devant elle.  A ses côtes, Marcels s’agitait.  Il avait froid, il voulait 
descendre.  Qu’y avait-il donc à voir ici ? Mais elle ne pouvait détacher ses regards de 
l’horizon.  Là-bas, plus au sud encore, à cet endroit où le ciel et la terre se rejoignaient 
dans une ligne pure, là-bas, lui semblait-il soudain, quelque chose l’attendait qu’elle avait 
ignoré jusqu’à ce jour et qui pourtant n’avait cessé de lui manquer.  Dans l’après-midi qui 
avançait, la lumière se détendait doucement ; de cristalline, elle devenait liquide.  En 
même temps, au cœur d’une femme que le hasard seul amenait là, un nœud que les 
années, l’habitude et l’ennui avaient serré, se dénouait lentement.48 (26-7) 
 
Atop the fort Janine finds herself caught in a moment during which she temporarily escapes from 
reality, encountering and embracing a landscape and a world that has always seemed so foreign 
and hostile.  Later in the night, abandoning the sanctum of her marital bed, Janine will return to 
this same spot and will experience a jouissance completely unfamiliar to her being, consequently 
discovering a new sanctuary in the nocturnal desert oasis and celestial cosmos.  In Sibelman’s 
essay, he notes that the fort and parapet are phallic, introduce Janine to a world outside of her 
marriage and Marcel, and instigate her phantasmatic orgasm at the story’s end (49-51).  
However, Sibelman’s argument only works when considering Janine’s phantasmatic sexual 
experience as intrinsically heterosexual in which a phallus must be present.  To deem the fort and 
parapet as unequivocally phallic is rather fallacious since Camus gives no description of the fort 
                                                
48 “Janine, pressing all her body against the parapet, was still and speechless, incapable of tearing herself away from 
the void opening before her.  At her side, Marcel was growing restless.  He was cold; he wanted to go back down.  
What was there to see here anyway?  But she could not detach her gaze from the horizon.  Over there, even further 
south, at that place where sky and earth become one in a pure line; over there, it suddenly seemed there was 
something awaiting her, something before which she had never known until this day but which, however, had not 
ceased to be lacking.  In the advancing afternoon, the light was gently relaxing; from crystalline, it became liquid.  
At the same time, in the heart of a woman who, by chance, was brought here alone, a knot, which over the years, 
from habit and ennui, had tightened, was slowly untangling.” 
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that resolutely intends phallicism nor does Janine’s phantasmatic intercourse transpire with the 
fort and parapet.  Sibelman is just in noting that the fort introduces Janine to the vast expanse of 
the Algerian desert, but the fort is not conclusively phallic nor does it unreservedly indicate the 
masculine.  Of course, the fort historically represents the masculine since wars and regimes are 
endeavors and constructions of a masculine order.  Nonetheless, the fort has become a part of 
that mysterious and mystical landscape and become a means of bringing Janine to that 
transcendental place between earth and sky where she is no longer controlled by masculine time 
or Marcel’s masculine order.  Inevitably, Janine’s spiritual connection and phantasmatic 
intercourse occurs with the landscape and the cosmos, not with an allegedly phallic fort and 
parapet.    
 And as Janine slowly feels herself finding liberation from her husband’s world, she is 
immediately pulled back into the masculine order as Marcel, who becomes annoyed with 
Janine’s imprudence and disregard for his own discomfort atop the fort, pulls his wife away from 
the parapet, away from her oasis, and avers, “‘On crève,’ dit Marcel, ‘tu es stupide.  
Rentrons.’”49 (28).  Health and medical accuracy aside, Marcel’s words clearly reassert and 
reestablish his masculine order: it was Janine’s idea to go the fort, and Marcel, clearly 
uncomfortable and unaware or uncaring of his wife’s moment of happiness, decides that Janine 
in acting foolishly, this ascent atop the fort has been a pointless endeavor, and, therefore, he must 
intervene to fix this illogical feminine order and reintroduce his overbearing masculinity.  
Subsequently, Camus writes of Janine, “Son exaltation l’avait quittée. . . . Qu’y ferait-elle 
désormais, sinon s’y traîner jusqu’au sommeil, jusqu’à la mort?”50 (28).  The masculine order 
has been reestablished not only because Marcel intervenes and pulls Janine back into this order, 
                                                
49 “’We’re going to freeze to death,’ said Marcel. ‘You’re being stupid.  We’re going back.’” 
50 “Her exaltation had left her. . . . What was there to do now, except to drag herself towards sleep, towards death?” 
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but also because Janine feels that she has just lost an irrecoverably singular experience.  All that 
Janine can do now is drag herself to bed, ultimately towards death, and this notion specifically 
represents the intrusion of masculine time, a time without redemption or regeneration that leads 
us straight towards death.  Whereas Janine’s temporary withdrawal into fantasy stresses eternity, 
her eternal connection with this world and the eternal promise that this world is for and belongs 
to her, Marcel’s disturbance reintroduces this masculine reality of finitude.  And though Janine 
has been re-burdened by Marcel’s masculine order, she will try once more to escape, to liberate 
herself and spiritually recover her oasis. 
 And thus, later that evening Janine leaves Marcel in bed and runs back to the desert oasis 
where she has a near-orgasmic experience as she reaches that place between earth and sky, 
exulting in her spatial and temporal laissez-aller.  Atop the fort yet again, Janine’s jouissance 
engrosses her and transports her to a place of pure, phantasmagoric, and carnal rapture.  In this 
moment, we see a feminine time emerge, uniquely distinct from the masculine time that has 
controlled this story.  However, in the end it appears that Janine is unable to sustain this 
experience and exultation, ultimately transient and ineffectual in the face of the existential 
degradation she has experienced over the years, trapped within the confines of a masculine order.  
In the end, defeated and dejected, Janine goes back to her marital bed and Marcel and declares 
that nothing has happened, that nothing is wrong, and, hence, declares the seemingly immutable 
negation and nothingness of her existence, the sterilization of her future. 
 In the desert once again, Janine feels “une sorte de giration pesante entraînait le ciel au-
dessus d’elle,”51 the gyration being our first indication that Janine’s experience is more than 
spiritual and additionally the circularity and regeneration indicating her absconding of masculine 
linearity.  Janine continues to connect with the cosmos as Camus writes: 
                                                
51 Janine feels “a sort of languid gyration moving the sky above her” 
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Dans les épaisseurs de la nuit sèche et froide, des milliers d’étoiles se formaient sans 
trêve et leurs glaçons étincelants, aussitôt détachés, commençaient de glisser 
insensiblement vers l’horizon. . . . Elle tournait avec eux et le même cheminement 
immobile la réunissait peu à peu à son être le plus profond, où le froid et le désir 
maintenant se combattaient.  Devant elle, les étoiles tombaient, une à une, puis 
s’éteignaient parmi les pierres du désert, et à chaque fois Janine s’ouvrait un peu plus à la 
nuit.  Elle respirait, elle oubliait le froid, le poids des être, la vie démente ou figée, la 
longue angoisse de vivre et de mourir. . . . En même temps, il lui semblait retrouver ses 
racines, la sève montait à nouveau dans son corps qui ne tremblait plus.  Pressée de tout 
son ventre contre le parapet, tendue vers le ciel en mouvement, elle attendait seulement 
que son cœur encore bouleversé s’apaisât à son tour et que le silence se fît en elle.  Les 
dernières étoiles des constellations laissèrent tomber leurs grappes un peu plus bas sur 
l’horizon du désert, et s’immobilisèrent.  Alors, avec une douceur insupportable, l’eau de 
la nuit commença  d’emplir Janine, submergea le froid, monta peu à peu de centre obscur 
de son être et déborda en flots ininterrompus jusqu’à sa bouche pleine de gémissements.  
L’instant d’après, le ciel entier s’étendait au-dessus d’elle, renversée sur la terre froide.52  
(33-4) 
 
Yet again, we can analyze this passage according to what Irigaray and Kristeva had to say about 
the relationship between feminine sexuality and time.  Irigaray connects the feminine with the 
“universal circulation and vibration that goes beyond the enclosure within reproduction.  Turning 
in a cycle that never resolves to sameness,” and like Janine’s jouissance, within the feminine 
“something takes place, between earth and sky, in which she participates in a continual gestation, 
a mystery to be deciphered.”  In this scene, Janine perceives the sky as turning, and she turns 
with the sky, feeling the “water of the night” flowing through her in continuous waves.  Janine 
“recovers her roots,” which indicates this notion that she was previously lacking something 
essential to her being.  Camus also writes that in this moment she ceased to worry about the 
                                                
52 “In the dark depths of the dry, cold night, thousands of stars were constantly forming, and their icicles glittering, 
immediately detached, began to slip little by little toward the horizon. . . . She was turning with them, and the same 
motionless progress united her little by little with the profundity of her being where cold and desire were competing 
with each other.  Before her, the stars were falling, one by one, then faded among the desert stones, and each time 
Janine opened up more and more to the night.  She was breathing deeply, forgetting the cold, the oppressive weight 
of others, the insanity and immobility of life, the long anguish of living and dying. . . . At the same time, she seemed 
to recover her roots, the sap rising anew in her body.  Pressing all her stomach against the parapet, stretched toward 
the moving sky, she was waiting for her overwhelmed heart to calm down and find silence within her.  The last stars 
of the constellations let fall their clusters a little lower on the desert horizon and immobilize.  Then, with an 
unbearable softness, the water of the night began to fill Janine, submerged the cold, gradually rising to the obscure 
center of her being and overflowing in continuous waves all the way to her whimpering mouth.  The moment after, 
the entire sky stretched out above her, knocked over on her back on the cold earth.” 
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anguish of living and dying, which further suggests Janine’s escape from masculine time, for she 
is no longer consumed with this notion of life as a finite experience with a linear beginning, 
middle, and end.  We also notice a stark contrast between Camus’s syntax in this passage relative 
to the style employed at the story’s beginning.  When we first meet Janine, the syntax is 
precisely that “noun + verb,” cause-effect syntax that Kristeva notes as fundamentally masculine, 
with the sole intention of narrative progress.  The sentence structure, in general, is relatively 
short and simple, driving the reader and Janine from one point or one moment to the next without 
contemplation.  Now at the story’s end, the sentences are poetically longwinded, the structure 
more complex, and Camus stresses the importance of this moment and its existential durée, 
rather than the narrative, linear progress from one moment to the next that ultimately advances 
the characters closer to death.  And so, Janine’s escape into the desert is an escape and liberation 
from the masculine world that has forced her into the role of the diffident, biddable wife who 
finds herself without a future, her life leading only to death.  In this moment, Janine revolts, 
denies death, abandons her husband, and experiences an “adulterous,” spiritual interconnection 
with the cosmos. 
 While I would like to say that Janine’s superlunary arousal and awakening endures as she 
leaves Marcel forever and establishes her life anew and independent, Camus ends his short story 
in a wholly unsatisfying and ambiguous manner, with Janine walking back to her hotel room and 
crawling in bed next to her husband once again.  Since Camus ends the story at this point, merely 
a few lines after Janine’s moment in the desert, we could surmise that Janine has discovered a 
brave new world wherein she can reconnect with her subdued feminine and live a life unaffected 
or not dominated by an oppressive masculine order.  However, Janine’s final words, which 
officially conclude this story, are a bit off-putting.  Stirring her husband out of sleep as she gets 
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back into bed, Janine responds to Marcel’s questions with a simple, “Ce n’est rien” or “It’s 
nothing” (34).  Of course, we could read this final statement as representative of Janine keeping a 
secret from Marcel and potentially as optimistic in that she might eventually leave her husband; 
though, I cannot help but feel unsatisfied with such an analysis, especially as the extreme shift in 
tone suggests defeat rather than triumph.  Why has Janine returned to Marcel?  Why does she tell 
him that nothing is wrong, that nothing has happened?  Janine’s experience in the desert is 
certainly worthy of more description and extrapolation than the equivocal, upsetting ending that 
Camus provides.  Her experience was something unique and fantastic that few have ever felt or 
will ever feel; and for such reason, we would hope or expect to find her forever changed, her life 
and purpose reinvigorated.  At the very least we would expect her to say something to Marcel, let 
him know how frustrated she is with their marriage or divulge some aspect of her epiphany that 
would indicate her desire for change.  Yet, Janine does nothing, says nothing, and returns to bed, 
to her position as diffident and biddable wife.  Thus, I feel as though Janine’s disposition and 
action in the final paragraph are mostly indicative of defeat, of her realization that she is truly 
and indefinitely trapped, her experience in the desert lamentably transient and unsustainable.  
Regardless of her experience in the desert, Janine remains afraid of death and dying alone, 
knowing that her liberating jouissance will never reconcile her anxiety of being alone and dying 
alone.  Alternatively, perhaps the ending is more of a social commentary: if Janine were to leave 
Marcel, she would consequently plunge herself into economic and social destitution.  Janine is 
already an “adulterous” woman, and to be without a husband and without the financial security 
that Marcel has provided would surely equate to social opprobrium and poverty.  To escape the 
masculine order that controls her life, Janine would indeed have to sacrifice her life, for she 
could never freely live such a life in a world that demands complete assimilation and obedience.  
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Thus, at the end she negates her epiphanic jouissance, re-negates her life, purpose, voice, and 
future in order to resubmit herself to the masculine order, which, for Janine, begins in her marital 
bed.   
 
 
Quentin, Jason, and Benjy Compson 
 In the past two sections, I have discussed two key instances where a feminine order, 
attempting to escape the oppressive confines of a masculine order, is ultimately subdued, 
especially as the feminine becomes a threat to the castration-anxious and retributive or 
correctional masculine.  Nevertheless, in The Sound and the Fury Faulkner presents a situation 
wherein the masculine order, successfully emasculated and castrated by the feminine, becomes 
wholly impotent and incapable of reestablishing its supremacy.  This emasculation and castration 
occurs within Quentin’s and Jason’s sections as the wayward femininity and sexuality of Caddy 
and Miss Quentin confront and emasculate both brothers.  Consequently, in this section I will 
focus more on the castration and ephemeralization of masculine time than the decapitation and 
ephemeralization of feminine time.  For this reason, I propose that Faulkner predominantly 
presents a masculine experience of time in The Sound and the Fury.   
Though I contend that Faulkner writes all four sections according to a masculine 
understanding of time, I will focus only on Quentin’s and Jason’s sections as they pertain to 
emasculation.  Though castrated and sterilized, Benjy’s section and time do not deny the 
feminine order like his brother’s sections.  Additionally, Benjy’s castration (both anatomical and 
temporal) is not by virtue of an emasculating feminine order but is the result of the masculine 
order of the Compson family, his life tragically negated by his family’s anachronistic existence, 
isolation, desperation, and decay.  As such, I will discuss Benjy’s section, time, and castration as 
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they pertain to the sterilization of identity.  The fourth section, or Dilsey’s section, does not 
immediately suggest temporal castration, probably because it deals with a female character as its 
central point of focalization, though its temporal structure is still masculine since Faulkner 
appears to be the section’s authorial narrator.  Unlike the others, Dilsey’s section exudes some 
hope, not for the Compson family, but for herself since she is the only character who “can live in 
the world the Compsons have made” (Hornback 58).  Accordingly, Dilsey’s section will not 
receive individual examination; nevertheless, her section will inevitably become germane.  
Finally, though I propose in this discussion that Quentin’s time is both masculine and castrated, I 
will follow this section with a chapter on queer time, proposing another manner of understanding 
Quentin’s temporal reality.  However, for the purposes of this specific argument, I will analyze 
Quentin’s time as characteristically hetero-masculine. 
 The discussion of time in The Sound and the Fury, especially when considering 
Quentin’s and Benjy’s sections, is nothing new, and in the past eighty years of criticism, major 
critics and scholars have seemingly examined, debated, and criticized every theory, notion, and 
misconception of time that Faulkner presents in this fiction.  Sartre is mostly accredited with 
initiating the discourse on time in this novel.  Sartre presents a very Bergsonian and existential 
view of Faulknerian temporality, that the American writer presents time according to the notion 
of durée (or duration) and memory, where the sense of the natural past is prolongated into the 
present (Bergson 20).  Indeed, in one of the most recent essays on time in Faulkner, Marjorie 
Pryse notes Faulkner’s knowledge of Bergson and examines where Faulkner gets Bergson and 
where he fails.  Pryse’s essay and Faulkner’s familiarity with Bergson notwithstanding, Sartre 
does not agree with Faulknerian temporality and metaphysics.  As Justin Skirry explains in an 
essay meant to clarify Sartre’s anti-Faulknerian stance, Sartre’s main criticism is that Faulkner’s 
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time is clock-based and chronological and that The Sound and the Fury renders its characters 
without futures and with only pasts (Skirry 15).  In other words, Sartre claims that Faulkner 
“decapitates” time (La Nouvelle Revue Française 52.2 148).  However, Sartre is not entirely 
against this temporal decapitation, for he also reminds us that Marcel Proust uses a similar 
technique throughout A la Recherche du Temps Perdu.  Sartre is against the fact that Faulkner, 
unlike Proust, never resolves this tensional, confused, decapitated sense of time which ultimately 
drives characters to suicide or hurls them into an existential abyss whereas Proust’s characters, 
through epiphany or logic or French intellectualism, regain or “re-find” (retrouver) time.  In his 
essay’s conclusion Sartre expounds that Faulkner ascribes an unrealistic absurdity to human life, 
and he declares that “un avenir barré, c’est encore un avenir”53 (151).  But why is it more 
realistic to regain time and futurity than to be forever lost in the bottomless pit of the past?  In 
other words, why is this decapitated time, this feeling of having no future, less sensible than the 
assumed anticipation of tomorrow?  Can there not be a multitude of temporal experiences, each 
of which is equally significant?             
 This last question is for the most part rhetorical, for the obvious answer is affirmative.  
Many critics, following Sartre, began to examine the phenomenology of time and how the 
Compson siblings individually experience time.  This new insistence on examining temporal 
experiences largely aided the study of individual character psychologies and gave credence to 
these perspectives as realistic possibilities.  But still, I believe that one of the major problems 
with the general temporal analysis of The Sound and the Fury is this immediate assumption that 
time is a neutral and asexual concept, strictly scientific, mathematic, and philosophical even 
when considering personal experiences.  The discourse on time and the terminology used to 
understand temporality are what largely induce this neutrality and asexuality.  In “Textual 
                                                
53 “a barred future, it’s still a future” 
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Duration Against Chronological Time: Graphing Memory in Faulkner’s Benjy Section,” Pryse’s 
essay leads us to believe from the get-go that time and Benjy’s experience of time can be 
understood according to science and math (she even includes line graphs and statistical charts!) 
and, hence, immediately ascribes a neutral, pedantic, and emotionless conception to time, as if 
our lives and experiences of time can be reduced to the simplicity of numbers and the rigidity of 
graphs.  Even Sartre’s term “decapitated” to describe Faulknerian temporality suggests 
neutrality, yet it does succeed in evoking the body, yet it evokes the wrong body part.  Most 
critics, including Sartre, have approached the temporality in Faulkner’s novel as a universality, 
as an idea that one should treat and examine as if it were or could be true for every or any 
individual.  In the term “decapitated,” the neutrality and universality lies in the fact that all 
bodies can be decapitated, which consequently implies that Benjy’s, Quentin’s, and Jason’s (note 
the repetitive masculine) experiences of time are not asexual but trans-sexual or trans-gendered54 
and could also be ascribed to Caddy or her daughter, to the female body or all gendered bodies, 
in general.  But, how can we ascribe universality of time to three homodiegetic narrators, 
especially since the purpose of the first-person narrative and stream-of-consciousness is to show 
an individual experience and subjective perspective?   
 Thus, I propose that Sartre’s “decapitation” be changed to “castration” to more justly note 
the one-sided gender perspective that this novel purports.  And of course, as we recall Cixous’s 
essay “Castration or Decapitation?” we note her distinction between the masculine’s castration 
and the feminine’s decapitation: the feminine castrates the masculine with her intransigence and 
ridiculing or undermining of the masculine order, and the masculine retaliates by decapitating 
and silencing the feminine to reestablish the masculine order.  Obviously, both castration and 
                                                
54 I use trans-sexual and trans-gendered not according to their popular usages but according to an etymological 
meaning, of have the ability to cross and transcend sex and gender, and, therefore, the time of men is equally the 
time of women and any non-normative gender. 
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decapitation suggest severance and the dismembering of a body part.  However, these distinct 
body parts are wherein the discrepancy lies.  For the male, hypothetically speaking, it is the 
phallus, or the presence of a penis, from which he receives his power, or his biological “right” to 
dominance.  Of course, as Jacques Lacan has made quite clear, the phallus is the “privileged 
signifier” and the fear of castration is always present in the male (Lacan 1187).  The female, 
nonetheless, derives her power and potential subversion of male authority from her head, her 
voice and ability to laugh at the male.  Hence, while castration is what disempowers the male, 
decapitation is what disempowers and silences the female.  If we include Kristeva’s and 
Irigaray’s theories of masculine and feminine time, we can surmise that Faulkner’s writing style 
of chronological addition is in stark contrast to the circular, regenerative, and monumental 
characteristics of feminine time.  As a result, the severance of the teleological, chronological, and 
linear time that Faulkner displays must equate to castration, not decapitation.  Of course, I have 
heretofore assumed that Faulkner presents only a masculine time in The Sound and the Fury, and 
a few critics have published papers presenting critiques that argue otherwise. 
 In separate essays, both Marsha Warren55 and Bing Shao56 claim that Quentin’s section 
initially follows a masculine sense of time but slowly disintegrates (or feminizes) as the eldest 
Compson child struggles with his future and with memories of his mother and sister.  Eventually, 
as Warren and Shao assert, Quentin commits suicide to escape from time, ultimately marking his 
transition to feminine time.  Warren specifically notes that Quentin’s desire to die aligns him 
with the feminine, because it symbolizes his wish to escape from masculine time (108-10).  
Shao, on the other hand, simply notes the transition from a linear time to a circular time to depict 
the transition from a masculine to a feminine time (53-4).  While I applaud Warren and Shao for 
                                                
55 “Time, Space, and Semiotic Discourse in the Feminization/Disintegration of Quentin Compson” (1988) 
56 “Time, Death, and Gender: The Quentin Section in The Sound and the Fury” (1994) 
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looking at time in Faulkner as gender-influenced, I must contest the presence of a consistent or 
accentuated feminine time within the Quentin section or anywhere in this novel.  The 
disintegration of masculine time does not immediately indicate the emergence of the feminine.  
To de-masculinize or to emasculate does not mean to feminize, for this would ascribe a sort of 
unjustified simplicity to the feminine.  For the latter to be true, we would need to consider 
masculine time and feminine time as antitheses, as negations, but negative hermeneutics cannot 
account for sex and gender, or for that matter sexed and gendered time.  Hence, this issue is what 
Irigaray refers to as “sexual difference,” not sexual negation.  Negation suggests 
interchangeability, the ability to adopt “the structural position of the other sex” (Olkowski 79).  
Yet, the theoretical negation of one sex in order to adopt the place of the other does not 
overcome the biological, cultural, and linguistic differences and limits that precede the original 
sex.  These differences exist within the “interval” that separates the sexes, and within this gap are 
language and the phallogocentricity of the Symbolic order (88).  And Irigaray stresses that sex as 
negation is the primary reason, historically and philosophically, why women “have been women 
only in relation to the determinations made for them by men,” by a system of oppositions, the 
effect of which is “to displace women from any situation they might establish for themselves in 
their own terms” (77-78).  Therefore, we cannot simply regard the deterioration of time and 
futurity in this novel as feminization, but rather, we should consider it as a de-masculinization, 
distinct from the feminine and possessing its own, unique features. 
       While we do not witness a consistent or unmistakably feminine time in this novel, we do 
witness the castration and emasculation of masculine time, especially in Quentin’s and Jason’s 
sections.  For the most part, in both sections we witness a time that is chronological or 
chronologically organizable.  Since we are dealing with the thoughts of homodiegetic narrators 
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and stream of consciousness, the chronology is not immediately apparent, and thus we read this 
novel in terms of a fragmented chronology.  Each section and each event, nevertheless, has a 
datability and linearity relative to the clock, calendar, or to each other.  Additionally, we even 
understand time to be largely teleological in Quentin’s section and Jason’s section, for both are 
concerned in one way or another, implicitly or explicitly, with the end or a particular end.  For 
Quentin, this end is death and suicide, a future which he completely embraces during his final 
day.  For Jason, his desire for economic stability and prosperity and his cause-and-effect 
planning of the future emphasizes this teleology.  Now, however, the issue of masculine time in 
this novel becomes a question of how Faulkner alludes to a feminine time and order that 
effectively emasculates and castrates this masculine linearity and teleology. 
 Returning to Warren’s discussion of time in Quentin’s section, we do indeed witness in 
Quentin’s section the destruction of progress linear time, the castration of masculine time, and as 
Sartre claims, the deterioration of the future.  Nevertheless, this destruction of the linear does not 
thence induce the cyclical or regenerative, but rather it implies a castration of masculine time, 
which effectively highlights its teleology.  This point is where Warren’s argument falters.  To 
align feminine time with disorder, as Cixous does, is much different from aligning it with death 
(and in my discussion of queer time, I will further note why we must vacate this idée reçu of the 
feminine as aligned with death, and vice versa).  This feminine disorder is not disorderly because 
it essentially lacks any stability or uniformity, but rather it is disorderly because it is at odds with 
the masculine norm that many consider universal and universally stable.  The feminine stresses a 
regenerative modality rather than a teleology or a finitude, and when confronted with masculine 
time, the feminine is able to castrate and emasculate its other.  A perfect example of this 
confrontation and castration of the masculine occurs when Quentin remembers himself and 
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Caddy at the branch having a sexually charged conversation about committing murder/suicide 
and incest: 
 you go on home its late  
 all right 
 her clothes rustled I didnt move they stopped rustling 
 are you going in like I told you 
 I didnt hear anything  
 Caddy 
 yes I will if you want me to I will 
 I sat up she was sitting on the ground her hands clasped about her knee 
 go on to the house like I told you 
 yes Ill do anything you want me to anything yes  
 she didnt even look at me I caught her shoulder and shook her hard 
 you shut up 
 I shook her 
 you shut up you shut up 
 yes 
she lifted her face then I saw she wasnt even looking at me at all . . .  (Faulkner 99; my 
italics) 
  
In this excerpt I have marked Caddy’s lines with italics, and the other lines include Quentin’s 
words to his sister and his narration.  The siblings’ conversation about murder and incest is 
ending, and Quentin tells Caddy to go back to the house.  Though technically affirming that she 
will go back to the house, Caddy’s responses suggest rather that she is agreeing to have sex with 
her brother.  Quentin desires incest with Caddy to psychologically negate his sister’s 
indiscretions with other men and to exorcise the past with a self-constructed truth that will 
effectively restore a sense of order for Quentin.  Yet, Caddy’s affirmative responses prove this 
desire impossible.  She symbolically castrates Quentin, castrates and emasculates his sense of 
time by proving that he will never be able to change history and that ultimately he is a powerless 
slave to this teleological masculine time.  And surely, Quentin underscores this powerlessness at 
the end of his section when he seems fixated on the word “temporary,” on the ephemerality of 
his own existence (112-3).  Moreover, in the tenth line of this excerpt, we see a chiastic quality 
 88 
to Caddy’s speech that exhibits, yet again, this circularity of feminine time: “yes . . . 
anything/anything yes.”  In Caddy’s affirmation to Quentin’s desires, the chiastic, circular 
quality of her speech denies the teleology of Quentin’s language and time, insinuating a syntactic 
structure more concerned with spatiality than temporality.  Caddy begins where she ends and 
vice versa, but she denies finality, the doom and death that her brother’s language purports.  
Recalling Kristeva, we see in Quentin’s language that his sentences follow this linear structure, 
this Faulknerian syntax of chronological addition that has become indicative of the masculine.  
Of course, upon hearing his sister’s affirmations, Quentin immediately responds by trying to 
negate Caddy’s sinful desires, by trying, yet again, to correct the past and prove himself 
dominant.  Again, this second attempt is useless.  He notices that Caddy is not looking at him, a 
sort of paradoxical intransigence wherein she agrees but subsequently denies assigning any 
efficacy to Quentin’s desire to reconstruct time according to his own moral order.      
 In Jason’s section, we see castration take on a comparably symbolic role: the 
emasculation of his masculine ego equally becomes a castration of his masculine temporality.  
Jason’s only concern in life is money.  To Jason, time is money and most of the time he thinks 
about the money he has lost and the past burdens that have caused him to lose money.  Thus, like 
Marcel in “La Femme Adultère,” Jason’s time is the time of business and economics, the time of 
his narrative essentially controlled by the time of commerce and the stock exchange.  Ironically, 
Jason remarks, “I haven't got any money; I've been too busy to make any” (152).  If we correlate 
this remark to Jason’s time, we can therefore understand that Jason has no time.  In Time and 
World in William Faulkner’s ‘The Sound and the Fury’ and ‘Absalom, Absalom!’ Bernhard 
Radloff explains that Jason is always “behind time” and “behind schedule,” that “Jason’s plans 
for the future always fall short of expectation because he has too little time” (109).  For Jason, if 
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time is money (and vice versa) then the flow of time is also equal to the flow of money.  
Although he steals the money that Caddy sends to her daughter, in the end, the female Quentin 
returns the favor and thus completely stops (castrates and emasculates) the flux of Jason’s 
masculine, linear time.   
 This notion of castration is fortified near the end of the fourth section when Jason first 
speaks with the sheriff and then later when he tries to imagine having sex with Lorraine to divert 
his mind from his stolen money.  While speaking with the sheriff about Quentin stealing and 
running away with his money, Faulkner writes that Jason’s “sense of injury and impotence [was] 
feeding upon its own sound” (188).  While the use of impotence here largely refers to 
powerlessness and helplessness, we equally understand that Jason’s sense of authority in the 
Compson household and his general sense of masculinity are maintained by the fact that he is the 
household’s solitary source of income.  Furthermore, the notion that his impotence has a sound 
indicates that this impotence is externalizing itself, audibly or orally in this case, but sexually 
later.  With his money gone and, effectively, his time, Jason is also deprived of his manhood.  
Later, trying to get his mind off his niece and his lost money, Jason tries to think about Lorraine, 
a prostitute from whom he obviously buys sex.  First, literally, with no money, Jason would be 
unable to pay Lorraine for sex—this being another indication of impotence, of both finances and 
his manhood.  Second, while trying to think of himself and Lorraine in bed, he is unable to 
sustain this image or proceed imaginarily with the sex act:  
“‘I’ll think of something else,’ he said, so he thought about Lorraine.  He imagined 
himself in bed  with her, only he was just lying beside her, pleading with her to help him, 
then he thought of money again, and that he had been outsmarted by a woman, a girl.  If 
he could just believe it was the man who had robbed him.  But to have been robbed . . . 
worst of all, by a bitch girl.”  (191)     
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In this passage we see Jason’s imagining of himself and Lorraine in bed quickly eradicated by 
his feelings of emasculation.  He also pleads with Lorraine for help, which suggests either 
financial or emotional help in coping with his family issues or sexual help because he is 
physically impotent and is unable to fornicate.  Third, Jason’s castration is suggested not only 
within his thoughts of Lorraine but also in the fact that Jason is the “first sane Compson since 
before Culloden and (a childless bachelor) hence the last” (212).  Technically, as the last 
sexually potent and mentally capable Compson male, Jason represents the last chance for the 
Compson family to maintain posterity and genealogy.  Although Benjy is actually the youngest 
Compson son and, hence, the end of the bloodline, his intellectual disability and physical 
castration prevent him from procreating and perpetuating the family’s lineage.  Jason, however, 
is too consumed with the past, with his financial and emotional castration, to think about 
procreation and posterity.  He alienates himself from his family and his ancestry, and he isolates 
himself socially, constantly defining everyone else as “other.”  Therefore, he does not follow 
through with his duty to history that masculine time induces, failing not only to perpetuate the 
Compson name but also to start a family of his own, to bequeath affluence and descendants to 
the state and to the human race.     
 For Benjy, the emasculation and castration of time rests on the notion that he does not 
comprehend time, especially the idea of a future.  His sense of time is focused on the past and 
present, but mostly on a past that seems more current, immediate, and significant than the actual 
present.  For this reason, critics have mostly analyzed Benjy’s section according to Bergson’s 
theory of duration, that the present is defined by whatever events one perceives to still be 
important, whether they occurred two minutes or two years ago.  Perhaps the most exaggerated 
example of duration in this section occurs while Luster and Benjy are at the branch looking for 
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Luster’s lost quarter.  Taking off his shoes and rolling up his trousers to get into the water, Benjy 
thinks, “I hushed and got in the water and Roskus came and said to come to supper and Caddy 
said It’s not supper time yet.  Im not going”  (11; Faulkner’s italics).  The first clause takes place 
in the narrative present, April 7, 1928.  Marked by Faulkner’s italics, the second clause is a 
memory from 1898 on the day of Damuddy’s death.  In fact, the italicized portion is 
chronologically the very first event in the narrative of Benjy’s section while the first clause 
chronologically represents one of the narrative’s final events.  Thus, the narrative and linguistic 
present and the past-present differ by thirty years.  Nonetheless, Benjy’s memory apprehends 
both events as occurring in the present, almost in a way that indicates an atemporal recurrence or 
regeneration of past events.  The italics are merely a marker for clarity so that the reader may 
discern the impression of a chronology.  Nevertheless, without the italics (as in Benjy’s mind), 
this sentence would mark perfectly the linearity of masculine time, of the “and . . . and . . . and” 
structure of the perpetual present and chronological addition.  The paradox is that the linearity of 
this sentence marks an inversion of the past and present and emphasizes syntactically the notion 
that the past becomes the future (of the sentence and Benjy’s mental reality).  In his essay on 
Faulkner, Jean Pouillon writes, “The past, therefore, not only was but is and will be” (81; my 
italics).  If there is any section in this novel that we could argue as potentially displaying a 
feminine sense of time, it would be Benjy’s.  With its discernible chronology and continually 
regenerated past, Benjy’s section, though, seems to possess both masculine and feminine 
qualities.  As a whole, Benjy’s section is disorderly and has a chiastic quality—it begins where it 
ends and ends where it begins.  Still, this section does not engender the newness and hope that 
feminine time produces.  Rather, Benjy’s time is marked by the sameness of an irredeemable 
past, by a time that has no hope for progression or posterity, and by a future that is inevitably 
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chosen for him, especially by Jason, who has Benjy castrated and, as revealed in the Appendix, 
sends him to the state asylum in Jackson.  Accordingly, with the presence of the Appendix, we 
can possibly ascribe a teleology to Benjy’s section, a teleology of irrecoverable loss.  And as his 
family sends him away to Jackson, the loss of his freedom and soon his life evoke this teleology.    
 Hence, Benjy’s story is primarily a story of loss and negation.  He loses his birth name 
(“Benjy” represents the negative meaning of “Maury”).  He loses his pasture, Caddy, his penis, 
his right to life.  Tragically, Benjy’s past eventually negates his future—this notion is ironically 
linked with the notion that Benjy’s past becomes his future.  And as Faulkner notes in the 
Appendix, Benjy “could not remember his sister but only the loss of her” and “he remembered 
not the pasture but only its loss” (213; my italics).  Finally, at the very end of this section, we see 
crystalized in Benjy’s mind two metaphorical images of loss.  First, while preparing for bed in 
the narrative present, Benjy notes, “I got undressed and I looked at myself and I began to cry” 
(47).  Benjy cries because of his lacking of genitals, and although the castration occurred fifteen 
years ago, he is equally disturbed and saddened by the sight of his body as if the castration only 
recently happened.  This crying also suggests that Benjy is unaware of his sexuality, and he cries 
only because he comprehends the physical lack, not the sexual significance of the castration.  We 
also see this sexual unawareness when Benjy moans at the girls passing by, unable to articulate 
his desires, he repeats several times, “I was trying to say” (34).  Benjy knows what he wants 
(Caddy? a pre-Oedipal desire for wholeness and bodily gratification?), but he is unable to 
articulate or even comprehend what that desire means.  His castration, the negation of his sex and 
genitalia, and his body as a whole (that is, the whole that constitutes the lacking) consequently 
becomes a symbol of his loss, especially of his lost time, future, and hope.  Second, at the very 
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end of his section, Benjy goes back to 1898 during the day of Damuddy’s death, and he 
remembers going to bed and falling asleep with Caddy.  Benjy remembers: 
Father went to the door and looked at us again.  Then the dark came back, and he stood 
black in the door, and then the door turned black again.  Caddy held me and I could hear 
us all, and the  darkness, and something I could smell.  And then I could see the windows, 
where the trees were buzzing.  Then the dark began to go in smooth, bright shapes, like it 
always does, even when Caddy says that I have been asleep.  (48; my italics) 
 
This final image stands as a metaphor for what becomes of Benjy’s life during his section and 
this novel—the darkness of this past image becomes the darkness of his future.  First, Benjy 
notes the image of his father going black, then the door.  The room is already black.  Finally, the 
window goes black.  This pervasive and slowly advancing darkness symbolizes the gradual loss 
that Benjy experiences in his life.  Interestingly enough, the window is the final image to go 
dark.  The house and the bedroom have all gone dark, perhaps symbolizing the eventual 
dissolution of the Compson family as well as Benjy’s displacement from the family when he is 
sent to Jackson.  The darkening of the window, and hence of the outside, suggests the negation of 
any hope and order, for all that lies ahead in more of the same darkness and disorder.  And the 
novel famously ends with Benjy furiously bellowing in a scene that evokes the title’s and the 
story’s connection to Macbeth: “a tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying 
nothing” (Shakespeare 874).  With his moans and bellows, Benjy signals the negation of 
meaning in the Compson world, the loss of order, and the doom of a futureless existence. 
 Even still, Benjy’s time, and the time of his brothers, is predominantly masculine, and so 
we should be wary of reading this novel’s temporal representations as universal modalities, 
especially when considering gender and sex.  We cannot assume that the castrated and futureless 
times of Benjy, Quentin, and Jason are equally a reality for Dilsey or for Caddy and her 
daughter, though this novel does not devote a homodiegetic narration to a female character to 
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reveal her firsthand experience of time.  If such a section existed, especially in the fourth section, 
perhaps we could then deconstruct the masculine and feminine times and determine where they 
overlap in the Faulknerian storyworld.  Without this first-person feminine narrative, one of the 
largest conclusions that we can extract from this novel’s temporal structures is a critique of 
masculine time, history, and the Southern tradition.  Especially in the cases of Quentin and 
Jason, Faulkner presents both brothers as anachronisms.  Both cling to those Southern values, 
morals, and traditions that have deteriorated during the postbellum years.  For Quentin, his 
anachronism is an issue of female chastity, of preserving the family name and honor.  For Jason, 
his anachronism is an issue of patriarchy, familial dominance, financial authority, and racial 
supremacy.  And as the years pass, Quentin and Jason become more anachronistic, clinging to 
the past while society progresses and changes and consequently isolating themselves in both time 
and space.  On the other hand, Benjy is not an anachronism, but, rather, his section tells the story 
of how his family’s anachronistic, hypocritical, and isolated existence tragically affects and 
eventually negates his existence.  Although we see that Benjy wants to express himself, to 
articulate his actions and thoughts to his family, he is unable to comprehend or rationalize his 
existence.  His entire being is at stake, since, if he cannot justify his actions and vindicate 
himself, his family will forever send him away.  Thus, we see that the Compson family imposes 
a masculine linearity and teleology on Benjy’s time as Jason sends him off to his death in 
Jackson.  Benjy’s lacking of a future is not a result of choice or a fatal flaw but a result of this 
familial imposition of anachronistic Southern morality and respectability, which allows no room 
for Benjy or any intellectually disabled person to live as an equal. 
Accordingly, we return to the problem of the nuclear family and the time that 
encompasses this familial model.  In practically every example of which I have thus far spoken 
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in this study, Faulkner and Camus have always called into question the family and family time, 
even if implicitly, and, for such reason, we return to the issues concerning the Child and child-
rearing, reproduction and genealogical futurism.  Whereas several scholars have referred to 
family time as akin to “reproductive futurism,” I wish to alter this term slightly by swapping 
reproduction with genealogy.  I make this change because reproduction, I feel, does not entirely 
describe what family time and posterity comprise, for this issue is not merely one of biology and 
procreation but is equally one of familial morality, tradition, legacy, patrimony, and patronymy, 
all of which genealogy assumes.  This term is also seemingly paradoxical, and for good reason.  
Genealogical futurism or, as Halberstam names it, generational time is paradoxical because it 
supposes a future via reproduction and inheritance (which is still largely patrimonial and 
patronymic) but also it “connects the family to the historical past of the nation, and glances 
ahead to connect the family to the future of both familial and national stability” (Halberstam 5).   
In Faulkner’s and Camus’s works, both authors question who is upholding this supposed 
“stability” and whether genealogical futurism and family time can even create stability.  In 
Sanctuary, Requiem for a Nun, The Sound and the Fury, and practically every other novel he 
wrote, it is no accident that Faulkner presents family after family, all of which are chained to 
legacies, desirous of posterity, consumed by (mostly primogeniture) inheritance, and all of which 
eventually collapse, for genealogical futurism becomes wholly impractical and unsustainable.  In 
The Sound and the Fury, genealogical futurism cannot justify or respect the life of an individual 
like Benjy because, if genealogical futurism is purportedly to create familial and national 
“stability,” it must proceed hand-in-hand with eugenics, ensuring that the abject do not continue 
and propagate for the sake of family legacy and honor, capitalistic progress, and social 
homogeneity and order.  The irony, of course, is that by castrating and then sending away Benjy 
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by the authority of genealogical futurism, the Compsons, indeed, incite their self-implosion.  
Additionally, in Requiem for a Nun, Temple can no longer suffer her husband and family, not 
only attempting to run away from them but also wanting to run away with another man.  And 
might we place blame on Temple’s judicial father in Sanctuary for her desperate desire to escape 
her family?  Throughout the novel, Temple’s family is nonexistent, especially her father, who 
only assumes his role of overbearing patriarch at the novel’s end, after Temple’s abduction and 
the corruption of her innocence, purity, and Southern respectability have ultimately called his 
name, honor, and judgeship into question.  Trying to re-assimilate his daughter back into the 
world of the ceremonious Southern aristocracy, Temple’s father practically imprisons her and 
ensures that she will marry Gowan to merge the Drake and Stevens legacies.  But as Temple 
makes so abundantly clear, as the Drake and Stevens families merged in the patronymic name of 
genealogical futurism, she, Temple Drake, was killed and resurrected as Mrs. Gowan Stevens, 
yet again her identity sterilized.  Attempting to revive Temple Drake while her marital-familial 
life exacerbates her ennui, Mrs. Gowan Stevens commits adultery and tries to runaway with 
Pete—the identity of Temple Drake still assumed by the prurient world of the Memphis 
underground.  And as she tries to revive Temple Drake, Mrs. Gowan Stevens theoretically 
destroys the Drake-Stevens pedigree and bond but, in doing so, instigates inadvertently the very 
real destruction of her family. 
In Camus’s canon, we see the similar destruction of the family in Le Malentendu; though, 
as previously mentioned, an absurd world and God (Le Vieux) incite this familial destruction, 
thereby denying to entrust any notion of genealogical futurity with credence or efficacy.  In “La 
Femme Adultère” Camus’s criticism of genealogical futurism is commensurate with Faulkner’s 
critique.  The marriage of Janine and Marcel is more obviously Camus’s initial criticism, for 
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their union is wholly and traditionally unequal.  Janine, living in and influenced by a world that 
stresses marriage, fidelity, and procreation as institutions of happiness, only cares to stay with 
Marcel because he “makes her exist” in this masculine and teleological world, wherein, if she 
were alone, she would be marginalized as the abject and would inevitably die alone.  Thus, like 
Temple, Janine is considered adulterous as she realizes that her marriage and husband alone will 
never give her happiness nor do they make her exist; instead, they have suppressed her existence, 
sterilized her identity.  And we could say the same of procreation within this marriage.  Janine 
declares several times that she and Marcel have no children.  While one could argue that these 
statements suggest Janine’s desire to procreate, I believe the opposite to be true.  Janine never 
unequivocally voices her desire for children; rather, it appears that Janine’s mentioning that she 
has yet to procreate is equivalent to her statements that Marcel makes her exist in this world—
statements the simply mirror the conventions that she is expected to follow if she wishes to 
“exist” in this world.  Janine knows, nonetheless, that, like her marriage, a child will not 
suddenly give her life meaning and happiness.  And though critics like Anthony Rizzuto57 and 
Louise Horowitz58 have censured Camus’s works as misogynistic for denying his female 
characters procreation, in the case of Janine and Marcel, procreation and the adherence to 
genealogical futurism would not reintroduce life and love into an already lifeless, loveless 
marriage.  Rather, antithetical to the idea of giving new life, reproduction would intensify the 
lifelessness and lovelessness of their marriage, especially the existential doom that Janine is 
already facing.  Therefore, not giving Janine and Marcel children, Camus silently critiques and 
repudiates the notion of marriage, childbearing/rearing, and, consequently, reproductive futurism 
as inducing generational and social stability and happiness. 
                                                
57 “Camus and a Society Without Women” (1983) 
58 “Of Women and Arabs: Sexual and Racial Polarization in Camus” (1987) 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE QUEER TIMES OF QUENTIN AND CALIGULA 
 
 While discussing this notion of genealogical and reproductive futurism, we must note 
perhaps the greatest opposition to this seemingly pandemic conception of time and futurity: that 
is, the existence of queer time.  The relevance of this section to sterility will become more 
obvious as this discussion advances; and still, if we are to understand the heteronormativity of 
genealogical futurism as tautologically representative of life and the fertile perpetuation of 
humanity, then we could immediately surmise that queer time is tautologically representative of 
death and sterility, that is, non-procreativity.  Defining queer time is no easy matter, nor should 
we strive to limit queer time to a specific notion of temporality, especially given the diversity 
comprising the queer.  Still, it will be helpful to have some idea of what queer time is or could 
be, how and where it emerges, and what larger social consequences it induces.  I contend that we 
can read both Quentin Compson’s as well as, and most importantly, Caligula’s experiences of 
time as queer.  Of course, this contention immediately assumes that both Quentin and Caligula 
are queer characters, which I believe is an entirely plausible, if not crucial, argument if we wish 
to move past this prevalent and rigid analysis of both Quentin and Caligula as moral monsters or 
dejected characters suffering from some sort of existential dilemma and anguish allegedly 
inherent to the human condition.  To do so, I will first map out several comprehensions of queer 
time relative to what have largely become the pedestrian temporalities of the heteronormative 
and the progressively emerging homonormative.  Then, I will move on to both Quentin and 
Caligula, first, explaining how we might read both as queer characters and, second, analyzing 
their metaphysics as temporally queer in their own right. 
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 Queer time, as we begin to wrap our heads around what this term could mean, initially 
stands as a temporality immediately influenced by what queer sexualities or sex acts insinuate.  
Though no one is just in saying that the queer will or could never perform or enjoy the 
heteronormative sex act, obviously the queer have received their status as queer largely for the 
reason that their sexual jouissance does not conform exclusively to heterosexual intercourse and 
practices.  Other than carnal pleasure and gratification, heterosexual intercourse and 
insemination intends and valorizes reproduction, from which clearly generates this notion of 
genealogical and reproductive futurism.  If heterosexual intercourse and procreation indeed 
“create the future,” queer sexuality, consequently, would stand opposite to procreation and the 
future.  As I mentioned earlier, if society decrees reproduction and the to-be-intrauterine as 
controlling and generating “the future,” society then begins to reject, consciously or 
unconsciously, and deem the respective lives and futures of the queer, who are still alive and 
were once those to-be-intrauterine children, as secondary and worthless.  In his titularly pithy 
book No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Edelman notes the relationship between 
queer temporality and the death drive, expiating:  
If the fate of the queer is to figure the fate that cuts the thread of futurity, if the 
jouissance, the corrosive enjoyment, intrinsic to queer (non)identity annihilates the 
fetishistic jouissance that works to consolidate identity by allowing reality to coagulate 
around its ritual reproduction, then the only oppositional status to which our queerness 
could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive we’re 
called on to figure and insisting, against the cult of the Child and the political order it 
enforces, that we . . . do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter tomorrow, 
since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the 
future.  (30-1; Edelman’s italics) 
 
In his very contentious work, Edelman claims that instead of the queer countering the persistence 
of the Christian and conservative ideological attacks on queerness as “future-negating,” as pro-
abortion and tautologically anti-life, and as a threat to Western civilization, the queer should 
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embrace these invectives and the death drive not only as intrinsic and immitigable in the eyes of 
the opposition but also as positively rupturing the social and civic orders that have deemed them 
the other and the abject, while still adamantly demanding equal rights (26).  For Edelman, the 
temporality and futurity of the queer must end in the here and now, for the future is “kids stuff,” 
“mere repetition and just as lethal as the past” (31).  From Edelman, we then extract the 
connection of queer time and the death drive—this conception will be crucial when analyzing 
Quentin and Caligula.   
 Likewise, in her book In a Queer Time and Place: Transgendered Bodies, Subcultural 
Lives, Halberstam’s understanding of queer time, with similarities to Edelman’s, is a bit more 
specific and more hopeful, though not future-ful.  Halberstam’s book considers queer time as 
uniquely opposed or counter to the general and mostly heteronormative conceptions of time 
while noting additionally the emergence of queer time during the HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 
1980s.  And so, Halberstam writes: 
Queer time perhaps emerges most spectacularly, at the end of the twentieth century, from 
within those gay communities whose horizons of possibility have been severely 
diminished by the AIDS epidemic. . . .  The constantly diminishing future creates a new 
emphasis on the here, the present, the now, and while the threat of no future hovers 
overhead like a storm cloud, the urgency of being also expands the potential of the 
moment, and . . . squeezes new possibilities out of the time at hand. . . .  Queer time, as it 
flashes into view in the heart of crisis, exploits the potential of what Charles-Pierre 
Baudelaire called in relation to modernism “The transient, the fleeting, the contingent.”  
Some gay men have responded to the threat of AIDS, for example, by rethinking the 
conventional emphasis on longevity and futurity, and by making community in relation to 
risk, disease, infection, and death.  And yet queer time, even as it emerges from the AIDS 
crisis, is not only about compression and annihilation; it is also about the potentiality of 
a life unscripted by the conventions of family, inheritance, and child rearing.  (2; my 
italics)  
 
Thus, Halberstam not only notes the “no future” characteristic of queer time, she additionally 
notes that queer temporal structures are in opposition to conventional and normative temporal 
modalities, including family time and genealogical futurism, the feminine “biological clock,” 
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capitalism and production, social time or the middle-class customs of respectability and 
scheduling, and longevity and safety (as opposed to a “live fast and die young” lifestyle of risk-
taking).  In his book Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity, José Muñoz quite 
bluntly calls this time “straight time” (22).  And for Halberstam, a few vivid examples of those 
groups and persons living by a queer time include, but are not limited to, HIV/AIDS victims, 
drug addicts, prostitutes, artists, club kids of the rave culture, and any queers who dare to live a 
life of “stretched-out adolescence” (153).  While Halberstam’s comprehension of queer time is 
certainly very appealing, well explained, and far more pragmatic than the usually abstruse 
metaphysics of time, I must question why she believes that queer time has only emerged since 
the early eighties at the outset of the HIV/AIDS epidemic?  Queer individuals and groups have 
probably been living lives counter to straight time throughout history, though their narratives are 
certainly less spoken of or vivid as the one’s that Halberstam explores.  Additionally, while the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is a good example of how queer time might be one of an ever-diminishing 
future since the infection and disease were originally oracles of death and still prove fatal despite 
prodigious medical advances, does the future of the queer not diminish simply by way of being 
marginalized as abject, as worthless, contemptible flesh in a society that stresses adherence to 
convention and assimilation?  In a society that deems anyone as the less-than-desirable Other, 
what notion of futurity could possibly exist for those abject bodies when that society wishes 
them not to have a future?  Essentially, I contend that queer time has always existed as long as 
cultures have deemed the “deviant,” the “aberrant,” the “abnormal” as sordid and unworthy, even 
before the nightmare of HIV and AIDS, and, accordingly, I take my analysis of queer time all the 
way back to Caligula—that is, Camus’s Caligula. 
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Quentin 
As I have already discussed, the time of Quentin Compson is one that has aroused much 
interest in scholars, and, for the most part, Quentin’s temporal experience has largely been 
assessed according to his obsession with morality and tradition, his belief that the past is more 
important than the present and future, and his inability to reconcile the past with the existent 
changes within the present.  Consequently, I implore that we question what Quentin’s obsession 
with Southern morality and tradition could potentially suggest about his sexuality, rather than 
simply his adherence to hetero-masculine convention, for I contend that Quentin does not solely 
adhere to hetero-masculine or normative standards despite his failed efforts to restore moral 
order.  Hence, I claim that Quentin is queer and eventually comes to represent many of the 
important characteristics of queer time that both Edelman and Halberstam considered in their 
respective works, namely the death drive and the denial of longevity, inheritance, safety, and 
bourgeois respectability. 
In the Appendix to The Sound and the Fury, Faulkner writes that Quentin “loved not his 
sister’s body but some concept of Compson honor precariously and (he knew well) only 
temporarily supported by the minute fragile membrane of her maidenhead” (207).  Quentin 
“loved not the idea of the incest which he would not commit, but some presbyterian concept of 
its eternal punishment” (207).  And finally, Quentin “loved death above all,” “loved and lived in 
a deliberate and almost perverted anticipation of death as a lover loves and deliberately refrains 
from the waiting willing friendly tender incredible body of his beloved, until he can no longer 
bear not the refraining but the restraint and so flings, hurls himself, relinquishing, drowning” 
(208; my italics).  Before I begin to extrapolate the transparent presence of Quentin’s death drive 
in these lines as well as in the novel’s text, I will first explore what “type” of relationship 
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Quentin has with Death.  Doreen Fowler notes persuasively the connection between death and 
sex in this novel; however, she mistakenly claims that the death that Faulkner speaks of in the 
Appendix is inherently and strictly feminine (Fowler 3).  While it has certainly become a 
scholarly idée fixe to immediately associate the feminine with death, have we ever questioned 
whether Death should or needs to be gendered?  And yes, Fowler, and many other scholars, 
could easily support her claim to this feminine death by noting that Quentin quotes Saint Francis 
of Assisi’s dying words of “Little Sister Death” and, hence, associates the feminine with Death 
(49).  Yet, the implications of considering why Quentin associates his sister and the feminine 
with Death are much different from the implications of blindly assuming that Quentin’s and 
Saint Francis’s words unequivocally signify a truism of Death’s femininity.  Still, even if we are 
to assume Death as feminine, must we then consider Quentin’s relationship with Death as 
heteronormative and heterosexual, wherein Quentin would need to occupy the role of the 
masculine?  Or, can we consider this Quentin-Death liaison as queer59? 
Looking at Quentin’s love of Death through the heteronormative lens that Fowler’s 
argument purports, we then need to question how Quentin displays himself as masculine and 
how Death displays “herself” as feminine.  However, immediately as we try to do such a 
deconstruction, we see that Quentin seems to represent the feminine, but only, of course, as we 
consider this relationship according to heteronormative convention.  Quentin is the one waiting 
for his deadly lover, rather than the conventionally masculine “take-charge” attitude of romantic 
competition.  Quentin is also the one that swoons over Death’s appeal, and swooning is never 
associated with men60; men must not swoon, for to do so would mean to make themselves open 
                                                
59 At the time, Faulkner used the now pejorative “perverted” to describe Quentin’s love of Death, which still 
suggests something “abnormal” or not heteronormative about this love. 
60 Looking up “swoon” in the Oxford Dictionary of English, it was to no surprise that every example of this verb 
considers only a woman swooning over a man, who is always in a superior position. 
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to vulnerability and subordination, which is contrary to the masculine order.  Bearing in mind, as 
well, that death is equally a euphemism for sex, as Quentin “flings” and “hurls” himself toward 
the Charles River, toward death, he is equally flinging himself toward his first sexual encounter 
with Death.  Quentin is, of course, a virgin, and Death, the skilled lover.  Yet again, Quentin is 
the one in a swoon, seeming to fill the stereotypical feminine role but not the masculine.   
Quentin’s role as the feminine in a hetero-relational dyad is further plausible as he notes 
that his friends often call his roommate, Shreve, his “husband”—Quentin, then, assuming the 
role of Shreve’s wife (50).  And certainly, near the section’s end, Faulkner gives us specific 
instances during which Shreve and Quentin’s friendship is marked by something more than just 
homosociality: (1) when Shreve twice puts his hand on Quentin’s knee, presumably trying to 
console his friend after his arrest, and (2) when Shreve tries to help Quentin clean up and nurse 
his wounds after his fight with Gerald Bland.  In both cases, Quentin, however, pulls away from 
Shreve’s hands and touch; though, his aversion to Shreve’s touch in these moments, probably 
since they are not alone, is less an issue of disinterest or a want of independence than an issue of 
the social limits to homosocial interaction.  We could also note that Quentin continually touches 
or can feel his letter to Shreve in his coat pocket.  While we could say that such awareness is 
simply Quentin’s irresoluteness about committing suicide, we might say that the letter represents 
a metonymic displacement of desire—Quentin touches the letter because he knows he cannot 
touch Shreve.  Finally, in the section’s final paragraph, Quentin’s final thoughts, presumably 
before he leaves his dorm that evening to commit suicide, are ultimately about Shreve; Quentin 
can actually feel his letter to his roommate “crackling through the cloth” of his coat—the 
crackling or the letter equally evocative of Quentin’s crackling heart and strained desires (113).  
And so, Quentin’s last thoughts are not about his sister or directly about Death, but are about his 
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friend and, subtextually, about how they can never be more than roommates; never can Shreve 
be more than Quentin’s phantasmatic husband.  Can it then be the case that Shreve represents 
Death or Quentin’s love of Death just as much, if not more, than Caddy or any alleged femininity 
that one might ascribe to Death?  
With all the latter in mind, I feel that we can no longer properly consider Death as 
innately and strictly feminine or Quentin’s relationship with Death as heteronormative.  And 
still, there are additional examples suggestive of Quentin’s potential queerness, noticeably his 
noting of times when other male characters, other than Shreve, touch his knees or arms: (1) while 
on the trolley, Quentin remarks that a black man touched his knee while passing by, and (2) later 
while speaking with the Deacon, Quentin remarks, “He touched my arm, lightly, his hand has 
that worn, gentle quality of niggers’ hands” (63).  While we note the historical racism of these 
two examples, we also notice Quentin’s fetishization of the black male body, especially the 
Deacon’s hands and touch, which Quentin seems to enjoy.  But, still keeping all these sexual 
complications in mind, if we consider Quentin as a queer character, his love of Death as queer, 
and his relationship with or desire for Shreve as queer, we can begin to comprehend why 
Quentin’s temporal reality becomes one of future-negation, of no future. 
 Returning to the issue of Quentin and Shreve’s “marriage,” we might consider Shreve 
and Quentin’s potential attraction or love of his roommate as transitively commensurate with his 
love of Death.  But how might Shreve come to represent Death?  To answer this question, we 
must return to the realties and conventions of the Southern tradition.  In the Appendix, Faulkner 
writes that Quentin’s desire to commit incest with Caddy—though, it is unclear whether 
Faulkner deems this desire as unconsciously, subconsciously, or consciously self-constructed—is 
not based out of lust for his sister’s body but is due to “some presbyterian concept of its eternal 
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punishment.”  This remark indicates that not only is Quentin aware of these Southern and 
religious values but also he equally wants to break these rules for a masochistic desire to be 
punished.  We could say the same of his relationship with Shreve, that such type of love 
according to Presbyterian dogma would ensure eternal punishment.  As such, we can possibly 
analyze Quentin, his desires and queerness as redolent with Edelman’s connection of the queer 
with the death drive.  And while Quentin promotes and tries to uphold a now moribund, 
Compson value of female chastity, his repressed desires are still starkly opposed to those same 
traditions to which he clings.  Thus, unable to reconcile tradition with desire, past with present, 
Quentin perceives his life as futureless, and by committing suicide, he effectively negates his 
future. 
 While Quentin’s suicide is obviously indicative of the relationship between queerness 
and the death drive, his time is also characteristic of Halberstam’s theory of queer time as 
opposed to the temporal structures around family and bourgeois sociality, longevity, and 
inheritance.  On Quentin’s last day of life, we note his rejection of the clock.  Quentin 
remembers his father’s comment that “clocks slay time” and soon breaks his pocket watch, 
trying to focus his mind away from the arbitrary readings of a mechanical dial (54).  The clock, 
as Faulkner presents it, becomes the predominant temporal structure not only in Quentin’s world 
but in everyone’s reality, even despite the fact that it inaccurately and damagingly displays a 
time that controls our lives.  The clock then becomes the primary figure of time as progress, of 
capitalism and production, of the old aphorism “early to bed, early to rise,” the time of bourgeois 
scheduling and respectability, and although the clock is meant to show the “present” time, it 
becomes, rather, a figure of the irredeemable past and the ever-diminishing future.  As Quentin 
tries to reject this time, he breaks his watch, and he skips class.  With the past as unrecoverable 
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and the future as ever-diminishing or non-existent, Quentin’s chapter, his final day on June 
Second, 1910, becomes indicative of Halberstam’s relating of queer time with Baudelairean 
modernity—queer time as constituting “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent” (Baudelaire 
684).  Though Quentin’s time soon becomes a time of compression and annihilation, it is also a 
time that is arguably about the here and now, for the then and there have already been negated.  
And how could we deny that Quentin’s time on his last day of life is not about the here and now 
since his day is all about exploration and wandering, about squeezing new possibilities out of the 
very short time he has left, even despite the fact that his mind often wanders to the past?  Quentin 
spends his day roaming around town, helping a little girl find her family, getting arrested, and 
getting into a fight with a fellow student.  This list of events by itself does not suggest that 
Quentin’s time is in the here and now, but we should question why Quentin waits until the end of 
the day if he is going to commit suicide regardless.  Why not do the deed earlier and just quickly 
end his pain?  Although Quentin thinks about death often and shows many indications of his 
wish to die, he does not come to a resolute conclusion until the day’s end, and, even then, 
Faulkner keeps Quentin’s final decision somewhat ambiguous.  Rather, Quentin decides to live 
one more day, during which he struggles with his past but simultaneously questions what this 
world has left to offer him in terms of a future. 
As Quentin lives his final day wandering and wondering, within all the foreshadowing of 
death and excessive cerebrality, I find there to be several utopian moments in this section, 
moments that emphasize queer time as “[distilling] the eternal from the transitory,” a phrase that 
would coincide with what Muñoz calls “queer utopian memory” to highlight how the 
performativity of the past engenders a future in the present, even if this “future” is never fully 
realized (Baudelaire 684; Muñoz 35).  Though one could argue that the majority of Quentin’s 
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thoughts of the past are more distressing than pleasing, I feel that there are examples that are 
more hopeful and utopian.  One, in particular, occurs near the section’s end as Quentin heads 
back to the dormitory after departing from Shreve and Spoade, and Quentin thinks: 
. . . then I was hearing my watch and I began to listen for the chimes and I touched 
Shreve’s letter through my coat, the bitten shadows of the elms flowing upon my hand.  
And then as I turned into the quad the chimes did begin and I went on while the notes 
came up like ripples on a pool and passed me and went on, saying Quarter to what?  All 
right.  Quarter to what.  (108)  
 
I initially note this passage because of Quentin’s touching his letter to Shreve—the metonymic 
displacement of desire that I believe highlights Quentin’s homosexual desires.  I also note this 
passage because of the obvious indication that Quentin is aware of or “in” time, though I also 
believe that what Faulkner suggests about Quentin’s temporal experience in this passage is more 
complex.  Quentin’s watch cannot actually “tell” the time since it no longer has any hands, but it 
is still ticking.  Though Quentin can hear the clock ticking, he is listening for the clock to chime, 
suggesting that the current time is near some quarter-hour interval.  However, when the clock 
does chime, Quentin discerns the chimes as transitory like the waves of pool water.  In this 
moment, Quentin transitions outside of time with these transient chimes, though the chimes 
ultimately dissipate while Quentin remains (for now).  Still, in this moment Quentin is no longer 
bothered by or cares for (the) time.  While it is unclear who “speaks” the last three phrases—
Quentin or the chimes?—the end of the passage insinuates that the mechanics of time are no 
longer disturbing Quentin.  The transition from “Quarter to what?” to “Quarter to what.”—from 
interrogative to declarative—proposes that the time in and of this moment is completely useless 
and irrelevant, for Quentin never resolves the “what” into a number but leaves the time as an 
unknown.  The “All right” between the interrogative and the declarative signals Quentin’s 
emotional transition, indicating his psychological satisfaction with not resolving this unknown.  
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Quentin can finally dismiss the mechanics of time, reaching a transcendental place where he can 
“distill the eternal from the transitory”—the transitory being those chimes, the mechanics of 
time, and the eternal being a life or world outside time where the anguish of time lost or losing 
time is inconsequential.  For this reason, I return to Quentin touching the letter in his pocket.  If 
we wish to understand the letter as a metonymic transposition from Shreve’s body to Shreve’s 
letter and Quentin’s continual touching the letter as symbolic of his desires, we could then 
deduce that in this moment Quentin is able to escape time via fantasy as he phantasmatically 
allows himself to defer to his desires and touch Shreve.  Quentin returns the touches that he had 
only recently rejected while Shreve tired to console and care for him.  In this regard, I consider 
this moment as symptomatic of Muñoz’s queer utopian memory: his letter to Shreve allows for 
Quentin to perform what he could not perform in the past and, in doing such, presents a utopian 
moment of hope that one day the metonymic barrier will be torn down, and body can finally 
touch body.   
 Nevertheless, this moment does not last long; Quentin’s death drive proves immitigable.  
Even though we do not actually know what Quentin’s letter to Shreve says, we can make a 
decent guess that the letter is probably a confessional, yet again the letter allowing Quentin to 
perform what he could not perform in the past.  Furthermore, whether the metonymic barrier of 
desire and homosocial limits could ever crumble in the future, in the present the barrier remains 
buttressed, and Quentin, who can no longer endure this present, this repressed dystopian memory 
of the past, seeks death, denies longevity, denies the platitudinous “it gets better” mentality, 
denies his family’s legacy and inheritance—though, Quentin does wait until the last day of 
classes, which he skips, to kill himself as to “get the full value of his paid-in-advance tuition” 
(208).  And still, his suicide essentially negates that education and the original propose of that 
 110 
now-wasted money, which was to create a future for Quentin, for him to carry on his family’s 
patronymy and patrimony as his education at a prestigious school should ensure him a wife and 
career.  Even though such a future of heteronormativity and social, familial adherence would 
technically, in Sartre’s terms, still constitute a metaphysically intact future, what perceivably 
worthwhile future could possibly await Quentin, or any of us, if he or we are to deny our 
identities for the sake of conformity and obedience, for the fear of opprobrium and alienation, 
and in the name of morals and values that are just as precarious and ephemeral as those 
individuals and institutions that seek to perpetuate them?  Sorry Sartre, a barred future is not a 
future.     
 
Caligula 
 I say with fair certainty that Caligula, or at least Camus’s version of the infamous 
emperor, is a queer character.  Perhaps my deepest grievance with most of the critical work on 
Caligula hitherto is the common reading and understanding of Caligula’s pain and anguish as 
indicative of some absurdist and existentialist notion of angoisse innate to the human condition.  
In other words, most analyses have essentialized Caligula’s struggles according to Camus’s 
philosophies that absurdity is inherent to the world we have created and that such absurdity is, 
therefore, inescapable, restricting, and psychologically oppressive to the individual life and 
experience.  Nevertheless, if we consider the Camusian storyworld created in Caligula as 
symbolic of our absurd world—which it would need to be if we are to judge Caligula according 
to the same absurdism, existentialism, and nihilism derived from our existences—then we would 
need to surmise that every character in this play must suffer to some existentially equivalent 
extent as Caligula since we have tautologically essentialized his struggle.  Yet, Caligula’s 
 111 
thoughts, feelings, and experiences are wholly singular and seem foreign to the rest of the play’s 
cast.  The only character who comes close to comprehending Caligula is Scipion, which, I 
believe, is by virtue of the young Roman’s own queerness and love for the emperor.  Relatively 
speaking, no other character in this play experiences of expresses any sort of existential suffering 
akin to Caligula’s; therefore, I ask, how plausible it is to scrutinize Caligula’s anguish as 
essential to the human condition if he is the only one experiencing this angst?  Thus, I propose 
that we look at Caligula as a queer character, as an abject other and whose experience foments 
from his outsider position.   
Although I am resolute in this polemic, I will first address why some might cast 
aspersions on this contention of including Caligula in the realm of the queer.  Obvious is the fact 
that, historically, Caligula was a diabolical emperor whose reign was marked with horror, mass 
bloodshed, and tyrannical excess.  For this reason, we also know that Caligula as emperor has the 
power to create and alter the laws—and, indeed, he actually becomes the Law in Camus’s play—
and these laws are essentially what establish certain lives and actions as sordid and abject, laws 
which try to create or perpetuate a certain normativity and standard of living as proper.  Since 
Caligula is the system, since he has the power and is The Law, how could we possibly consider 
him a queer character, especially if to be queer is more a socio-political matter than just merely a 
sexual one?  Moreover, why would those groups within the realm of the queer want to include a 
“bloodthirsty” tyrant in the same realm?  Later in this section, I will address specifically 
Caligula’s status as The Law, but for now I will mention that nothing about Caligula’s 
emperorship depicts his desire to uphold the morality, conventions, and laws that have deemed 
many, himself included, as abject.  In fact, Caligula uses his imperial authority to reverse the 
dialectical hierarchizations within conventional morality and heteronormativity to establish a 
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new order wherein he transfers agency back to the abject.  
 Beginning this discussion, I will broach my own question: Might we read Caligula, not 
just the play itself but its central character and his actions as an allegory or metaphor, or as 
allegorically or metaphorically hyperbolic?  Numerous popular readings of Caligula consider 
this play a critical satire for political violence and misuse of power or an illustration of existential 
and absurdist philosophies and understandings of the limits of freedom and free will.  But, can 
we momentarily defect from these types of readings, avoid looking at Caligula as merely an 
insane, bloodthirsty emperor, and try to understand who his character is and what he might 
represent outside the political and philosophical realms?  In my reading, I hope to analyze and 
present Caligula not as an insane character bent on destruction, but as a misunderstood Other, as 
a character deemed an outsider from the very beginning even though politically he exists on the 
“inside.”  Furthermore, though Caligula’s actions in this play are reprovable when taken literally, 
this play equally functions on multiple metatextual levels, stressing not just the power of law and 
politics but also the power of the performance and performativity.  This play is about not only an 
emperor but a man playing or performing the role of an emperor as well as various other 
personalities simultaneously.  Caligula’s role as emperor is merely a performance: just as the 
character of Caligula constitutes a fictive personality to the audience, Caligula as emperor 
functions as a fictive, performative character for Caligula as a human.  For this reason, I view 
Caligula’s actions in this play as indicative of that performance and its objectives, that is, to 
restore equality, freedom, and happiness among the miserable populations by destroying the 
morals, values, and conventions that have shackled men and women and have created this 
present inequality, anguish, and grave loneliness.        
 In this section I will begin by exploring how we might initially consider Caligula a queer 
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character, specifically by noting and exploring his variegated sexuality, particularly his 
homosexuality or bisexuality, polyamory, and transgenderism, which includes performative 
transvestitism or drag and transsexual desires.  I will also discuss how other characters view 
Caligula as an outsider and an aberration for his love of the arts, literature, and theatre as well as 
his suggested prediegetic incest with his sister, Drusilla.  Additionally, I will also note several 
variations in the popular English translation of Caligula that will either add to or alter our 
understanding of Caligula as queer.  Though both the original and the translation, I feel, present 
Caligula as a queer character, the translation goes a bit further to push the limits of Caligula’s 
sexuality.  From here, I will transition to how we are to understand this play’s metaphoricity and 
metatextuality, examining the pervasive mise en abyme and play-within-a-play structuring that 
heightens this work’s performativity.  With Caligula’s queerness and this play’s performativity 
in mind, I will then discuss how Caligula experiences a uniquely queer temporality.  I will 
discuss how at moments Caligula’s time resonates with Muñoz’s concept of queer utopian 
memory and how Caligula’s performativity creates a future in the present.  I will equally 
expound how Camus’s notion of the absurd meets Halberstam’s notion of queer time as centered 
on the here and now while Caligula embraces the world’s absurdity and the reality of his ever-
diminishing future.  Finally, I will elaborate on Caligula’s death drive and how his performance 
as tyrant is equally a performance that instigates and portends his death, culminating in the end 
of both the play’s performance and Caligula’s performance as a mortal.    
 Camus signals Caligula’s queerness and otherness at the play’s outset by one of his 
patricians who comments: “Je l’ai vu sortir du palais.  Il avait un regard étrange”; (“When I saw 
him leaving the palace, I noticed a queer look in his eyes”)  (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 
16; Gilbert 3; my italics).   In the original, Camus writes that Caligula had an “étrange” look 
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when the Old Patrician saw him leaving the palace while Stuart Gilbert’s translation uses “queer” 
as the descriptor.  The common translation of “étrange” would be “strange,” though Gilbert’s 
translation of “queer” equally works insofar as queerness suggests strangeness to what is “usual” 
or “normal.”  Of course, the connotations of “queer” are equally redolent with hints of sexual 
deviance or aberration—such use of queer dates back to 1914, and by 1948, the year of Gilbert’s 
translation, queer had popularly assumed the connotations of homosexuality and general sexual 
deviance or perversion (“queer, adj.”).  Nevertheless, we see the first major difference between 
the original and the translation—shall we read Caligula as merely a strange character or a queer 
character?  Regardless, both terms suggest that his fellow noblemen consider Caligula an oddity, 
though we will eventually see that Caligula’s strangeness seems to extend into his sexuality 
without Camus directly calling him queer.  Moreover, this play begins by informing us that 
Caligula has been missing for several days following the sudden death of his sister-mistress, 
Drusilla.  Caligula’s running away is also indicative of his position as an outsider, for we enter 
this play with Caligula physically positioned as an outsider, outside the palace and his position as 
emperor.  And soon, we witness Cherea claim that Caligula “aimait trop la littérature" (liked 
literature too much) and that an artistic emperor is not “convenable” (appropriate or befitting), 
or, as Gilbert translates, Caligula is an “anomaly” (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 21; Gilbert 
6).  Finally, when Caligula enters on stage for the first time, we receive a description of him in 
the stage directions as completely filthy and dejected, an image that is not convenable for the 
image of royalty.  In the same stage directions, Camus also provides several hints insinuating 
that Caligula is possibly sexually impotent or has castrated himself.  Camus details that when 
Caligula sits down, the emperor lets his arm hang limp between his knees, an image that 
obviously is both phallic and indicative of impotence or castration, both potentially being 
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additional reasons for Caligula’s position as and sense of being an outsider—such reason will 
later be voiced by a patrician who believes Caligula’s misuse of power to be symptomatic of his 
“impuissance” or impotence (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 23; 49).     
 While Caligula is certainly established as a political and imperial anomaly and outsider 
from the very beginning, Camus illustrates that Caligula’s sexuality is very complex and far from 
heteronormative.  We know that Caligula is artistic, potentially impotent, and considered 
effeminate by his patricians; however, Camus equally insinuates that Caligula is bisexual, or 
potentially homosexual, as well as polyamorous.  First, we note that Caligula unofficially had 
two mistresses before his sister’s death: Drusilla and Caesonia.  Second, we also notice that 
Scipion seems to be another of Caligula’s lovers—Scipion indeed declares his love for Caligula 
throughout the play in a manner unlike any other male character.  We might also note that 
Caligula has Scipion’s father executed extradiegeticly between Acts One and Two: the father-
child dyad traditionally obstructs the child’s romances, and Caligula, by severing the head of this 
dyad, attempts to replace Scipion’s father with himself, a measure that seems both cruel yet 
oddly romantic as well as pederastic.  Third, while speaking with Caligula, Caesonia remarks, 
“S’il est vrai que tu aimais Drusilla, tu l’aimais en même temps que moi et que beaucoup 
d’autres”61 (38).  If we are to understand Caligula’s “love” for Drusilla as romantic rather than 
fraternal, then the love that he shares with Caesonia and the “others” is an equally romantic love, 
indicating Caligula’s polyamory.  As such, we recognize that Caligula’s sexuality does not 
topically conform to heteronormativity; however, some of the more explicit examples that this 
play stages suggest that Caligula’s sexual proclivities list more toward homosexuality.   
Fortifying our understanding of Caligula as queer, and potentially as homosexual, we 
                                                
61 “You may have loved Drusilla, but you loved many others—myself included—at the same time” (Gilbert 15) 
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should note, however, that Camus’s play never explicitly displays any sexual intercourse on 
stage, especially male-female intercourse, though there is the suggestion of off-stage intercourse 
between Caligula and Mucius’s wife.  Suspicious off-stage sex notwithstanding, Camus does 
metaphorically represent intercourse with Caesonia and with Scipion in separate scenes; 
however, I am more interested in the differences that each scene purports when juxtaposed.  
First, Caligula and Caesonia’s sex scene is metaphorically replaced with Caligula viciously 
beating on a drum and demanding that Caesonia obey him—this scene is transparently more 
indicative of rape than intercourse, especially as Caesonia cries for Caligula to stop, the climax 
coming when Caesonia cries that she is going insane (43).  Though, intriguing is the fact that in 
the 1938 manuscript to this play, Camus does not include this drum beating, indicating that this 
scene was originally less metaphorically gravid with sexual energy and violence.  In the 1938 
manuscript, the scene merely consists of Caligula and Caesonia having a heated têtê-à-têtê that 
ends similarly to the 1944 publication with Caligula staring into a mirror, gazing at himself in a 
sadistic yet suggestively autoerotic manner (“manuscript original incomplete de Caligula”).  
Second, Caligula and Scipion’s sex scene metaphorically occurs when Caligula asks that Scipion 
recite one of his poems to the emperor.  With young, shy Scipion unable to perform, Caligula 
gives the young man some guidance, and eventually they both begin to recite the poem together 
until they finally finish, both clearly elated.  After the recitation-cum-orgasm, the stage directions 
note that Caligula pulls to his chest a quivering Scipion, and the two wax philosophic about 
nature as Caligula strokes the young man’s hair and Scipion continues to bury his face in 
Caligula’s chest (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 78-80).  The stark contrast between these two 
scenes proposes several important ideas.  First, Caligula loves Scipion more than Caesonia but, 
essentially, Caligula is required to have a female lover.  Second, the juxtaposition would also 
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indicate that Caligula is perhaps homosexual rather than bisexual, or he just prefers men to 
women without dismissing the possibility of hetero-relational intercourse.  Third, the fact that 
Caligula “rapes” Caesonia and makes poetic love to Scipion would highlight a misogynist 
undertone, which later becomes an overtone as he murders Caesonia.  Of course, the misogyny 
would appear less severe or pervasive in the 1938 manuscript without the metaphorical rape; 
however, the difference relative to the poetic sex with Scipion, which is present in the original 
manuscript, not only emphasizes Caligula’s homosexuality but also proposes a connection 
between his homosexuality and misogynistic feelings toward Caesonia as his requisite mistress.  
Adding this scene with Caesonia, Camus clearly endeavors to illuminate Caligula’s sexuality and 
desires as very complex and potentially imbued with repressed angst and frustration that 
violently surface across the play’s trajectory. 
In his essay “Camus and a Society without Women,” Anthony Rizzuto also draws a 
connection between Caligula’s homosexuality and misogyny.  Yet, the reason why Rizzuto 
draws this connection is rather fallacious and offensive to homosexual men who feel that their 
notion of time and futurity (their “destiny”) is neither assumed by reproductive futurism nor 
controlled by the Freudian “anatomy/biology is destiny” mentality that Rizzuto’s argument 
purports.  Pulling from a quote in Camus’s Carnets, Rizzuto notes that Camus aligns the life and 
futurity assumed within reproduction as obviously opposed to death, and, since death is the only 
known, inevitable truth in Camusian absurdism, reproduction then comes to prevent humans (in 
Camus’s works, his male protagonists) from understanding the truth of death.62  Thus, Rizzuto 
understands Caligula’s homosexuality, his sexual denial of the hetero-relational byproducts of 
procreation, as misogynistic, evincing that this aforementioned view “is evident in the 
                                                
62 This notion relates to what I have hitherto referred to as the phantasmatic future that assumes the heteronormative 
illusion of the future via the Child and genealogical futurism  
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misogynist attitudes of . . . Caligula, particularly in the earlier version of the play where his 
homosexuality is stressed.  Women seem useless to [his] purpose which is to deny that 
procreation and biology, for men, is destiny” (6).  Ignoring for the moment the fact that his essay 
mistakenly assumes the feminine energy only to allocate procreation and babies, what Rizzuto 
has essentially done in his study is to define a fairly common sexual preference of a homosexual 
male, who does not desire intercourse with women or procreation, as inherently misogynistic.  In 
other words, Rizzuto tautologically deduces that “love of man” is inherently commensurate with 
“hatred of women” without trying to understand how Caligula’s misogyny might be a 
consequence of socially instigated, repressed sexual desires, especially since the masculine “love 
of man” is historically, conventionally, and religiously63 debased beneath the masculine “love of 
woman.”  This adjudgment, however, is certainly not to say that misogyny incited by sexual 
repression is ever justifiable, simply inevitable, or less egregious nor is it to claim that Caligula’s 
general treatment of Caesonia is not misogynistic.  Consequently, I wish not to justify the many 
sexist facets within Camus’s canon that stem from his heterosexual male protagonists.  Yet, since 
Caligula is an extremely singular character in the Camusian canon—a queer character—we must 
also analyze him as such and avoid blindly lumping him, as Rizzuto’s study does, into the same 
group with the obviously heterosexual misogynists of Camus’s other works.  Rather, my point is 
to elucidate the violent potentiality of repressed sexual desires incited by a world that demands 
conformity and harshly censures and even punishes sexual aberration, which, ultimately, is 
paramount to our understanding of Caligula’s mentality and actions throughout this play. 
These suppressed yet festering desires seem equally important when considering Caligula 
                                                
63 We must remember that Camus’s play is only superficially “historical” and seems a story more interested and 
imbued with the political and social problems of the contemporary era, meaning that an attempt at an historically 
accurate comprehension leads us to overlook many of the modern relevancies and complexities that this play 
proffers, namely those concerning religious and social morality and standards of behavior and living. 
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as a character with transgendered characteristics and desires.  One of the first lines that we hear 
from Caligula is that he desires the moon (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 24-5).  We can 
apprehend this desire in multiple ways.  First, Caligula merely desires obtaining the impossible, 
something inhuman and supernatural that would consequently make him greater than human, 
freeing him from the pain and agony of life and mortality.  Second, the moon is often personified 
as a woman or is identified with certain goddesses, such as Cynthia, Diana, and Phoebe (“moon, 
n.”).  In this case, Caligula desires to have relations or intercourse with the moon goddesses, 
another feat that is obviously impossible.  Caligula will later joke with Helicon, whose task is to 
obtain the moon for the emperor, about how he has already “had” the moon—this confession 
becomes ironic since Caligula’s alleged hetero-relational intercourse becomes associated with an 
impossible feat, suggesting that earthly coitus with a woman is just as impossible for Caligula as 
coitus with a celestial sphere (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 99).  Third, since Aristotle’s 
time, the moon has been associated with insanity and irrationality (“moon, n.”).  Logically, 
Caligula’s desire for the moon could indicate a desire for lunacy and absurdity, yet this desire, 
though seemingly paradoxical and ridiculous in our rational world, does not carry the same 
negative connotations for Caligula.  Speaking with Caesonia in Act One, Caligula excitedly 
proclaims:  
Je veux mêler le ciel à la mer, confondre laideur et beauté, faire jaillir le rire de la 
souffrance. . . . Je ferai à ce siècle le don de l’égalité.  Et lorsque tout sera aplani, 
l’impossible enfin sur terre, la lune dans mes mains, alors, peut-être, moi-même je serai 
transformé et le monde avec moi, alors enfin les homes ne mourront pas et ils seront 
heureux. (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 41) 
 
I want . . . I want to drown the sky in the sea, to infuse ugliness with beauty, to wring a 
laugh from pain. . . .  I shall make this age of ours a kindly gift—the gift of equality.  And 
when all is leveled out, when the impossible has come to earth and the moon is in my 
hands—then, perhaps, I shall be transfigured and the world renewed; then men will die 
no more and at last be happy.  (Gilbert 16-7) 
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Caligula wishes to invert the standards and conventional, dialectical hierarchizations of good and 
bad, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, pleasure and pain, and, logically following 
Caligula’s logic, sanity and insanity.  Thus, if Caligula wishes to destroy the mores and 
inequalities of normativity, he must assume the side contrary to conventional logic, supporting 
those ideas and processes of thought considered senseless and dissentient to normative 
principles.  I also believe that these transpositions include issues of gender and sexuality, and 
Caligula’s yearning for the moon is equally a yearning to transform his body, to become a 
woman, for he is utterly dissatisfied with what the masculine body has provided him.  
Furthermore, later in the play, we see Caligula give two separate performances akin to what we 
might consider a drag show—Caligula dresses up in elaborate costumes of traditional female 
garments and makeup and dances on stage in front of his patricians.  Though performative 
transvestitism or drag does not indicate transsexual desires, it does further demonstrate that 
Caligula turns to transgenderism as a means of liberating himself from the heteronormativity that 
had previously encased his body and existence.  Finally, to further illuminate Caligula’s 
dissatisfaction with his masculine body, he exclaims to Caesonia: 
Oh! Caesonia, je savais qu’on pouvait être désespéré, mais j’ignorais ce que ce mot 
voulait dire.  Je croyais comme tout le monde que c’était une maladie de l’âme.  Mais 
non, c’est le corps qui souffre.  Ma peau me fait mal, ma poitrine, mes membres.  J’ai la 
tête creuse et le cœur soulevé.  Et le plus affreux, c’est ce goût dans la bouche.  Ni sang, 
ni mort, ni fièvre, mais tout cela à la fois.  Il suffit que je remue la langue pour que tout 
redevienne noir et que les êtres me répugnent.  Qu’il est dur, qu’il est amer de devenir un 
homme ! (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 39-40; my italics) 
 
Oh, Caesonia, I knew that men felt anguish, but I didn’t know what that word anguish 
meant.  Like everyone else I fancied it was a sickness of the mind—no more.  But no, it’s 
my body that’s in pain.  Pain everywhere, in my chest, in my legs and arms.  Even my 
skin is raw, my head is buzzing, I feel like vomiting.  But worst of all is this queer taste 
in my mouth.  Not blood, or death, or fever, but a mixture of all three.  I’ve only to stir 
my tongue and the world goes black and everyone looks . . . horrible.  How hard, how 
cruel it is, this process of becoming a man!  (Gilbert 15; my italics). 
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Officially, this scene comes not long after Caligula appears on stage for the first time, and, 
hence, he is still distraught and crestfallen.  Most significant about this passage is that Caligula is 
aware that his body is suffering and changing or transforming, as Caligula mentions in the 
previous excerpt.  There is an odd taste in his mouth, and Gilbert, yet again, uses “queer” to 
explain this taste.  Caligula is distressed by and dissatisfied with his current corporeal reality, and 
he comments that this must be the process of becoming a man.  The use of “man” is curious here 
for several reasons.  First, “man” could merely represent the sexist usage of the masculine to 
mean “human” or “everyone.”  In this case, Caligula would be suggesting that this bodily 
anguish is essential in the process of “being” or “becoming” a human or, rather, the human he 
wishes to be.  However, if “man” here indeed signifies only the masculine body, then Camus 
presents yet another contradiction.  Caligula seems pained and discontented with his masculine 
body, yet he figures these feelings to be essential to his “becoming” of a man.  Of course, the use 
of devenir or becoming equally suggests that despite the sexual identifications of biology, no one 
is (être) ever one sex or the other, or one gender or another.  Rather, sex, gender, and sexuality 
are processes of becoming but never fully reached, and later Caligula will begin to express his 
gender and sexuality as a performance.  Still, we know that Caligula exudes transgendered 
qualities and, possibly, transsexual desires.  So, what shall we make of this contradiction, that 
Caligula is becoming a man yet simultaneously wants to liberate himself from his masculine 
body?  Perhaps this contradiction is intentional and not meant to be reconciled.  Or perhaps, 
Caligula is attempting to redefine what “man” means or includes, as the eventual queering of his 
sexuality and gender and liberating himself from the hetero-masculine norms are what will, 
indeed, make him the “man” he wants to be.                    
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 Debatably, this process of becoming and the performativity of gender, sexuality, and 
identity are paramount to our understanding of not only this play but also Caligula and his 
actions—or, shall we now say, his performance.  As I mentioned earlier, I believe that we should 
read this play and Caligula’s actions not simply as situated within a larger performance for an 
audience but as a performance within a performance, and so on, as the pervasive mise en abyme 
opens up an existential chasm in this play that devours and nullifies any notion of realism.  
Furthermore, Caligula continually refers to how he is “playing a part,” and later when speaking 
with Cherea, he asks his patrician if it is possible for two men “se parler de tout leur cœur—
comme s’ils étaient nus l’un devant l’autre, dépouillés de préjugés, des intérêts particuliers et des 
mensonges dont ils vivent”64 (107).  In this moment, Caligula wishes to drop his performance 
and remove his mask; by this point, he is becoming extremely exhausted and ill—the 
performance is finally taking its toll on his body.  Yet again, we equally notice the homoerotic 
implications of this remark; Caligula wonders not only if two men can stop pretending and ever 
speak honestly to one another but also if two men can ever openly love each other in the way that 
Caligula desires rather than maintaining the façades of homosociality.  Moreover, directly before 
this moment, Caligula places himself in front of a mirror and begins to speak to his reflection, 
admonishing his reflection for its performance, for the extent to which it has gone to play the 
tyrant, to bring logic, equality, and freedom to a miserably illogical, unequal, and unfree world 
(104-5).  As last, we see that Caligula is wholly unsatisfied with his performance or even that the 
performance has commandeered his mind, soul, and body, and Caligula has no other choice but 
to continue this performance until the end, until he is dead and the curtain can finally drop.  As 
                                                
64 “to talk to each other with complete frankness—if only once in their lives? Can they strip themselves naked, so to 
speak, and shed their prejudices, their private interests, the lies by which they live” (Gilbert 50) 
 123 
such, this play is no longer about a murderous authoritarian—such a subject is merely a façade, a 
distraction, an insignificant shard of Caligula’s fragmented identity.          
For these reasons, I feel that a downright censure of Caligula’s actions, or performance, is 
essentially to misread what Caligula as performer and artist is trying to do, and I also contend 
that Caligula’s performance includes the pervasive murders and violence and the plunging of 
Rome into chaos.  Though my intentions are not to justify murder and violence in the “real 
world,” I do attempt to actuate a new apprehension of Caligula’s murderous performance as 
metaphorically hyperbolic and extreme.  Even though Caligula as an historic figure and tyrant is 
“realistic,” Camus’s play is still fictive and mimetic.  And though I could delve into the never-
ending debate of art versus life, art versus reality, this play’s metatextuality and mise en abyme 
ultimately indicate the artificiality of the play’s narrative and that we should avoid the literal and 
superficial readings of Caligula according to conventional morality, for, ultimately, this play is 
an absurd play, precursory to the Theatre de l’Absurde of writers like Beckett and Genet, whose 
plays deny any reading attuned to realism, standard logic, or morality. 
 The degree to which Caligula is metatextual is quite extensive and complex and is largely 
in the form of the mise en abyme, which is found as both the performance-within-a-performance 
and the omnipresence of mirrors that virtually reflect the performance-within-a-performance and 
create the abysm that this play and its characters plunge into by the end.  Inevitably, the 
metatextuality and mise en abyme signal that this play is about dramatic art and the power of 
performance rather than immediately being a play about politics and tyranny.  First, we note that 
this play wields multiple other performances within its framework.  Two of these performances 
include Caligula’s drag: the first shows Caligula dressed up as and playing the role of the 
goddess Venus, and the second depicts Caligula dancing on stage, dressed in a tutu and his hair 
 124 
garland with flowers.  A third performance occurs implicitly when Caligula and Scipion recite 
the young poet’s verse, which I examined as equally metaphorical for intercourse.  The fourth 
performance is more a performative competition: Caligula has several poets, including Scipion, 
write and perform verses in front of the emperor.  Caligula’s performance as Venus informs and 
performs Caligula’s desires to become immortal as well as his transgenderism.  Caligula’s 
performance as a beflowered, avant-garde ballet dancer equally informs and performs his 
transgenderism.  In addition, the mere absurdity of this second performance equally performs 
and signals the utter breakdown of the old order and the initiating of Caligula’s newly inverted, 
absurd order.  In both performances, Camus underlines the power of art and literature not only as 
performative and transformative but also as deifying, the artist or performer becoming the god of 
her or his fictive and performative world.  And since Caligula as performer has created the world 
around him, both in Rome and on the stage, he has consequently made himself the god of this 
world, equally giving him the power to dictate and destroy this world.  Thus, after Caligula 
finishes his dramatic dance, Caesonia enters and asks the audience whether they enjoyed the 
performance, informing them that anyone who did not enjoy Caligula’s “émotion artistique” will 
be executed (124-5).  If Caligula creates this world via his performance and becomes its god, 
then those who did not like the performance must equally dislike this new world around them 
and its god, and, therefore, must be punished (the syllogism and enthymeme become the 
tautological verifications of Caligula’s absurd logic).    
Nevertheless, the poetic recitations pose a different performative purpose.  As already 
mentioned, the poetic performances serve as substitutes for sexual intercourse—the poetic 
emotion is evocatively comparable to the jouissance of coitus.  I will return to the scene of 
Caligula and Scipion’s metaphoric sex when I discuss Caligula’s queer temporality; at the 
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moment,  though I would like to focus on Caligula’s poetry competition.  The contest’s objective 
is to write a poem about death that obviously suits Caligula’s fancy.  Having each poet read 
individually, Caligula then blasts his whistle once he becomes dissatisfied with a poem’s content.  
One by one, as each of the seven poets recite their verses about death, Caligula cuts each of their 
poems short, ridiculing their incomprehension of death.  Therefore, this competition becomes a 
performance wherein Caligula attempts to define death according to what death is not—that is, 
death is not to be understood according to the naïve pleonasms of the seven lachrymose poets.  
Nonetheless, when Scipion’s turn to read comes, he presents a poem perfectly attuned to 
Caligula’s absurd ideology and reads: 
 Chasse au bonheur qui fait les êtres purs, 
 Ciel où le soleil ruisselle, 
Fêtes uniques et sauvages, mon délire sans espoir! (Caligula suivi de Le 
Malentendu 139) 
 
 Pursuit of happiness that purifies the heart, 
Skies rippling with light, 
O wild, sweet, festal joys, frenzy without hope!  (Gilbert 66) 
 
Clearly, Scipion’s poem seems more concerned with life or metaphorically with ebullient rapture 
and sexual jouissance, rather than death.  Yet, Scipion is the winner.  As a result, this 
competition serves several significant purposes.  First, since Scipion’s lively poem wins, 
Caligula defines death and life according to another apparent contradiction and inversion: 
whereas life is restrictive and agonizing, death is liberating and purifying.  Scipion’s poem, then, 
is metatextually imbued with Caligula’s absurd logic as well as indicative of Caligula’s personal 
struggle with his own mortality.  Second, Caligula uses poetry and art to define life and death 
rather than using the amorphous yet recognizable impressions of life and death as defining or 
restricting the poem’s agency and relevance to reality.  Therefore, Caligula places the mimetic 
and the Symbolic over the Real: art creates and defines life and death, not vice versa.  And 
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Caligula, as artist and performer, can then dictate the meaning of life and death.  As a whole, this 
contest metatextually informs Caligula’s existence as an emperor who creates the law and 
dictates who lives and who dies.  However, as I previously disclosed, eventually the performance 
begins to torment and enervate Caligula as well as it essentially overpowers and enslaves the 
emperor.  For this reason, the performance is no longer what makes Caligula a god; the 
performance itself becomes the god, and Caligula must follow the wills and whims of the 
performance.  Still, Caligula initially instigates the performance and claims that it was his choice 
to perform and pretend.  So, if the performance is what drives this play and Caligula’s actions, 
what is the goal or the intended outcome of the performance? 
 While I have already hinted at what Caligula’s performance intends, there equally seems 
a larger purpose and aim.  To understand the performance’s determination, I turn our attention to 
a quote from the First Patrician:  
Mais l’essentiel est que tu juges comme nous que les bases de notre société sont 
ébranlées.  Pour nous, n’est-ce pas, vous autre, la question est avant tout morale.  La 
famille tremble, le respect du travail se perd, la patrie tout entière est livrée au blasphème.  
La vertu nous appelle à son secours, allons-nous refuser de l’entendre ? (Caligula suivi de 
Le Malentendu 52-3)   
 
Anyhow, the great thing is that you, too, feel that the whole fabric of society is 
threatened.  You, men, agree with me, I take it, that our ruling motive is of a moral order.  
Family life is breaking down, men are losing their respect for honest work, a wave of 
immorality is sweeping the country.  Who of us can be deaf to the appeal of our ancestral 
piety in its hour of danger?  (Gilbert 22) 
 
Although the First Patrician speaks these words as a denouncement of Caligula’s actions, I shall 
look at them as Caligula’s aim by virtue of his performance.  And in this manner, I will begin to 
merge Caligula’s queerness and performance with his desire to rid the world, or at least Rome, of 
the conventions and morals that have deemed him an outsider, an anomaly and aberration.  As 
the Frist Patrician complains, Caligula has destroyed all the institutions and conventions upon 
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which the patricians believe the stability of their society rests.  Obviously, to the male 
aristocracy of Rome, their understanding of society is going to include those institutions and 
values—family, marriage, ancestry, the labor of the lower classes—that have effectively 
provided them with their superior status and luxury.  We should also note that this play only 
takes place within the palace’s walls, the perspectives we receive are only those of the patricians 
and nobility, and the deaths that we witness are only of those persons within the palace.  Since 
we do not actually know what is happening outside those walls, we cannot condemn Caligula 
based on the perspectives of a few ignorant, frightened, and emasculated patricians.  When 
Caligula speaks of the fact that men and women die and they are not happy, he is not referring to 
his patricians and to the upper classes of Rome that value their heteronormative realities as 
superlative, absolute, and unquestionable (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 27).  And later, we 
see that Caligula actually supports and commends thieves, prostitutes, the disenfranchised and 
marginalized, those persons and subcultures who barely survive as they deny to exist according 
to the norms and laws that effectively deem them as abject.  And though Caligula is centered on 
the “inside” of the palace walls, we see that he empathizes with the outside, and by inverting the 
conventional dialectics of history and piety, he wishes to consequently crush the inequalities and 
give men and women the freedom to live unrestrained by the manacles of normativity.  
Caligula’s performance intends this outcome, this future, and though he claims to live without 
hope, his performance inevitably imports a hope and a future, for the performance allows him to 
stage the future in the present.   
 As a result of Caligula’s performative aim, I move on to how Caligula displays what we 
can consider a queer understanding and experience of time.  Caligula’s time as queer is, yet 
again, very complex, and my analysis does not intend or represent the sole manner of examining 
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his metaphysics.  However, I will analyze Caligula’s time according to several theories, all of 
which will produce unique conclusions.  First, I will look at how Caligula’s performances, 
particularly his drag and poetic performances, produce a future in the present.  Second, I will 
look at how Caligula’s time denies the heteronormative temporal modalities of longevity, family, 
procreation and reproductive futurism, and economics and politics.  Finally, I will analyze how 
Caligula’s performance is also imbued with his death drive, and how his performance not only 
stages a future in the present but also instigates and portends his death.    
 In his book Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity, José Muñoz 
explains that queer performances, those performances that transparently do not conform to 
heteronormativity, contain what he calls an “anticipatory illumination of a queer world, a sign of 
an actually existing queer reality, a kernel of political possibility within a stultifying heterosexual 
present” (49).  This notion is in stark contrast to a heteronormative conception of futurity 
wherein the present is abandoned for the sake of a phantasmatic future (49).  Esteeming the 
queer and queerness as utopian or utopia-inducing, Muñoz goes on to quote Theodor Adorno’s 
theory that utopia exists within and becomes “the determined negation of that which merely is” 
(qtd. in Muñoz 64).  I believe that Caligula’s performances have this “anticipatory illumination” 
and enact a queer reality in the present, and, since Caligula is the emperor, he possesses the 
means of making the queer a reality.  Furthermore, these performances are equally staged at the 
expense and emasculation of Caligula’s patricians, who are indeed this play’s villains.  Caligula 
negates that which is present, the logic, morality, and convention that has created a horribly 
unequal and suffering world.  Caligula negates “that which merely is” in order to engender 
utopia while he performs this utopia on stage and in poetry.  As Caesonia claims, Caligula is 
creating a “nouvelle décoration" (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 68).  This phrase is 
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particularly interesting because of the multiple possible meanings of “décoration."  First, 
décoration suggests decoration and design, obviously indicative of the arts and the theatre.  
Second, the word can also figuratively translate as design meaning order, social and political 
design, the structure and way of living.  Camus’s diction consequently connects the order and 
design of the performance with the order and design of society; as such, Caligula creates this 
new décoration, this utopia through performance. 
 Beginning Act Three, Caligula’s first drag performance as Venus demonstrates not only 
Caligula’s enacting a queer utopia in the present through transgenderism but also the 
undermining of the old order by forcing the patricians to praise an emperor dressed as a woman 
and to give alms for the performance.  First, by making the patricians address and praise him as a 
woman and goddess, Caligula begins to establish the potentiality of himself living a freely 
transgendered life, rearranges gender standards, and supplants the non-normative genders as 
honorable and worthy of praise.  Second, the performance emasculates the patricians.  Not only 
must they praise their transgendered emperor but also they must empty their pockets in praise of 
this performance and lower their economic statuses.  And while we could easily call this 
indicative of Caligula’s vanity (which it is), we should note that Caligula has equally inverted 
Rome’s economic sphere, purging the kingdom of its age-old economic inequality.  Whereas 
trade and production were previously the primary sources of economics and capital, now the 
nationalization of the brothel has become the fiscal epicenter, to which attendance is mandatory 
(68-9).  Now, the coin has been flipped.  Rome, the patricians included, must now support those 
persons and lives previously considered plebian, sordid, sinful, and abject.  And though the 
extremity of Caligula’s actions are immediately reproachable according to conventional logic 
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and morality, we must remember the purpose of his various performances, to disrupt and destroy 
the old order, the dichotomized inequality of hegemony and to liberate the marginalized.   
 Caligula’s recitation of poetry with Scipion presents another performative futurity and 
utopia in the present.  As explained earlier, the recitation is metaphorical for intercourse.  
However, we should not merely read this scene as what could be, as an ersatz substitution for the 
real yet forbidden homosexual intercourse.  Unlike Quentin, who can only perform his desires by 
metonymic displacement, Caligula and Scipion’s performance creates their future and utopia in 
this moment rather than merely envisaging a possibility.  First, we note the beautiful, natural 
imagery of Scipion’s poem; his poem is about a “certain accord de la terre . . . de la terre et du 
pied”; (“a certain harmony . . . between one’s feet and the earth”) (Caligula suivi de Le 
Malentendu 79; Gilbert 35).  As Scipion and Caligula recite back and forth, finishing the poem, 
we realize that this harmony is not simply between human and nature.  Instead, it is a solidarity 
and euphony between two people, in this case, between two men.  Second, with the recitation 
progressing, the harmony becomes corporeal as they bring their bodies together, and Caligula, as 
he holds Scipion against his chest, professes that he and Scipion “[aiment] les memes verities," 
that the “same eternal truths appeal to [them] both” (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 80; Gilbert 
36).  Though Caligula does not reveal what these “eternal truths” are, we can equally understand 
this phrase to denote the emperor’s profession of eternal love for Scipion.  Their eternal truth is 
love, and the only reason why Caligula could recite the verse with the young poet—a poem that 
he had allegedly not read—is his love for Scipion.  The performance is not just sex but love, the 
truth of their love eternalized in this moment.  In addition, as their bodies and souls merge, so do 
the present and future, but this future is not to be confused with the general notion of the future 
as phantasmatic, illusory, and constantly dematerializing through the present and to the past.  
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Nor is this future a mindless obsession with tomorrow that voids presence and the significance of 
the here and now.  The future created in this moment is much more stable, for the performance 
equally harmonizes the present and future, destroying the conventionally dichotomized present-
future dyad that forces the future to exist as an illusion.  
  The performative future and utopia of this poetic recitation notwithstanding, Caligula’s 
time also seems akin to what Halberstam defines as queer time: an ever-diminishing future that 
stresses the potentiality of the here and now, a time that denies the heteronormative virtues of 
longevity, safety, and reproduction.  There are several reasons why Caligula’s future is ever-
diminishing.  First, having embraced the world’s absurdity and following the logic of the absurd, 
Caligula as an artist, as Camus suggests in Le Mythe de Sisyphe, must live, perform, and create in 
a present sans lendemain, without tomorrow.  Second, we later discover that Caligula is very ill; 
after his second drag performance, Caesonia informs the patricians that Caligula is suffering 
from stomach problems, having just vomited blood back stage (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 
129).  While Caligula’s illness is obviously not HIV/AIDS, the disease clearly is taking a toll on 
his body, and resultantly Caligula feels his future to be ever-diminishing as his fatal malady 
slowly devours the time he has left.  Speaking again with Helicon in Act Three about retrieving 
the moon for the emperor, Caligula, still in his Venus costume and painting his toenails, firmly 
avers, “Je veux seulement la lune, Hélicon.  Je sais d’avance ce qui me tuera.  Je n’ai pas encore 
épuisé tout ce qui peut me faire vivre.  C’est pourquoi je veux la lune.  Et tu ne reparaîtras pas ici 
avant de me l’avoir procurée”65 (100-1).  What exactly does Caligula think will kill him?  His 
illness?  His enemies?  Regardless, Caligula understands his time to be limited, his future 
continuously fading.  At the same time,  though Caligula remarks that there remain reasons for 
                                                
65 “All I want, Helicon, is—the moon.  For the rest, I’ve always known what will kill me.  I haven’t yet exhausted all 
that is to keep me living.  That’s why I want the moon.  And you must not return till you have secured her for me” 
(Gilbert 46-7). 
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him to keep living, to discover and extract new possibilities from the time at hand—his time, 
therefore, firmly fixed on the present.  Third, as a queer character and vain emperor, Caligula 
seems wholly uninterested in reproduction or genealogical futurism.  If Caligula is impotent, as 
the stage directions and phallic symbolism imply, then he would be unable to copulate.  If 
Caligula is indeed homosexual, there remains the obvious possibility that he does not wish to 
perform hetero-relation intercourse and produce heirs, presumably with Caesonia, whom he 
seems to detest.  Returning to the scene with Caligula and Scipion reciting poetry, during a long 
tirade about his loneliness, Caligula utters in an exhausted, lamenting tone:  
Et près des femmes que je caresse, quand la nuit se referme sur nous et que je crois, 
éloigné de ma chair enfin contentée, saisir un peu de moi entre la vie et la mort, ma 
solitude entière s’emplit de l’aigre odeur du plaisir aux aisselles de la femme qui sombre 
encore à mes côtés. (Caligula suivi de Le Malentendu 82-3) 
 
And when I am with the women I make mine and darkness falls on us and I think, now 
my body’s had its fill, that I can feel myself my own at last, poised between death and 
life—ah, then my solitude is fouled by the stale smell of pleasure from the woman 
sprawling at my side.  (Gilbert 37-8) 
 
Clearly misogynistic in tone, Caligula’s lament also communicates that inevitably he must be 
with a woman, a future that he does not regard with promise or happiness.  Caligula voices his 
yearning for solitude, a feeling of peace, privacy, and independence that allows him to feel whole 
and composed, to reconnect and feel like himself once again.  Yet, such prospect is never 
sustainable.  Despite his drag performances wherein he can safely enact and satisfy his sexual 
and transgendered desires, off-stage and away from the performance, he will always be reminded 
of what he cannot be and the life he cannot live—the woman who eventually becomes his wife 
will always remind him of this defeat and impossibility.  Hence, comparable to Quentin, the 
difference between the futures Caligula must live and the future he wishes to live opens up an 
existential chasm that renders his future futureless. 
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  With this understanding of Caligula’s vanishing future, we might also note that the 
emperor seems to have a determined death drive.  In fact, most of Caligula’s lines ooze with his 
death drive and denial of longevity.  Although Caligula avows his desire for immortality and 
deification, these assertions are meant to instigate his eventual murder at the hands of the 
patricians who can no longer bear their loss of wealth and power.  When Caligula tells Helicon 
that he has always known what will kill him, we can equally read this declaration as an 
announcement that he is aware of his inevitable assassination yet will not do anything to preempt 
this end.  By the end of Act 3, we see that Caligula does not intend to stop the conspiratorial 
patricians from exacting their revenge against the emperor.  While talking with Cherea, Caligula 
reveals a tablet that contains enough evidence of treason to sentence Cherea and the other 
conspirators to death.  Informing Cherea that the tablet is the only piece of evidence against the 
conspirators, Caligula grabs a torch and melts the tablet.  After destroying the evidence and upon 
dismissing Cherea, Caligula comments prophetically:  
Les dieux eux-mêmes ne peuvent pas rendre l’innocence sans auparavant punir.  Et ton 
empereur n’a besoin que d’une flamme pour t’absoudre et t’encourager.  Continue, 
Cherea, poursuis jusqu’au bout le magnifique raisonnement que tu m’as tenu.  Ton 
empereur attend son repos.  C’est sa manière de vivre et d’être heureux.  (Caligula suivi 
de Le Malentendu 113) 
 
Even the gods cannot restore innocence without first punishing the culprit.  But your 
emperor needs only a torch flame to absolve you and give you a new lease of hope.  So 
carry on, Cherea; follow out the noble precepts we’ve been hearing, wherever they may 
take you.  Meanwhile your emperor awaits his repose.  It’s his way of living and being 
happy.  (Gilbert 54)   
 
With all the evidence he needs to prevent the conspirators from assassinating him, Caligula 
choses, instead, to vindicate them and allow them to execute their “magnifique raisonnement,” or 
“noble precepts”—their assassination plot.  More surprising, nonetheless, is that Caligula 
remarks that he awaits his “repose,” essentially telling Cherea the he is anticipating his murder, 
 134 
and this anticipation of death is “his way of living and being happy.”  Not only does Caligula 
have a resolute desire to die but also this concept of living in constant anticipation of death is 
what ironically and paradoxically gives Caligula happiness.  Unlike the numerous characters 
throughout this play who have groveled and begged for mercy in the face of their deaths, 
Caligula embraces his mortality as a reason to live and live fully, to take advantage of his 
remaining time.  Concurrently, Caligula views death as his repose and liberation, the end of 
suffering and his futureless future.  Yet, if Caligula’s life is mere suffering and all that awaits 
him is a future of sexual frustration and existential degradation, why does he not commit suicide 
instead of waiting to be murdered?  For Caligula, to commit suicide when mean to assume and 
be consumed by an unstable notion of a phantasmatic future because the act itself would indicate 
that not only can he no longer endure the present but also he has considered the future’s 
potentialities and decided that death seems the better option.  Yet, this type of phantasmatic 
future as dichotomized from the present does not exist according to Caligula’s logic, and so 
suicide becomes illogical.  Determined to live in the present, Caligula instigates his own demise.  
As his death becomes more palpably eminent, in consequence, Caligula has no other option but 
to live in the present, to perform and enact a queer utopian future in the present despite the fact 
that this future is unachievable.   
 Certainly, Caligula’s performance is a series of absurd paradoxes and conundrums that 
denies any wholly rational and tenable deconstruction; thus, my foregoing analysis is far from 
all-inclusive.  Primarily, the purpose of looking at Caligula as a queer character endeavors to 
incorporate his complex sexuality, his various performances, and his political power into a larger 
comprehension of how his character experiences time.  Caligula’s performances depict his 
artistic and sexual desires as well as they allow him to enact a future is the present, to produce a 
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momentary queer utopia.  Nevertheless, Caligula as a young, sexually expressive, and artist man 
is never reconciled with his political reality and the societal, conventional realities of Rome.  
And though he attempts to destroy the old order by negating and inverting all the norms, 
conventional logic, and morality that have created the unequal and abject world wherein he and 
many others suffer, Caligula equally realizes that the forces in Rome that uphold and embrace 
these mores will never allow his philosophies and desires to reach fruition.  Accordingly, his 
death drive becomes a manner of mitigating this reality, of erasing the burden and anguish of a 
future he wishes not to live by instigating his own death and, within the time he has left, attempts 
to create a utopia wherein he can be the “man” and be with the man he desires.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
Concluding this study, believe me, is no simply task, for there are undoubtedly additional 
examples and points of connection that I wish to make or that have gone unnoticed.  However, 
fundamentally, this study is not meant to be exhaustive but has endeavored to broaden the 
Faulknerian-Camusian scope and broach new questions to keep this comparison (and both 
authors’ individual canons) alive and thriving.  Primarily, this study has sought, as I have 
repeatedly mentioned, to connect the canons of Faulkner and Camus in a manner previously 
unaccomplished within the sparsely dense, critical discourse on these two seminal writers.  More 
specifically and as I hope to have shown, the similarities between Faulkner and Camus are not 
wholly one-sided, monocular, or strictly based on a Faulknerian influence on the Camusian 
canon.  Rather, my research and this study have pursued a comparative analysis that limns how a 
comparable Faulknerian and Camusian train of thought, ideology, and philosophy produced 
works of similar literary grandeur and metaphysical technicalities.  Moreover, time and temporal 
modalities are never easily discussed because, in order for one to discuss “time,” one must 
willingly understand that temporality can never be objectively regarded without the inevitability 
of simplifying, subjectifying, or even essentializing the aforementioned modalities and, hence, 
losing all verisimilitudes of pragmatism or vicissitudes and nuances of reality.  Furthermore, to 
discuss time according to fiction can equally render an argument less pragmatic and more 
dogmatic as the undertaken fiction is assumed to have a foundation in nonfictional reality.  And 
such a scholastic predicament is beyond this essay’s gambit.  Yet, without explicitly 
essentializing this study, in the very least we might surmise that parts of this study and the 
examples considered possess some pragmatic authenticity, particularly historical authenticity 
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and, more importantly, will reveal new topics and methods of reading both Faulkner and Camus, 
independently and jointly.   
Still, even if we cannot necessarily apply this study and its broached temporal modalities to 
pragmatism, we can certainly ascertain a myriad of authorial commonalities, which is this 
study’s salient intention.  Overall, this study has examined several key auctorial parallels, 
attempting to establish how Faulkner and Camus depict time as tragic via the motif of sterility 
(the ephemeralization of the perpetual).  As I have explained and presented throughout this 
review, the Faulknerian-Camusian ubiquity of sterility, whether metaphysically inherent or 
unwilling forced onto the individual or collective identity and perception of time, conveys the 
conception that the future does not exist or that futurity is impossible beyond an ever-present 
past and ever-diminishing present.  For Faulkner, time, or the sterility of time, can be succinctly 
condensed within an aforementioned quote from Requiem for a Nun: “The past is never dead.  It 
isn’t even past.”  This quote does suggest a future but not futurity, for the future is the past, a 
notion of time that seems retrograde, an apprehension of time totally contrary to the conventional 
understanding that the future is unpredictable and dichotomized from the past and from the 
present—i.e. what has become known as the phantasmatic future.  Thus, for Faulkner, time 
becomes sterile since it is impotent, lifeless, and unproductive, producing nothing new, 
reproducing an always already was and an inexorable demise.  Comparable to Faulkner, I feel 
that the Camusian understanding of time can equally be summed up by a signal quote from 
Caligula:  
Loneliness!  What do you know of it?  Only the loneliness of poets and weaklings. You 
prate of loneliness, but you don't realize that one is never alone.  Always we are attended 
by the same load of the future and the past.  Those we have killed are always with us.  But 
they are no great trouble.  It's those we have loved, those who loved us and whom we did 
not love; regrets, desires, bitterness and sweetness, whores and gods, the celestial gang!  
Always, always with us!  Alone!  Ah, if only in this loneliness, this ghoul-haunted 
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wilderness of mine, I could know, but for a moment, real solitude, real silence, the 
throbbing stillness of a tree!  (Gilbert 37) 
 
For Camus, the present becomes a garbage can for the past and future, but how are we to 
understand this “past” and “future”?  Because Caligula perorates this harangue, we understand 
the future to be synonymous with death since the absurdity of life offers nothing other than 
death, a past that supplants the phantasmatic future, and an ever-diminishing present steered 
toward annihilation.  In this sense, our future mortality and the mistakes and pains of the past 
always haunt our present, our time becoming nothing more than a trace of what was (the 
ephemera), and the only will-be is death.        
 And yet, whether intentional or at all desired, Faulkner and Camus present small 
glimpses of a future within their tragic tales.  In Les Justes, the hope resides in revolution, to 
fight for an obtainable future for the present living—to produce a future that does not become a 
perpetuation of the past.  In “La Femme Adultère,” the hope resides in the fact that we do not 
ultimately know what will come of Janine, and the possibility remains that she might find the 
fortitude to leave Marcel and establish her life anew and find peace with a world that has hitherto 
become foreign and menacing.  In Faulkner, vestiges of futurity seem more difficult to come by, 
yet we notice particular characters, like Dilsey, who obviously assume a metaphysics wholly 
singular and uncommon is the Faulknerian storyworlds—a metaphysics of endurance and 
resilience.  Nevertheless, even in a character as bleak as Quentin Compson, Faulkner 
subtextually alludes to some fleeting notion of hope or futurity.  When reading Faulkner’s canon, 
we see in the transition from The Sound and the Fury to “The Evening Sun” (1931) that Faulkner 
literally resurrects Quentin, who begins the short story at the age of twenty-four yet commits 
suicide at the age of eighteen or nineteen in The Sound and the Fury.  This resurrection 
narratologically gives Quentin more time, a future beyond his death as Faulkner gives him a 
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second chance at life.  And even within The Sound and the Fury, if we read Quentin as a queer 
character, we can deduce some subtextual futurity as Quentin spends his final day pondering 
whether to commit suicide.  Especially when we see Quentin’s metonymic displacement of 
desire portrayed with the continual touching of Shreve’s letter, these moments become 
metaphorical performatives wherein Quentin tries to enact his desires, thence producing a coup 
d'œil of futurity performed in the present.  And this queer utopian future via performativity is 
emphatically displayed in Caligula as the emperor endeavors to perform his homosexual and 
transgendered desires through poetry, theatre, and drag, attempting to enact a future utopia—a 
negation of what merely is—within his limited, ever-diminishing present.  Consequently, time 
and futurity are no longer notions of metaphysics, of a rigid yet incomprehensible distinction 
between past, present, and future.  Instead, they become indicative of our ability to forget these 
boundaries and dichotomizations while imagining, performing, and creating a reality of temporal 
liminality (rather than finality) wherein the nowhere of utopia becomes a here, there, and 
everywhere. 
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